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Structural reforms are increasingly at the core of the European and national agenda. But 
what are they? And what are the main factors shaping their content? This analysis of 
the structural reforms adopted between 2008 and 2015 in five European Union (EU) 
countries – the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Ireland and Italy – addresses these two 
questions.
Adopting a clear definition of structural reforms, the book proposes a new typology of 
structural reform strategies by examining developments in five policy areas and classifying 
them according to whether the focus is on social protection and/or investment.
An analysis of these five countries shows how a combination of EU constraints and 
opportunities, domestic path dependency and political dynamics has resulted in different 
structural reform trends; while some countries have experienced an overall devaluation in 
social standards (e.g. Ireland), others have pursued more mixed strategies. What is more, 
there have been different phases of structural reform patterns. After a first period of anti-
cyclical measures, austerity dominated between 2011 and 2013. In more recent years, 
many countries have followed a more pro-growth strategy.
The book provides evidence that the EU influenced structural reforms but lacked a 
coherent agenda to support growth. In such a context, different countries implemented 
different reform strategies that reflected their (partly) diverging socio-economic models.
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Introduction
The present book is the result of the project ‘Fiscal Austerity and Welfare 
Reforms’ funded by the ETUI and carried out by the European Social Ob-
servatory (OSE). The book has two aims. First, it provides an interpreta-
tive grid for the analysis of structural reforms in the Member States of 
the European Union. Both domestic and supra-national factors are con-
sidered in the framework proposed below for looking at how EU Mem-
ber States have fared in the crisis. Second, it assesses the reform trends 
in ﬁ ve EU countries in an attempt to shed light on possible common lines 
of action or, alternatively, diﬀ ering structural reform paths followed in the 
recent economic, social and ﬁ scal crisis. By structural reforms we mean 
policy measures that are expected to help improve economic growth 
prospects and the ability of economies to adjust to shocks. From the per-
spective of international organisations, structural reforms aﬀ ect a num-
ber of policy areas: labour market policies, the public sector, research 
and development (R&D), education and training, and social protection. 
As we shall show, the typical neoliberal approach to structural reforms, 
based on a desire to promote the liberalisation and deregulation of la-
bour and product markets (see Alesina et al. 2011), has recently been 
joined by a more neutral perspective. According to the latter interpreta-
tion, structural reforms are part of a broad strategy to improve a coun-
try’s economic growth potential and are not conﬁ ned to a ‘supply-side’ 
perspective (Dølvik and Martin 2014). From an analytical point of view, 
structural reforms largely overlap with the policy areas that are at 
the core of the comparative analysis of countries’ political economy. 
Many strands of the literature, from varieties of capitalism to welfare 
regime analysis, from the study of employment regimes to those focused 
on social models, address public policies that aﬀ ect economic and social 
conditions. They do so in order to better understand the way contem-
porary economic and social systems work and evolve over time. 
The book looks at ﬁ ve diﬀ erent policy areas: pensions, labour market, 
education, R&D and the public sector. This selection is consistent with 
the policies usually analysed by the EU and other international organisa-
tions.1
In what follows we look at the reforms adopted in ﬁ ve EU members – 
Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy and the Czech Republic – in the shadow 
of the Great Recession. These ﬁ ve countries are representative of diﬀ er-
ent welfare regimes, labour market regimes and varieties of capitalism. 
The Czech Republic is an example of an ‘embedded neoliberal market 
economy’ (ENLME) and belongs to the ‘ﬁ fth European welfare model’. 
Finland has a social-democratic welfare regime, with a Nordic labour 
market regime, and is a national coordinated market economy (NCME). 
Germany is representative of a conservative-corporatist welfare regime, 
a continental European labour market regime and sectoral-coordinated 
market economy (SCME). Ireland has a ‘liberal’ welfare regime (with an 
Anglo-Saxon labour market regime) and is a ‘liberal market economy’ 
(LME). Italy is representative of the Southern European welfare model 
(with a Southern-European labour market regime) and is a ‘mixed mar-
ket economy’ (MME).
In line with the interpretative grid we present in Section 1, we think of 
reforms as the result of a number of factors. The magnitude of the crisis 
is a ﬁ rst factor: it tends to accelerate reforms. New measures have been 
adopted to deal with recession and to open up more opportunities for 
growth. But the crisis has not been the only factor. It has interacted with 
other factors: domestic politics, policy legacy and the EU constraints and 
opportunities that have largely shaped national policymakers’ strategies.
Reforms are adopted by governments of diﬀ erent ideological orienta-
tions. Left-of-centre, right-of-centre and technocratic governments have 
promoted diﬀ erent sets of measures to restore growth and political con-
ﬁ dence. Policy measures inherited from the past (the so-called ‘policy 
legacy’) are a further domestic variable to consider. On the other hand, 
external and supranational factors also contribute to shaping reforms. 
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1.  The decision to focus on these ﬁ elds and not others is to some extent arbitrary. However, 
the list seems comprehensive enough to shed light on diﬀ erent areas that are assumed to be 
strategic for economic growth (see the EU through the European Semester documents) and is 
thus in line with the analytical aim of the book.
Introduction
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The selected country cases provide evidence of the EU’s inﬂ uence on re-
forms. Ireland is the country subject to the highest level of EU pressure 
(through the Memorandum of Understanding, MoU), having been se-
verely hit by the crisis. Italy has seen huge external constraints in a peri-
od of dramatic economic recession: by means of the European Semester, 
the reformed Stability and Growth Pact and more de facto conditionality 
exerted by the ECB (through the Securities Markets Programme) and 
other EU institutions. In turn, the Czech Republic has been aﬀ ected by 
EU governance in a ‘softer’ way – through the European Semester and 
other forms of economic and social coordination – because it is not a 
member of the euro zone.
The book is structured as follows. Section 1 summarises the interpreta-
tive approach we propose to use in order to analyse structural reforms 
adopted in the countries under scrutiny. Section 2 focuses on each ‘de-
terminant’ of the reforms, while providing a typology of structural re-
forms. Section 3 provides evidence of the structural reforms adopted in 
the wake of the crisis. Section 4 concludes.
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1. The interpretative grid: the crisis, domestic 
factors and the EU’s leverage
According to the most recent contributions in the literature (see Stamati 
and Baeten 2014; de la Porte and Natali 2014), we maintain that the 
structural reforms implemented in the shadow of the current economic 
and ﬁ nancial crises are inﬂ uenced by two sets of factors: (i) domestic fac-
tors, namely the ‘policy legacy’ dating back to the original welfare capi-
talist model and domestic political dynamics; (ii) supranational factors, 
mainly the EU constraints on national reform processes (see Table 1).
As we shall see, the magnitude of the crisis is a ﬁ rst element to con-
sider. The ways in which European countries have reacted to the crisis 
are shaped by domestic and supranational factors. The former consist 
of socio-economic institutions (for example, capitalist models, employ-
Table 1 Structural reforms in the wake of the crisis
Domestic factors Supra-national 
factors 
(EU leverage)
Structural 
reforms
Great Recession 
Policy legacy Variety of capi-
talism
Conditionality
 - MoU
 - SMP/OMT
Economic coordi-
nation
 - European 
Semester
 - SGP
 - Euro Plus Pact
EU regulation 
 - MFF
 - ESF 
Social standards 
devaluation
Social protec-
tionism 
Selective invest-
ment
Social standards 
improvement 
Welfare regime
Labour market 
regime
Political 
dynamics
Political orienta-
tion of govern-
ments and politi-
cal majorities
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
The interpretative grid
12 Balancing protection and investment: structural reforms in fi ve countries
ment and welfare regimes) inherited from the past (policy legacy) and 
domestic politics. As far as socio-economic institutions are concerned, 
and as stressed by Schröder (2009), in Europe (and in the EU) we have 
a number of varieties of capitalism. Coordinated market economies 
(CME) are based on high-level institutional capacities for coordination 
(for example, in terms of wage setting and skills formation), consistent 
with export-led growth and high value-added production. This is often 
combined with generous welfare systems (high coverage and high-level 
beneﬁ ts). Liberal market economies (LME), by contrast, are based on 
competitive industrial relations and formal contracting, and the opera-
tion of supply and demand in line with price signalling (Kang 2006). 
These traits are accompanied by typical ‘liberal’ welfare programmes 
(not very generous and even residual in some cases). By contrast, mixed 
market economies (MME) are characterised by more active macroeco-
nomic policies to boost domestic demand and productivity, a low-skilled 
workforce in need of public investments and subsidised jobs. Embedded 
neoliberal market economies (ENLME) are typical of the Visegrad coun-
tries. They are based on a compromise between economic competitive-
ness and some form of social and industrial protection, with the former 
dominating the latter. It is precisely these institutions that shape the 
recent economic and social trends in EU members. It is the interaction 
between these sets of institutions that provides a much more eﬀ ective 
analytical tool to trace and interpret recent reforms and to anticipate 
possible further developments (Hicks and Kenworthy 2003). Economic, 
social and labour market policies inherited from the past – and repre-
sented by the typologies mentioned above – are a key variable for inter-
preting reforms in the shadow of the crisis. 
Domestic politics is a third factor to analyse. National policymakers have 
maintained some room to manoeuvre in the design and implementation 
of their national reform agenda. Here we will limit our analysis to the 
nature (left/right orientation) of governments and parliaments in the 
countries under scrutiny and the strategies they have pursued to develop 
and implement reforms. We also consider the role of technocrats who 
have been asked to steer reforms in many EU countries. EU constraints 
are the fourth, supranational potential driver of reforms. In line with 
Stamati and Baeten (2014), we use the ‘EU inﬂ uence eﬀ ort’ as a quali-
tative working concept that takes into account the content of country 
recommendations and other EU governance instruments. In the next 
section we focus on each of the variables of our analysis.
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2.  Key factors shaping the path taken by 
structural reforms 
2.1 The Great Recession and the subsequent reform wave
As stressed by Starke et al. (2013: 32), an economic crisis is a sudden, 
often unexpected, deterioration of key macroeconomic indicators: GDP 
growth, inﬂ ation, public debt, poverty risks. Global crises are those ex-
perienced simultaneously by diﬀ erent countries on diﬀ erent continents.
The so-called Great Recession is precisely a serious and global disruptive 
event that has hit the political economy of many countries in Europe. The 
crisis began in mid-2007 with the drying up of liquidity in money mar-
kets, until it took a turn for the worse following the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in 2008. This was followed by a broad economic recession that 
hit Europe in 2009. The third step was the Greek budgetary crisis and the 
consequent tensions in the EU. In its early stages, the crisis manifested 
itself as an acute liquidity shortage among ﬁ nancial institutions. The in-
ter-bank market virtually closed and risk premiums on inter-bank loans 
soared. Banks faced a serious liquidity problem, as they experienced 
major diɤ  culties in rolling over their short-term debt. In this phase, 
concerns over the solvency of ﬁ nancial institutions increased, especially 
when a major investment bank defaulted in September 2008. Conﬁ -
dence collapsed, taking down major US and EU ﬁ nancial institutions. 
The crisis thus began to feed on itself, with banks forced to restrain 
credit, economic activity plummeting, loan books deteriorating, banks 
cutting down credit further, and so on. The EU economy entered the 
steepest downturn since the 1930s. The transmission of ﬁ nancial dis-
tress to the real economy evolved at record speed, with credit restraint 
and sagging conﬁ dence. 
The drop in ﬁ nancial wealth, across-the-board deleveraging, credit ra-
tioning and the rise in the prices of capital and debt, as well as the drop 
Key factors shaping the path taken by structural reforms
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in demand worldwide, came together to make a severe recession. Nega-
tive growth was particularly severe in the United States, but Europe was 
hard hit, too. Economic activity was aﬀ ected by the crisis, as was poten-
tial output (the level of output consistent with full utilisation of the avail-
able production factors labour, capital and technology). 
Labour markets in the EU started to weaken considerably in the second 
half of 2008, deteriorating further in the course of 2009. The EU unem-
ployment rate rose by more than 2 percentage points. The condition of 
the European economy in this crisis corresponds almost exactly to the 
textbook case for a budgetary stimulus. In the aftermath of the crisis, 
short-term ﬁ scal expansion was perceived as necessary to deal with the 
downturn (Natali 2010).
The decline in potential growth due to the crisis has put further pres-
sure on public ﬁ nances and contingent liabilities related to ﬁ nancial 
rescues and interventions in other areas add further risks. Part of the 
improvement in ﬁ scal positions in recent years was associated, among 
other things, with growth of tax-rich activity in the housing and con-
struction markets. The unwinding of these windfalls in the wake of the 
crisis, along with the ﬁ scal stimulus adopted by EU governments as part 
of the EU strategy for coordinated action, has weighed heavily on the 
ﬁ scal challenges even before the budgetary cost of demographic ageing 
kicks in.
The resulting surge in budget deﬁ cits has been unprecedented in the EU. 
As a result of automatic stabilisers and discretionary measures to save 
the banking sector and stimulate economic growth, EU countries have 
suﬀ ered increased budgetary tensions. This ﬁ scal stimulus amounted to 
up to 2 per cent of GDP, on average, in the EU for the period 2009–2010. 
Since 2010, analysts have seen a return to a much more familiar sce-
nario: the banks have gone back to business as usual, governments have 
unveiled budgetary restraint measures or ‘austerity’ programmes, while 
unemployment has risen. In 2009–2010 massive amounts of private 
banking debt were transferred to states, which felt compelled to keep 
their ﬁ nancial industries, and the economy in general, at arm’s length. 
The sub-prime crisis became a sovereign debt crisis (Degryse and Natali 
2011).
In the following years, austerity has continued to be put forward as the 
key to overcoming the crisis, despite evidence of ongoing economic diɤ  -
Key factors shaping the path taken by structural reforms
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culties in a large number of Member States. Southern Europe in particu-
lar is still trapped in a ‘double dip’ economic recession. A vicious circle 
of austerity plans, budgetary tensions and political and social dissatis-
faction has characterised recent months. In Continental and Northern 
Europe the economic cycle seems more reassuring. Summing up, some 
years after the start of the crisis, Europe is the only major world region 
in which unemployment is not decreasing. Long-term and structural un-
employment have continued to grow in most Member States. Poverty 
and social exclusion are on the rise in one-third of EU Member States. 
This is most visible in the increase in the numbers of people living in job-
less households and those suﬀ ering severe material deprivation. Young 
people have been most seriously aﬀ ected: they increasingly face consid-
erable problems in making the transition from education into employ-
ment, and many of those in work often hold unstable jobs with unfavour-
able conditions (Natali and Vanhercke 2012). 
During the crisis, the labour market performance in the EU was, on av-
erage, worse than that in other developed countries. Employment rates 
in the EU between 2008 and 2013 were lower than the OECD average, 
while unemployment rates were higher. In 2013, unemployment reached 
a peak of 27 million (about 11.5 per cent). These negative labour market 
trends were accompanied by negative GDP growth in both the EU and 
the euro area in 2011 and 2012. Income and wage inequalities have fur-
ther increased in the period. 
One of the key features of the crisis in Europe has been the increasingly 
divergent trends in the socio-economic performance of diﬀ erent coun-
tries. Since 2008, most employment and social indicators have pointed 
to growing divergence between the Southern and peripheral European 
Member States and those of Northern and Central Europe. Data on GDP 
trends prove that the crisis hit diﬀ erent EU Member States with diﬀ erent 
degrees of magnitude (Figure 1). 
The average unemployment rate reached 17 per cent in the south and pe-
riphery of the euro area, as against 7 per cent in the northern part of the 
continent. The gap has now reached its maximum level in the euro zone 
(about 10 per cent), around 10 times the diﬀ erence between the same 
regions outside the euro zone. Thus, the ﬁ nancial crisis that erupted in 
2008 has contributed to a huge divergence between the diﬀ erent Euro-
pean regions (Natali and Vanhercke 2013).
Key factors shaping the path taken by structural reforms
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Figure 1  GDP trends between 2009 and 2014
Source: Eurostat.
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2.2 Domestic factors: policy legacy and political 
dynamics
The crisis is understood here as an accelerator of reforms of economic 
and social policies at country level. But the economic shock did not de-
termine the reforms. The latter are the result of a complex interaction of 
both domestic and supranational factors. By domestic factors we mean 
both (policy) institutions inherited from the past and national political 
dynamics. 
2.2.1 Policy legacy
Exogenous challenges do not impact on immovable objects. But they do 
interact with highly complex institutions characterised by a more dy-
namic evolution over time. The term ‘institution’ is used as a synonym of 
policy arrangements, which create rules, constraints and incentives for 
political action (Myles and Pierson 2001). Welfare and production re-
gimes together represent the cornerstone of capitalist systems and their 
policy institutions tell us a lot about how a political economy works and 
reacts to crises. While in the past few years diﬀ erent clusters have been 
proposed in terms of social models (Dølvik and Martin 2014; Schweiger 
2014) and employment models (Bosch, Lehndorﬀ  and Rubery 2009), 
in the following we refer to the varieties of capitalism approach and to 
welfare and labour market regime approaches.
With regard to varieties of capitalism in Europe, we ﬁ rst refer to the sem-
inal work of Hall and Soskice (2001) and the deﬁ nition of two varieties of 
capitalism in Europe. The coordinated market economy (CME) is based 
on non-market relations, collaboration, credible commitments and de-
liberative calculation on the part of ﬁ rms. The liberal market economy 
(LME), by contrast is described in terms of arms-length, competitive 
relations, competition and formal contracting, and the operation of sup-
ply and demand in line with price signalling (Hall and Soskice 2001). In 
the LMEs, ﬂ uid labour markets ﬁ t well with easy access to stock market 
capital and the proﬁ t imperative, making LME ﬁ rms ‘radical innovators’. 
In the CMEs, by contrast, long-term employment strategies, rule-bound 
behaviour and durable ties between ﬁ rms and banks underpinning pa-
tient capital provision predispose ﬁ rms to be ‘incremental innovators’. 
CMEs then split into two sub-clusters (Thelen 2014): national-CMEs 
(NCMEs), in which coordination takes place at national level through 
comprehensive industrial relations with high levels of social partner 
density; and sector-CMEs (SCMEs), in which coordination happens at 
sectoral level and with weaker social partners. 
Mixed-market economies (MMEs) are the third model proposed by the 
literature. The state is an important actor through the creation of a large 
state-controlled business sector and control of the ﬁ nancial system. At 
the same time, interest associations of both business and labour have 
stronger organisational structures than in LMEs, but are more frag-
mented and weaker than in CMEs. Interest groups demand some form of 
compensation from the state for their acquiescence (Molina and Rhodes 
2007). Compensation usually consists of passive labour market policies 
and a transfer-oriented welfare state. More recent analysis of central and 
eastern Europe has proposed some further varieties. In line with Boh-
le and Greskovits (2012), we refer to Visegrad countries as part of the 
embedded neoliberal market economies (ENLMEs), based on relatively 
generous targeted social protection packages – a sort of side-payment 
for the opponents of neoliberal reforms – together with measures and 
nstitutions to attract multinationals.2
Whereas the varieties of capitalism approach tries to understand how 
ﬁ rms deal with institutional environments that vary between the pro-
duction systems of diﬀ erent countries, Esping-Andersen analyses how 
welfare is distributed in terms of individuals’ rights and duties vis-à-vis 
the state. Similarly, with regard to labour market policies, Bonoli (2013) 
has distinguished between four clusters of countries in Western Europe. 
Anglo-Saxon countries, namely the UK, have taken a liberal approach: 
low levels of labour protection and unemployment beneﬁ ts. The Unit-
ed Kingdom has reinforced the role of the market in addressing socio-
economic challenges, with low public spending on both passive and ac-
tive policies. Nordic countries – Denmark, Finland and Sweden – have 
put more emphasis on active policies. These have been combined with 
low levels of labour protection and generous unemployment beneﬁ ts. 
In Continental European countries, labour market protection has been 
Key factors shaping the path taken by structural reforms
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2.  Eastern Europe is characterised by, ﬁ rst, the Baltic countries, which are neoliberal market 
economies (NLMEs): with small ﬁ scal and welfare states, which perform well in terms of 
macroeconomic stability. Slovenia is a neo-corporatist market economy (N-CME) with highly 
developed industrial relations institutions and a generous welfare state. The peripheral mar-
ket economies (PMEs) are represented by Bulgaria and Romania: they are weak economies 
based on cheap labour, weak infrastructure and ﬁ rms that enjoy some independent sources of 
ﬁ nance (Drahokoupil and Myant 2012).
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traditionally high and combined with high levels of spending on passive 
measures. However, there have been few active labour market policies. 
These traits are even more evident in Southern Countries, where labour 
market protection has been high, active labour market policies of limited 
importance and passive labour market policies rudimentary. Davidsson 
(2011) has conﬁ rmed the existence of such clusters for Western coun-
tries, and has added a ﬁ fth: Emerging Eastern European Economies. The 
latter are characterised by segmented and deregulated labour markets 
and weak passive protection and active policies (see Agostini and Natali 
forthcoming).
All these typologies arrive at very similar country groupings, because 
‘virtually all liberal market economies are accompanied by “liberal” 
welfare states’ (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 50) and all coordinated market 
economies are accompanied by either a social democratic or a conserva-
tive welfare arrangement. Southern and Eastern European countries be-
long to further coherent clusters of economic, social and labour market 
policies.
2.2.2 Domestic political dynamics
The question ‘does politics matter?’ has for decades been at the centre 
of the academic debate about the role of domestic political dynamics in 
shaping policy change and continuity. In the past, authors have stressed 
how much the partisan composition of parliamentary majorities and 
governments matters in addressing the critical economic conditions re-
lated, for instance, to the Great Depression (Castles 2010). The same 
has been found for the European and North American reply to the oil 
shocks at the end of the twentieth century. Others have shown that party 
politics do not matter so much especially in the shadow of critical eco-
nomic junctures. For Starke et al. (2013), the basic ﬁ nding is that social 
democratic parties – often aided by trade unions (Korpi 1983) – have 
had a positive eﬀ ect on the expansion of welfare states across the OECD. 
In addition, Christian democratic parties have had a similar eﬀ ect on 
expansion, albeit with particular emphasis on speciﬁ c types of policies 
(Starke et al. 2013). 
Between the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-ﬁ rst 
centuries, however, partisan politics has been seen as less signiﬁ cant. 
Social democratic parties are often no longer seen as the guarantors of 
Key factors shaping the path taken by structural reforms
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welfare state expansion, either because of a general ideological shift, 
constraints stemming from economic globalisation or policy legacy (Hu-
ber and Stephens 2001; Kittel and Obinger 2002). 
Lipsmeyer (2011) ﬁ nds a diminishing partisan impact on social expend-
iture during downturns, because economic shocks aﬀ ect a large share 
of the population, including both left- and right-wing voters. Hence, 
left- and right-wing parties tone down their policies in the aftermath of 
shocks. Vis et al. also ﬁ nd that immediate crisis reactions in 2008/09 
were enacted ‘irrespective of the political leaning of the ruling parties’ 
(2011: 349). 
A further element to consider is the suspension of ideological diﬀ erenc-
es. In general, technocratic governance, the centralisation of decision-
making and consensus at the top should be the rule during periods of 
economic shock. This ‘crisis centralisation’ thesis would predict deci-
sion-making in small groups involving the executive and a loss of power 
of typical veto players. This is largely consistent with the emergence of 
caretaker governments, which have led reform eﬀ orts in some EU coun-
tries.
Populism has returned to European politics, with an impact on the re-
form agenda. Terms such as ‘welfare chauvinism’ can be used to describe 
the attitude of right-wing and populist movements towards social policy 
and industrial protectionism (Mewes and Mau 2013). Evidence collected 
so far shows that these populist movements tend to defend social spend-
ing against neoliberal strategies, especially for native citizens, while ex-
cluding immigrants.
2.3 The supra-national factors: EU leverage
Since the outbreak of the ﬁ nancial and economic crisis, several initia-
tives aimed at better synchronising and coordinating Member States’ 
ﬁ scal and macroeconomic policies and at strengthening the EU’s abil-
ity to monitor and steer domestic policies have been undertaken (cf. De 
La Parra 2013; Degryse 2012; Martin 2015; Schweiger 2014; Zeitlin and 
Vanhercke 2014). Existing instruments and coordination procedures in 
these policy domains have been made more stringent and new initia-
tives have been developed, in some cases through international agree-
ments outside the EU treaties. In order to identify the possible channels 
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through which any kind of ‘EU inﬂ uence’ on Member States’ structural 
reforms could develop (as well as the strength of such ‘EU pressures’), 
we will brieﬂ y illustrate a number of key procedures and tools developed 
or reinforced by the EU over the crisis years: (i) developments related 
to ﬁ scal, macroeconomic and sectoral policies coordinated through the 
European Semester; (ii) arrangements to provide ﬁ nancial assistance to 
Member States experiencing ﬁ nancial diɤ  culties; and (iii) ‘conditional-
ity’ attached to the Structural and Investment Funds 2014–2020.
2.3.1 The European Semester: ‘building blocks’ and governance 
procedures
Formally codiﬁ ed in the Six Pack,3 the European Semester is an annual 
policy cycle coordinating procedures related to three processes: the Eu-
rope 2020 Strategy and the Integrated Guidelines for growth and jobs 
(thematic coordination aimed at fostering structural reforms); the re-
formed Stability and Growth Pact (ﬁ scal policy); and the Macroeconom-
ic Imbalances procedure (macroeconomic policy). 
Launched in 2010, the Europe 2020 Strategy is aimed at fostering struc-
tural reforms in a number of policy domains in order to promote ‘smart’, 
‘sustainable’ and ‘inclusive’ growth. Europe 2020 relies on a set of 10 ‘In-
tegrated Guidelines for growth and jobs’ (Council of the European Un-
ion 2010) which concern – besides budgetary and macroeconomic issues 
(IGs 1–3) – policy areas such as research, development and innovation, 
climate change and energy sustainability, the business environment, em-
ployment, education and training, and social inclusion. Five quantitative 
EU headline targets related to these policy areas – to be translated into 
national targets and achieved by 2020 – have been agreed on and seven 
‘ﬂ agship initiatives’ aimed at facilitating progress towards the targets 
have been set up (cf. Vanhercke 2013). As for reporting and monitor-
ing procedures, both EU guidance/monitoring and Member States’ re-
porting are embedded in the procedures of the European Semester (see 
below). Further cooperation in some of the policy domains of the Eu-
rope 2020 Strategy has been introduced through the Euro Plus Pact, an 
agreement signed in March 2011 by 23 Member States4 that committed 
3.  The ‘Six Pack’ consists of ﬁ ve Regulations and one Directive adopted in 2011. 
4. The euro area countries plus Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania.
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themselves to take action in priority policy areas essential for fostering 
competitiveness and convergence, including competitiveness, employ-
ment, sustainability of public ﬁ nance, ﬁ nancial stability and cooperation 
on tax policy (European Council 2011: Annex 1). Every year each Mem-
ber State identiﬁ es a series of concrete initiatives to be completed within 
12 months in the domains covered by the Pact and the implementation 
of those initiatives is monitored through the European Semester.
With regard to ﬁ scal surveillance and coordination, provisions intro-
duced through the ‘Six Pack’ and the ‘Two-Pack’ legislation5 have rein-
forced the Stability and Growth Pact, strengthening both its preventive 
and corrective arms. Under the former, every year the Member States 
must submit their budget plans for the next three years (the ‘Stabil-
ity Programmes’ for euro zone countries and the ‘Convergence Pro-
grammes’ for the countries outside the euro zone), which are assessed 
by the Commission (ex-ante assessment). Negative assessment may lead 
to a series of consequences, including: (i) country-speciﬁ c recommen-
dations issued by the Council or (ii) Commission ‘warnings’ followed 
by Council recommendations, possibly leading to ﬁ nancial sanctions 
(for euro-area Member States). As for the ‘corrective arm’ of the SGP, 
the Excessive deﬁ cit procedure (EDP) has been reinforced, especial-
ly with regard to euro-area Member States, the latter being subject to 
closer monitoring and regular reporting requirements to the European 
Commission when subject to EDP. Indeed, euro zone countries under 
EDP must regularly submit reports allowing the Commission to assess 
whether there is a risk that the Member State will be unable to correct 
the excessive deﬁ cit by the deadline set by the Council, a circumstance 
that may entail a new recommendation containing further or diﬀ erent 
actions. Furthermore, those countries are requested to draft ‘Economic 
Partnership Programmes’ (EPPs), providing ‘a roadmap for structural 
reforms considered as instrumental to an eﬀ ective and lasting correction 
of the excessive deﬁ cit’ (European Commission, n.d.). Finally, ﬁ nancial 
sanctions are possible for euro-area Member States that fail to address 
excessive deﬁ cits. Further provisions aimed at strengthening ﬁ scal dis-
cipline in the Member States and EU-level surveillance have been in-
troduced through the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance 
in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG) and the Two Pack. The 
core of the TSCG – an intergovernmental agreement signed in March 
5. The ‘Two Pack’ includes two Regulations which entered into force in May 2013.
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2012 by 25 MS (all the Member States except the Czech Republic and 
the United Kingdom) – is the so-called ‘Fiscal compact’, which commits 
the contracting parties to embed into national legislation (preferably at 
the constitutional level) the ‘balanced budget rule’. As for the Two Pack, 
besides the provisions directly related to the SGP illustrated above, it has 
introduced a common budgetary timeline for the members of the euro 
zone, whose draft budgetary plans are now subject to a preliminary as-
sessment by the European Commission.
In the domain of macroeconomic policy, new procedures aimed at iden-
tifying at an early stage, monitoring and correcting ‘macroeconomic im-
balances’ have been introduced by the Six Pack. A new surveillance and 
enforcement mechanism – the Macroeconomic imbalances procedure 
(MIP) – has been introduced, under the responsibility of the ECOFIN 
Council. The MIP consists of three steps (Vanhercke 2013: 98). First, 
an ‘early warning system’ based on a set of 11 macroeconomic indica-
tors – with speciﬁ c ‘alert thresholds’ – concerning both external and 
competitiveness imbalances. The scoreboard is published in the ‘Alert 
Mechanism Report’ (AMR) – drafted by the European Commission – 
and allows the Commission to identify countries whose situation needs 
an ‘in-depth review’. Second, the Commission and the Council can adopt 
preventive actions consisting of recommendations to the Member States 
enshrined in the set of country-speciﬁ c recommendations issued in the 
context of the European Semester. Finally, if severe macroeconomic im-
balances are detected, an ‘Excessive imbalance procedure’ (EIP) can be 
opened (corrective actions). In this case, the Member State concerned 
must submit a corrective action plan (with a precise roadmap and dead-
lines for implementing corrective actions) and regular progress reports. 
Sanctions may be imposed if the Member State does not comply with the 
recommended corrective actions or if it fails twice to submit a suɤ  cient 
corrective action plan.
As for the governance procedures, the European Semester annual policy 
cycle starts in November, when the European Commission publishes 
the Annual Growth Survey and the Alert Mechanism report. While the 
latter document speciﬁ cally relates to the macroeconomic imbalances 
procedure, in the AGS the European Commission identiﬁ es the main 
economic challenges facing the EU and recommends priority measures 
to address them in the coming year. These priorities concern both eco-
nomic and ﬁ scal policies, as well as the other policy areas covered by 
Europe 2020. Priorities and guidelines set out in the AGS should feed 
into Member States’ Stability or Convergence Programmes (SCP) and 
National Reform Programmes, which deal, respectively, with budgetary 
policies and with reforms in the areas of the Europe 2020 Strategy. In 
order to ensure complementarities between ﬁ scal and other structural 
policies, SCPs and NRPs must be submitted simultaneously in April. On 
the basis of the NRPs and of the SCP – as well as relying on other infor-
mation gathered by its country-desks and services – in May the Europe-
an Commission issues draft country-speciﬁ c recommendations to be ap-
proved by the Council and then endorsed by the European Council.6 The 
CSRs are not addressed to countries under the adjustment programmes, 
which receive only the generic recommendation to implement actions 
agreed in their Memoranda of Understanding (see below).
2.3.2 Financial assistance
Since the beginning of the crisis, ﬁ nancial assistance has been provided 
to Member States experiencing ﬁ nancial diɤ  culties that might threaten 
the ﬁ nancial stability of the EU and of the euro zone. Two intergovern-
mental support mechanisms were created between May and June 2010: 
the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) and the Eu-
ropean Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the latter concerning euro-
area Member States only. The EFSF, initially conceived as a temporary 
arrangement, has been replaced by a permanent mechanism – the Eu-
ropean Stability Mechanism (ESM) – operational since October 2012. 
The activation of ﬁ nancial assistance mechanisms7 is subject to strong 
elements of conditionality: once a Member State requests ﬁ nancial as-
sistance, negotiations with the so-called ‘Troika’ (the European Commis-
sion, the IMF and the European Central Bank) start, eventually leading 
to the elaboration of an ‘Economic Adjustment Programme’. This docu-
ment (also known as a ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ or MoU) details 
the structural measures to be implemented by the borrowing country 
in order to receive further tranches of the loan.8 Progress towards im-
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6.  For a more in-depth discussion on the CSRs, cf. Clauwaert 2014, Bekker 2015, Zeitlin and 
Vanhercke 2014. 
7. For Besides balance of payments assistance for Latvia, Hungary and Romania, ﬁ nancial as-
sistance has so far been granted to four euro zone countries: Greece (May 2010), Ireland (No-
vember 2010), Portugal (April 2011) and Cyprus (March 2013).
8. Measures contained in the MoU are extremely prescriptive and typically include (Greer 2013) 
reforms of ﬁ scal policy (with a view to reducing public expenditure), reforms of state-owned 
enterprises (generally, their privatisation), reforms of the ﬁ nancial sector (cont. on next page)
plementation of the programmes is assessed by the Troika on a quar-
terly basis and, at each stage, the results of the assessment are reported 
in two documents drafted, respectively, by the European Commission 
and the IMF. Countries completing their adjustment programmes (so 
far, Ireland and Portugal) continue to be subject to an enhanced post-
programme surveillance by the EC and the ECB until they refund at least 
75 per cent of the ﬁ nancial assistance received.
Alongside the ﬁ nancial assistance mechanisms described above, in 2010 
the ECB launched the Securities Market Programme (SMP), whereby it 
would purchase, on the secondary markets, government bonds of euro-
area Member States. While this programme was formally unconditional, 
in some cases ECB interventions have been linked to a sort of ‘informal 
conditionality’, namely to stringent and pervasive requests to the Mem-
ber States concerned to introduce speciﬁ c measures aiming at enhanc-
ing growth, competition and accelerating liberalisations (Agostini et al. 
2015).9 In 2012, the SMP was replaced by Outright Monetary Transac-
tions (OMT), a programme that can be accessed only by euro zone Mem-
ber States that have formally entered the European Stability Mechanism, 
thus entailing ‘explicit’ conditionality (ibid.).
2.3.3 Structural funds
EU cohesion policy has traditionally been linked to the promotion of 
economic, social and territorial cohesion in Europe, and the Structural 
Funds have provided the Member States – especially the most disadvan-
taged regions – with additional resources for their development. One 
feature of the recent reform of the Funds appears particularly impor-
tant for the present research: the reinforcement of the conditionality at-
tached to their use. Indeed, in the context of the European Structural 
and Investment Funds 2014–2020, ‘conditionality’ can take on two con-
notations likely to have contrasting eﬀ ects in relation to the capacity of 
EU Funds to exert a direct and positive inﬂ uence on Member States’ so-
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  (cont. from previous note) and market-promoting sectoral reforms (including labour market, 
wage-setting systems, pensions and health care, services liberalisation). Cf. Merisio (2014) for 
a detailed description of the various steps leading to the deﬁ nition of MoU.
9. The most striking example is Italy, whose government received, in summer 2013, a letter 
jointly signed by the President of the ECB and his designated successor. The letter set out a de-
tailed policy agenda, as well as the legal instruments through which it should be implemented 
(Sacchi 2013). On the role of the ECB during the crisis, see Barbier (2012).
cial policies. On one hand, the Funds are subject to ‘ex-ante condition-
ality’, meaning that funding is conditional on the fulﬁ lment of speciﬁ c 
requirements linked to each investment priority (including, for instance, 
the requirement to deﬁ ne national strategic frameworks for poverty re-
duction or for reinforcing administrative eɤ  ciency). On the other hand, 
they are subject to ‘macroeconomic conditionality’: the contribution of 
the Structural Funds may be suspended when a Member State reaches a 
signiﬁ cant level of non-compliance under the various EU economic gov-
ernance procedures such as the EDP or the MIP.
To sum up, looking at the policy developments described above, what 
has been emerging is an increasingly complex system of governance, 
where EU ‘pressure’ on Member States’ policies may assume diﬀ erent 
forms and intensity, and may derive from the interplay between a vari-
ety of instruments and procedures. Indeed, on one hand, the coordina-
tion processes developed/reinforced over the years in the various policy 
domains do not have the same ‘strength’; on the other hand, not every 
country is equally aﬀ ected by the new economic governance arrange-
ments and the stringency of the enforcement mechanisms (hence, the 
degree of ‘EU intrusiveness’) diﬀ ers, largely – but not exclusively – de-
pending on whether the country is a euro zone member or not.10 
There are many references in the literature to an altered and reinforced 
Europeanisation of socio-economic policies, where austerity measures 
are increasingly put at the top of the agenda by EU policymakers and 
consequently shape national reforms (de la Porte and Heins 2015). Oth-
ers have painted a more complex picture, in which the reinforcement of 
EU economic and social governance has evolved over time. While the 
ﬁ rst post-crisis phase was characterised by austerity measures pushed 
through the European Semester and the other tools mentioned above, 
since 2013–2014 a more complex programme of structural reforms and 
more relaxed ﬁ scal consolidation has been proposed by the EU (see Zeit-
lin and Vanhercke 2014; Schmidt 2015).
10. In their analysis of health-care reforms implemented during the crisis, Stamati and Baeten 
(2014: 15–16) have tried to capture this variation of EU pressure on domestic reforms 
by setting up an index of ‘EU leverage’. The highest value of EU inﬂ uence is attributed to 
countries that have signed a Memorandum of Understanding, while the other countries are 
classiﬁ ed under the remaining groups (moderate or weak leverage) taking into account fac-
tors such as the number and content of the Country-speciﬁ c Recommendations they have 
received, whether they are euro zone countries and whether they have been subject to an 
Excessive Deﬁ cit Procedure or have signed an Economic Partnership Agreement.
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2.4 Assessing structural reforms
Structural reforms are in fact a vague concept. These measures are 
expected to help improve economic growth prospects and the ability 
of economies to adjust to shocks. Product and labour market reforms 
should promote more eɤ  cient use of scarce resources (Canton et al. 
2014). In the words of Rubio (2014: 2), structural reforms promote both 
countries’ competitiveness and their adjustment capacity. While there is 
general agreement on what structural reforms are expected to contribute 
to, the precise deﬁ nition of their substance is much more diverse. For 
some, in line with the liberal paradigm, these reforms are interpreted in 
terms of (de-)regulation of product markets – through the limitation of 
entry barriers, price control, public ownership and so on, and of labour 
markets, decentralisation of collective bargaining, stricter deﬁ nition of 
wage setting targets and reform of unemployment protection. For oth-
ers, and in line with a less normative interpretation, the term refers to a 
much longer list of policy areas: from competition and the regulation of 
labour and product markets, to areas such as education, pensions and 
social protection systems, and even sectors concerning the core activi-
ties of the state (tax collection, public administration, the judicial sys-
tem). The IMF (2015), for instance, concentrates on labour and product 
market policies, education, health, innovation, housing policies, the ef-
ﬁ ciency of public sectors and tax systems. The European Commission 
(2014a) has provided a detailed set of policies under the broad deﬁ nition 
of structural reforms in the European Semester: market competition and 
regulation, tax reform, unemployment beneﬁ t reform, labour market re-
forms (including active labour market policies), human capital invest-
ment and R&D investments.
From an analytical point of view it is possible, through the study of dif-
ferent policy areas and their evolution, to grasp the complex interplay of 
policy decisions and the importance of institutional complementarities. 
Eichorst et al. (2010) point out that institutions do not work in isolation. 
On the contrary they form complex institutional arrangements. System 
coordination and institutional complementarities are key elements of 
capitalist models, and ‘when present in the “right” form, mutually rein-
force each other’ (Hassel 2014: 11). It is precisely these interactions that 
determine the economic and social performance of a country or group of 
countries. The focus on diﬀ erent policy areas ﬁ rst helps with the identi-
ﬁ cation of national political economies, their logic and functioning. Sec-
ond, it allows us to trace common and coherent trends where they exist, 
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or, on the other hand, to avoid over-estimating policy coherence. Thus, 
diﬀ erent arrangements may lead to equivalent performances. More than 
one model for economic growth and prosperity, indeed many models 
may coexist (Hall and Soskice 2001).
But what is the reform trend in the EU countries? To address this ques-
tion we need to clarify what structural reforms look like and how they 
can be assessed. The more recent literature has clariﬁ ed that not all 
reforms involve retrenchment and a reduction of social and economic 
rights. Reform packages can be varied and consist of diﬀ erent measures 
with diﬀ erent outcomes. Echoing Polanyi (see Bohle and Greskovits 
2012) we focus on two diﬀ erent policy approaches reﬂ ecting two organ-
ising principles of contemporary welfare capitalism: economic liberal-
ism and social and industrial protection. These two approaches inspire 
two policy agendas that are both included in structural reforms: one fo-
cused on investment in productive capacities (to increase the country’s 
competitiveness); the other on protection (see Table 2).11
Table 2 shows four ideal-types of structural reform. In line with the liter-
ature on welfare and economic reforms – Hausermann (2012) and Thel-
en (2014), as well as Starke et al. (2013) – we ﬁ rst identify the two polar 
opposites. We refer to social standards devaluation, in cases of a set of 
measures aimed at cutting spending and consolidating public ﬁ nances 
and with an overall decline in social rights (for example, deregulation, 
Table 2 Diff erent types of structural reform
Investments
Decrease Increase
Protection
Decrease Social standards 
devaluation
(Selective) investment 
strategy
Increase (Socio-economic) 
protectionism
Social standards 
improvement
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
11.  The distributional consequences of structural reforms constitute another analytical dimen-
sion of considerable interest. In the following sections we do not refer to this, but other 
contributions in the literature have focused on the issue (see Almendinger and von den 
Drieschs 2014).
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the decentralisation of collective bargaining and so on). Social standard 
devaluation is based on the idea that the deliberate deﬂ ation of domes-
tic wages and prices through cuts to public spending and deregulation 
is designed to reduce a state’s debts and deﬁ cits, increase its economic 
competitiveness and restore what is vaguely referred to as ‘business con-
ﬁ dence’ (Blyth 2013). This is the case of countries more aﬀ ected by the 
crisis, in which a combination of economic recession, ﬁ scal stress, specu-
lative attacks in the ﬁ nancial markets and social tensions have led to a 
systematic decrease in social rights and protection, while cutbacks have 
hit investments as well. This reminds us of the ‘low road’ to economic 
competitiveness based on cost-cutting, conﬂ ictual labour relations and a 
narrow set of social programmes (Millberg and Houston 2005).
At the opposite end of the spectrum we see social standards improve-
ments: this consists of increased spending in order to improve a coun-
try’s growth potential. This is also the type of policy pursued in the ﬁ rst 
years after the emergence of the Great Recession, when policymakers 
aimed to bail out the European economy, to implement ‘Keynesian’ poli-
cies and, some said, to take the opportunity aﬀ orded by the crisis for a 
‘paradigm shift’ (Degryse and Natali 2011). Beyond an increase in social 
protection and consumption, the social standards improvement scenar-
io consists of increased investments in the country’s productive capacity 
through skills formation, R&D, education and innovation policies and so 
on. This is the ‘high road’ to economic competitiveness, with innovation 
based on cooperative labour relations and generally stronger and more 
centralised labour unions, high quality production and higher wages and 
costly welfare programmes (Millberg and Houston 2005).
As stressed in Table 2, we add two intermediate reform paths. On one 
hand, there is the (selective) investment path, based on cost-contain-
ment in the ﬁ eld of ‘non-productive’ spending and an expansion – in 
parallel – of speciﬁ c growth-oriented policies (Kolev and Matthes 2013). 
The aim is to set up eﬀ ective consolidation programmes that foster 
long-term growth and minimise the potentially negative short-term ef-
fects on economic activity. Comprehensive expenditure reviews are used 
to single out spending items that can be reduced without signiﬁ cantly 
endangering the eﬀ ectiveness of government spending. Countries with 
suɤ  cient ﬁ scal space should aim at a gradual ﬁ scal adjustment, while 
improving long-term growth prospects by moderately increasing public 
investment and education expenditures. Social investment can be part of 
this strategy of investments in human capital and knowledge to support 
labour market participation, or to confront new social risks (Morel et al. 
2012). A more selective investment strategy is the so-called ‘Schumpe-
terian Workfare State’ based on ‘the promotion of product, process, or-
ganisational, and market innovation; the enhancement of the structural 
competitiveness of open economies mainly through supply-side inter-
vention; and the subordination of social policy to the demands of labour 
market ﬂ exibility and structural competitiveness’ (Jessop 1993: 9).
On the other side, we refer to socio-economic protectionism, where re-
forms tend towards strengthening social protection, while investment 
is sacriﬁ ced. Here the priority is to address the resulting social and eco-
nomic diɤ  culties. This does not involve an overall increase of public 
spending, but rather the deﬁ nition of a strong network of protection and 
the promotion of social rights through the rationalisation of some public 
spending. A high level of public spending contributes to internal demand 
and consumption. This reform path aims at improving growth through 
domestic demand and at safeguarding social peace, for instance, through 
the segmentation if not dualisation of welfare recipients and the labour 
force (Hausermann 2012). This is also the case of populist forces that 
have a reform agenda consistent with the protection of domestic ﬁ rms 
and the increase of social protection spending (for example, pensions) at 
least for native citizens.
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3. Country cases
3.1 Czech Republic
3.1.1 Setting the scene: key traits of the country’s political 
economy
The Czech economic and ﬁ nancial outlook is showing signs of recovery 
after the years of ﬂ uctuating economic trends noted since the outbreak 
of the crisis. Following a period of rapid economic expansion, the coun-
try experienced a double-dip recession from 2009 to 2014. The GDP 
growth rate started to decline in late 2008 and reached its lowest level 
in 2009 (–4.8 per cent), mainly triggered by exports and ﬁ nancial chan-
nels. In 2010 and 2011, the national currency depreciation relative to the 
euro – limiting to a certain extent the drop in exports – as well as an in-
creased public deﬁ cit (–5.5 per cent in 2009) led to slight GDP improve-
ments. However, recession was experienced again in the next two years, 
followed in 2014 by an increase in the GDP growth rate of 2 per cent. De-
spite a regular increase of the gross government debt as a percentage of 
GDP in the aftermath of the crisis (from 28.7 per cent of GDP in 2008 to 
45 per cent in 2013), its level remains well below the limit of 60 per cent 
and the EU average, and, for the ﬁ rst time since 2007, it experienced a 
reduction in 2014 (42.6 per cent of GDP) (Table 3).
With regard to labour market trends, the crisis has had a negative 
impact on both employment and unemployment rates. However, the 
Czech employment rate returned to growth in 2010, and in 2014 reached 
a high point of 73.5 per cent. Also, the national unemployment rate in 
2014 fell to 6.1 per cent, while the region of Prague alone scored the low-
est unemployment rate among all the European regions (2.5 per cent). 
However, this positive result inﬂ uences the national performance, which 
is also characterised by a substantial gap between regions (Eurostat, 
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2015).12 As for poverty levels, in 2013 the Czech Republic was in a better 
position than the average of its peer economies from central and eastern 
Europe and the EU28. The country registered lower rates of people at 
risk of poverty or social exclusion (14.6 per cent against 24.5 per cent in 
the EU28). Moreover, the poverty statistics did not turn out to be seri-
ously aﬀ ected by the economic downturn, showing stable results during 
the whole post-crisis period.
As outlined by Agostini and Natali (forthcoming), the Czech Republic, 
along with its central and eastern European peers, is characterised by 
a highly internationally integrated neoliberal market economy, devel-
oped along with generous but targeted social protection measures and 
deregulated labour markets. With regard to the ‘varieties of capitalism’ 
approach, these are features of the cluster ‘embedded neoliberal market 
economy’, in which the Czech Republic is included (Table 4). 
Nevertheless, even if the Czech Republic ultimately developed a similar 
economic and social model to its neighbours, the path followed from the 
Velvet Revolution to the economic downturn experienced in the country 
Table 3 Czech Republic: selected socio-economic indicators, 2007–2014
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Real GDP growth 5.5 2.7 -4.8 2.3 2.0 -0.8 -0.7 2.0
General government 
gross debt (EDP 
concept)
27.9 28.7 34.1 38.2 39.9 44.6 45.0 42.6
General government 
defi cit/surplus (% of 
GDP)
-0.7 -2.1 -5.5 -4.4 -2.7 -3.9 -1.2 -2.0
Employment rate (% 
20-64)
72.0 72.4 70.9 70.4 70.9 71.5 72.5 73.5 
Unemployment rate (%) 5.3 4.4 6.7 7.3 6.7 7.0 7.0 6.1
People at risk of 
poverty or social exclu-
sion (% of the total 
population)
15.8 15.3 14.0 14.4 15.3 15.4 14.6 n.a.
Source: Agostini and Natali (forthcoming: Appendix).
12.  The second lowest rate registered among regions is 5.1 per cent and the highest 8.7 per cent.
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in 1996–1997 consistently diﬀ ered from the process of transition under-
taken in Hungary and Poland. This factor ultimately led to the develop-
ment of some peculiarities within the model that still exist.
The national path to capitalism pursued in the Czech Republic until the 
economic recession of 1996–1997 was the product of two main factors: 
a political élite driving the transition from a state-planned to a market-
oriented economy devoted to defending the national sovereignty of the 
newly born Republic – the Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus in the ﬁ rst place 
– as well as a diﬀ erent legacy of economic reforms implemented before 
the collapse of the regime – or rather, the lack of such reforms. Indeed, 
unlike Hungary and Poland, the Czech Republic started its transition 
phase from a solid ﬁ nancial position, a low level of government indebt-
edness and little or no reliance on foreign capital. Additionally, Prime 
Minister Klaus ﬁ rmly pursued his attempt to create his own national way 
to capitalism, of which the ‘voucher privatisation’ scheme provides one 
of the most telling examples (Bohle and Greskovits 2012).
After 1997, it did not take long for the Czech Republic to become highly 
competitive in attracting FDI in comparison with its neighbours. Nowa-
days, therefore, the country can be fully included in the economic and so-
cial model of the whole central and eastern European region. As already 
mentioned, this model is strongly inﬂ uenced by the marked presence 
of transnational companies within national borders, as well as strong 
reliance on the inﬂ ow of FDI and on exports of complex manufactured 
goods, of which the automotive sector is the leading industry (Myant 
and Drahokoupil 2012). The sound ﬁ nancial and macroeconomic condi-
Table 4 The Czech social model
Country Labour market regime Welfare regimes Variety of capitalism
Czech Republic Central Eastern Europe 
(CEE)/Emergent
CEE/Post-communist Embedded neoliberal 
market economies 
(ENLME)
Peculiarities:
– key role of FDI;
– national sovereignty as 
a keystone of the coun-
try’s political economy;
- egalitarian welfare
Source: Agostini and Natali (forthcoming).
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tions of the Czech economy are still an important feature of its capitalist 
model. This keeps the country on safer ground than its peer economies, 
which bear the weight of larger public debts.
The sought-after neoliberal market economy has been combined in the 
Czech Republic with a relatively generous (but targeted) welfare state, 
built on the previous socialist experience. This has resulted in greater 
levels of egalitarianism of pensions and greater concern for the preven-
tion of unemployment, rather than compensation for job loss (Bohle and 
Greskovits 2012). The reasons behind the creation of the so-called ‘pen-
sioners’ welfare state’ varied from ideological motives to more practi-
cal political reasons. In this regard, both the inﬂ uence of the socialist 
ideology rewarding work and productivity and the importance of gen-
erating consent through social provision have played an important role 
(Sirovátka 2011).
Despite the country’s high level of political, economic and ﬁ nancial in-
ternational integration, the government is the most important actor in 
shaping taxation, employment and welfare policies. This tendency be-
came less clear during the process of accession to the EU, but it was con-
ﬁ rmed in the aftermath of the crisis, partly because of the Eurosceptic 
position taken by the centre-right government coalitions. At the national 
level, the Czech political scene has suﬀ ered from a certain degree of in-
stability, which saw the centre-right governments headed by Topolánek 
and Neþar fail to complete their terms of oɤ  ce and alternate with non-
partisan caretaker governments (Table 5). 
The peak of the instability was the corruption and spying scandal that 
led Neþar to resign in July 2013. Consequently, as a result of the last 
parliamentary elections, a clear political shift occurred. This was marked 
by the victory of the Czech Social Democratic Party (ýSSD), led by Prime 
Minister Sobotka and, more surprisingly, the Action of Dissatisﬁ ed Citi-
zens (ANO 2011). The latter became the second most-supported party in 
the country at its ﬁ rst political elections. The economic programme of 
the current government was built on the desire to move away from the 
social standard devaluation implemented by the previous centre-right 
governments during the period 2007–2013. It includes more social ex-
penditure in order to increase the minimum wage and pensions, intro-
duce new pro-family relief, as well as public investments in infrastruc-
ture and construction. In order to make such an expensive programme 
more aﬀ ordable, spending on administration is expected to be cut, while 
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corporate taxation and the budget deﬁ cit are expected to grow, although 
the latter will remain under the 3 per cent limit (Kaáan 2014).
The clear political shift has been mirrored also at European level, where 
the cohabitation of the Prime Minister Sobotka with the ﬁ rst directly-
elected President Zeman – who calls himself a European federalist 
– should make the Czech Republic a more predictable member of the 
EU. Indeed, in the wake of the crisis and after the launch of the new EU 
system of economic governance, the Czech Republic has resisted deeper 
integration by refusing to adopt the Fiscal Compact on ﬁ nancial stability 
and slowing the path towards the adoption of the single currency (Kaáan 
2012). 
Table 5 Governments of the Czech Republic from 2006 to 2015
Years Prime Minister Position in the 
political spec-
trum
Coalition forces Reform 
programme
September 2006–
May 2009
Mirek Topolánek 
(ODS)
Centre-right Civic Democratic 
Party (ODS);
Christian and 
Democratic 
Union–Czechoslo-
vak People’s Party 
(KDU-CSL);
Green Party
Social standard 
devaluation
May 2009–
June 2010
Jan Fischer Caretaker govern-
ment
(1)
July 2010–
July 2013
Petr Necas (ODS) Centre-right Civic Democratic 
Party (ODS); 
Public Aff airs (VV);
Top 09
Social standard 
devaluation
July 2013–
January 2014
Jirí Rusnok Caretaker govern-
ment
(1)
January 2014– Bohuslav Sobotka 
(CSSD)
Centre-left Czech Social 
Democratic Party 
(CSSD);
ANO 2011;
Christian and 
Democratic 
Union-
Czechoslovak 
People’s Party 
(KDU-CSL)
Social standard 
improvement (key 
role of invest-
ments)
Note: (1) Due to the peculiar nature and short duration of the mandate, the caretaker government’s 
approach to reform is not clear.
Source: Kałan 2014; Malek 2013.
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Therefore, the ’EU inﬂ uence eﬀ ort’, as deﬁ ned by Stamati and Baeten 
(2014), could only be eﬀ ective in the country by means of the country-
speciﬁ c recommendations (CSR) and the Excessive Deﬁ cit Procedure 
(EDP) launched in December 2009. However, the latter turned out to 
be a rather light ﬁ scal and ﬁ nancial conditionality tool from the EU, as 
the country is not a member of the euro zone. Nevertheless, it is worth 
mentioning the decision taken by the Sobotka cabinet to adopt the Fiscal 
Compact (not yet ratiﬁ ed) and to move forward on the path towards the 
adoption of the single currency, which could ultimately occur not earlier 
than in 2020.
3.1.2 Structural reforms, sector by sector
Pensions
Although generous public pensions have been depicted as one of the 
main features of the Czech welfare regime, the reforms implemented 
since 2009 altered this tendency, as they were devoted mainly to im-
proving the ﬁ nancial sustainability of the whole system. Restrictive re-
forms were introduced from 2008, when the revision of entitlements 
to disability pensions adopted by the Topolánek-led government – and 
coming into force in 2010 – led to a drop in the number of newly granted 
disability pensions. The measure prevented an increase in this kind of 
pension throughout the crisis period, also producing a long-term impact 
on the extension of working lives in the country (Natali and Zaidi 2015).
Between 2011 and 2013, the Neþar government adopted various meas-
ures in order to improve the ﬁ nancial sustainability of the pension sys-
tem. The results of these changes, however, did not signiﬁ cantly aﬀ ect 
pension beneﬁ ts in relative terms (Natali and Zaidi 2015), nor were these 
restrictive measures continued by the following government. With re-
gard to the reduction of pension payments, in 2013 the centre-right gov-
ernment introduced a temporary change to the indexation mechanism 
for old age, survivor and disability pensions, aiming to reduce the in-
crease in pension beneﬁ ts for ﬁ nancial consolidation purposes. Also, an-
other measure to reduce public spending was the prevention of economi-
cally active pensioners from applying a basic tax credit when calculating 
their personal income tax from labour income. However, the measure, 
which was supposed to be implemented in 2013–2015, was abrogated by 
the Constitutional Court in mid-2014.
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Upon adoption of the act introducing a (funded) pension savings pillar 
in November 2012, pension savings were launched at the beginning of 
2013. This reform was intended by the government to be an instrument 
to increase the long-term security of the system, through diversiﬁ cation 
of the pension system and by providing a viable complement to the pay-
as-you-go system. The reform envisaged voluntary entry for persons 
under 35 years of age to the savings pillar and it was open to employed 
(or self-employed) persons when the reform was launched, but not to 
unemployed or economically inactive persons (Ministry of Finance of 
the Czech Republic 2013).
Furthermore, the ODS-led government introduced an increase in the re-
tirement age by two months per year without setting a ﬁ nal target age. 
For women, the amendment of the Act on Pension Insurance speeded 
up the increase in retirement age temporarily from four to six months 
per year until 2041, when the uniﬁ cation of the pension age is expected 
to occur (Oɤ  ce of the Government of the Czech Republic 2014). The 
amendment has been shaped in accordance with the prospect of an age-
ing population and changes in life expectancy, also responding to specif-
ic EU pressure related to this concern. It will gradually lower the average 
period of pension payments for individual generations to approximately 
20 years.
Nevertheless, the Sobotka government, in power since January 2014, 
reversed the approach to reform characterising the centre-right govern-
ments preceding it and set out on a path of deﬁ cit spending with regard 
to pension beneﬁ ts. It also proved to be less prone to follow recommen-
dations from Brussels with regard to further increases in the retirement 
age and pre-retirement schemes. Indeed, while maintaining unaltered 
the legislation on the retirement age, it restored the standard formula 
that links the indexation of pensions to 100 per cent of the consumer 
price index and one-third of real wage increases. Moreover, it included 
in the 2015 budget a discretionary 1.8 per cent pension increase (Oɤ  ce 
of the Government of the Czech Republic, 2014). It also planned to make 
the second pillar inactive starting from January 2016, when contribu-
tions to the fully-funded pillar will be either returned to the participants 
in cash or transferred to the existing voluntary third pension pillar.
Summing up, the economic downturn and more stringent budget con-
straints have led to a high concentration of new measures in the ﬁ eld of 
pensions. Speciﬁ cally, from 2008 to 2013 the clear attempt to reduce the 
Czech Republic
state budget deﬁ cit led to the adoption of restrictive policies. This im-
plied more diɤ  cult pension entitlement and increased retirement age, as 
well as changes to the indexation mechanism. Nonetheless, since 2014 
there has been a move towards a social standards improvement strategy 
especially with regard to pension indexation and with the possibility of 
discretionary increases in pension payments.
Labour market
In the aftermath of the crisis, the Czech labour market has suﬀ ered 
mainly from worsened services oﬀ ered to job seekers as a consequence 
of major reshuɥ  ing of the Public Employment Services (PES) and cuts 
in unemployment beneﬁ ts. Nevertheless, since 2010 the labour market 
has responded positively to the crisis. There have been improved per-
formances in terms of both employment and unemployment rates, al-
though structural problems were still identiﬁ ed, and started to be ad-
dressed only in 2013 and in 2014, as outlined below.
With regard to Passive Labour Market Policies (PLMP), the tendency of 
centre-right governments was directed mainly towards the implementa-
tion of restrictive measures, while no major reforms have been adopted 
since 2013. In 2010 unemployment beneﬁ ts were cut from 65 per cent 
to 45 per cent of previous earnings from the ﬁ rst month of unemploy-
ment. Furthermore, in January 2012 an important attempt to reduce 
unemployment beneﬁ ts was made by the Neþar government, through 
the introduction of a measure whereby the unemployed could be obliged 
to participate in the public service programme. If the unemployed per-
son refused, their entitlement to unemployment beneﬁ ts would have 
been lost. However, the measure was not implemented because it was 
cancelled by the Constitutional Court in November of the same year 
(Sirovátka et al. 2015).
During the period 2010–2012, the attempt to reduce public spending 
was also pursued through restructuring of the Czech PES, the Labour 
Oɤ  ce of the Czech Republic. This attempt was accomplished by means 
of a substantial cut in the number of Labour Oɤ  ce employees from 
8,136 to 6,237. This staﬀ  reduction was combined with the merging of 
the minimum income scheme/social assistance administration with the 
employment oɤ  ces, thus adversely aﬀ ecting the performance of both of-
ﬁ ces in delivering their services (ibid.). However, given the shortcom-
ings experienced as a result of the cuts, the year 2013 represented a turn-
ing point in the restructuring of the Czech Labour Oɤ  ce, which started 
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during Neþar’s mandate and continued during the caretaker government 
in oɤ  ce since July 2013. The number of employees was raised twice: 
slightly in March and more substantially in July, when 700 new jobs 
were created (Oɤ  ce of the Government of the Czech Republic 2014). For 
the Sobotka government, the commitment to continue restructuring the 
Labour Oɤ  ce through improved eɤ  ciency and streamlined cooperation 
between the central and regional level is also a result of pressures from 
speciﬁ c EU recommendations on the topic.
Although public expenditure on ALMP remains substantially lower in 
the Czech Republic than in other Member States, the number of partici-
pants in these policies has increased in the past few years. Speciﬁ cally, 
in 2014 accessibility to ALMP increased thanks to the high participation 
of the unemployed in the vocational training programme ‘Requaliﬁ ca-
tion by Choice’, as well as the implementation of the Youth Guarantee 
scheme (Sirovátka et al. 2015). The Czech Republic presented a Youth 
Guarantee Implementation Plan in December 2013, which was revised 
in April 2014. Several actions were launched during the year, mainly 
delivered by the PES, although their main focus was on education. The 
implementation of these policies was supported by European funds. 
Nonetheless, despite the responsive approach shown in implementing 
the Youth Guarantee, further national funding for the Youth Guarantee 
Implementation Plan was not provided. Further ﬁ nancing of youth pro-
grammes is also available in the Severozapad region (the only eligible 
region in the country) thanks to the allocation of 13.6 million euros from 
the Youth Employment Initiative (European Commission 2015e).
The focus on job creation was also included in the reform of the sys-
tem of investment incentives provided to employers. This was done 
through an amendment to the Act on Investment Incentives introduced 
by the current government (Oɤ  ce of the Government of the Czech Re-
public 2014). The main implications for the labour market produced by 
the amendment – which took eﬀ ect on 1 May 2015, will result from the 
increase in incentives in the form of cash grants provided to employers 
in order to create new jobs, and an increase in retraining and training 
activities in regions with higher unemployment rates in comparison with 
the national average. The amendment also removes previous restric-
tions in certain ﬁ elds of investment, including limits on job creation for 
technology centres and business support services centres (CzechInvest 
2015).
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As outlined above, labour market policies in the Czech Republic included 
a tightening of unemployment beneﬁ ts throughout the period 2008–
2014. Restrictive measures were taken also in relation to the restructur-
ing of the PES by means of substantial staﬀ  cuts and mergers. An in-
creased focus on ALMP since 2014 is visible through the implementation 
of programmes using EU funds, as well as in the provision of investment 
incentives to businesses to ﬁ nance job creation and training activities. 
Education
In the aftermath of the crisis, public expenditure on education as a per-
centage of GDP was lower in the Czech Republic than the EU average for 
the whole period. It experienced a slight decrease relative to GDP and 
as a percentage of total public expenditure in 2008, followed by slight 
increases in the following years (Agostini and Natali forthcoming).
In 2011, the amendment to the Education Act of 2004 brought about 
modiﬁ cations in the ﬁ nancing of schools and school facilities, including 
the addition of a diﬀ erentiation between teaching and non-teaching staﬀ  
and between employees by school types (OECD 2015a; 2015b). Prior to 
2013, allocation of resources for non-teaching staﬀ  was reduced by 9.5 
per cent, particularly staﬀ  in early childhood education and care, while 
the pay cuts in the public sector did not aﬀ ect teachers’ wages. School 
management, especially in small schools, has faced ﬁ nancial diɤ  cul-
ties, as salaries of pedagogical staﬀ  have increased, while those of non-
pedagogical staﬀ  have been reduced (Sirovátka et al. 2015). Shortages of 
places in early childhood education and care and, more in general, short-
comings in the management of childcare facilities have been addressed 
subsequently to the approval of the Act on Children’s groups in 2014. 
Responding to the necessity to facilitate the participation of women in 
further education and the labour market, the Act represents an increase 
in public expenditure of about CZK 1.5 billion, with about 300,000 chil-
dren in pre-school care, aged between 3 and school age, beneﬁ ting from 
the measure (ibid.).
During the EU budgetary period 2007–2013, through the Education for 
Competitiveness Operational Programme (ECOP), grants based on pro-
ject applications were allocated, most of them to promote the use of ITC. 
The programme, mostly covered through the European Social Fund, also 
aimed at prioritising the further training of teachers and other education 
staﬀ .
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On a similar trend, the education reform strategy approved by the So-
botka government, also responding to speciﬁ c CSRs on the topic, has 
focused on enhancing quality and equity in education, thus taking a 
restructuring approach to reform. Moreover, the focus on pro-growth 
measures in the ﬁ elds of education, R&D and transportation has been 
mirrored in the 2014 state budget, where national ﬁ nancing (before ad-
ditional European funding) for the purpose has been established to the 
tune of CZK 26.6 billion for the three-year period from 2014 to 2016 (An-
nex, Oɤ  ce of the Government of the Czech Republic 2014).
As for higher education, in 2010 the Ministry of Education, Youth and 
Sport presented a Strategic Plan for 2011–2015 devoted mainly to bring-
ing about a change in the focus of higher education institutions from 
quantity to quality in all their main activities and functions. Indeed, slow 
reactions to labour market needs and increased participation in tertiary 
education without a proper increase in resources have led to concerns 
about the quality of the services oﬀ ered (OECD 2013a). A substantial re-
form in the ﬁ eld was recently adopted by the coalition government head-
ed by Sobotka in March 2015. The amendment to the Higher Education 
Act, already under discussion by previous governments, established rules 
for the evaluation of universities. It also creates academic and professional 
proﬁ les in order to support synergy between study programmes and the 
speciﬁ cities of the labour market. The transition between education and 
the labour market is a focus of national policies, partly those favouring 
cooperation between businesses and universities, which is still at a low 
level of development in the country. Additionally, within the framework 
of the Youth Guarantee, several measures related to education policies 
are now active. This is particularly the case with regard to preventive ac-
tions taken in relation to early school leaving and facilitating the return 
of early school-leavers back to education (OECD 2013a).
It follows that the reform path taken in the ﬁ eld of education has been 
rather selective in the choice of investment. Spending cuts were experi-
enced in terms of wage reductions for non-teaching staﬀ . Moreover, the 
reforms implemented were mainly devoted to improving the quality and 
fairness of the system, thus achieving better outcomes with the resourc-
es allocated. However, the country has relied substantially on European 
funds in operational programmes devoted to increasing the national 
competitiveness through higher educational outcomes and improved 
ICT knowledge. Several measures were also implemented in 2014 within 
the framework of the Youth Guarantee.
Czech Republic
Public sector
In the aftermath of the crisis, the process of restructuring the public sec-
tor in the Czech Republic has been characterised by measures devoted 
to cost-containment and modernisation. In 2011, one of the most signiﬁ -
cant and contested measures implemented was a 10 per cent reduction in 
the budget for public sector wages (Eurofound 2015). The measures im-
pacted government departments and organisations fully or partly fund-
ed by the state. Only teachers were not subject to the reduction, while the 
budget to pay their wages was expected to increase. Whether the reduc-
tion of the budget aﬀ ected the number of employees through lay-oﬀ s or 
whether it meant a reduction of wages (or both) was up to ministries. 
However, as provided for by law, in case of lay-oﬀ s the government was 
still required to propose reallocation options and the employee was en-
titled to an allowance (OECD 2015d). The main input for the launch of 
this restrictive reform process came from the national level, where the 
newly elected Neþar government in 2010 decided to pursue its objectives 
of ﬁ nancial containment by substantially reducing public expenditure on 
employment in the public sector. However, additional external elements 
such as the EDP may have played a role in this process. 
The introduction of restrictive legislative measures was opposed by 
trade unions. This prevented the government from abolishing the auto-
matic progression of public employees’ salaries through a 12-point pay 
scale on the basis of service and replacing it with one based purely on 
performance. However, the pay cuts were ultimately adopted despite the 
protests. Indeed, social dialogue remains rather weak and uncertain in 
the country and the decision-making process in the Czech labour mar-
ket, regulated in detail by the Labour Code, is shaped around a top-down 
approach of legal regulation rather than on consultation with the social 
partners (EPSU 2012).
Speciﬁ c pressure from the EU has been highlighted in the CSRs ad-
dressed to the Czech Republic concerning the need to start restructuring 
of the public administration in order to improve its quality and eɤ  cien-
cy. Speciﬁ cally, the recommendations stressed the importance of adopt-
ing the long-awaited Civil Service Act, ultimately adopted by the Sobotka 
government and eﬀ ective since January 2015. This act aims at improv-
ing the eɤ  ciency of the public service, which would be consistent with 
the process of social investment and increased productivity pursued by 
the centre-left government – although new regulation on remuneration 
in the sector is still pending adoption. However, when it comes to the 
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transparency and eɤ  ciency of the Public Administration, inﬂ uence has 
been exerted by the EU on the national decision-making process, as an 
improved and more transparent funding administration is instrumental 
in the total allocation of European funds. 
Overall, the strategy pursued in reforming the public sector in the Czech 
Republic in recent years has been consistent with the path of selective 
investment. Restructuring of the sector did indeed lead to the deterio-
ration of employees’ protection and salaries, especially during the pe-
riod 2010–2011, but it was also focused on modernising the sector and 
improving its eɤ  ciency and transparency. This is particularly true with 
regard to public administration reforms and the need to improve the 
management of EU funds.
Research and development 
Gross domestic expenditure (as a percentage of GDP) on R&D has in-
creased regularly since 2002. The country has formally reached its na-
tional Europe 2020 target and is well placed to achieve the common Eu-
ropean target of 3 per cent of public and private spending on R&D. Total 
public and private expenditure in 2012 amounted to CZK 72.36 billion, 
of which total public expenditure on R&D support was CZK 39.1 billion. 
This led to an increase in public spending in this area to 1.02 per cent 
of GDP. The largest share of the R&D conducted (53.6 per cent) in 2012 
was carried out in the corporate sector, 18.4 per cent in the government 
sector and 27.4 per cent in higher education (Oɤ  ce of the Government 
of the Czech Republic, 2014).
Despite the substantial public investment eﬀ ort in the sector, poor in-
novation outcomes in relation to the level of R&D spending and a lack 
of cooperation between the public research sector and the sphere of 
application, particularly the corporate sector, have proved to be major 
causes for concern. The reforms implemented and the strategies applied 
attempted to address these structural weaknesses. The amendment of 
the Income Tax Act (Act No. 458/2011 Sb) adopted in 2011 boosted tax 
deductibility to include services related to R&D projects. In 2014, the 
reduction would have increased from 100 per cent to 110 per cent if ex-
penditure had also increased in comparison with the previous tax period 
(OECD 2014b). As for cooperation among the diﬀ erent bodies, a con-
tinuation of the cooperation programme between businesses and higher 
education institutions – the ‘education for competitiveness’ operational 
programme – has been planned for the period 2014–2020.
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To sum up, when it comes to R&D spending and programmes activated 
in the ﬁ eld, government activities over the years have aimed at imple-
menting an investment strategy and improving educational outcomes, 
as well as cooperation between the public and private sector.
3.1.3 Preliminary remarks on Czech structural reforms and their 
determinants
In the Czech Republic, the structural reforms undertaken during 2008–
2015 have been inﬂ uenced mainly by domestic factors. Within this 
framework, the EU played a restrictive role – by imposing ﬁ scal and 
ﬁ nancial constraints by means of the EDP and the CSRs – as well as 
providing a stimulus for the optimisation of resources and pro-growth 
investment through the allocation of structural and cohesion funds.
As for the implementation of restrictive measures and cuts during 
2008–2013, a certain level of agreement between national reform pro-
grammes and EU pressure helped in shaping the economic policy of the 
centre-right governments with regard to ways of ‘reducing the deﬁ cit’. The 
launch of the EDP in December 2009 might have played a formal role in 
this regard. Nonetheless, the corrective instrument was not so severe, 
because the country is not a member of the euro zone and it did not 
sign the Fiscal Compact in 2012. During the aforementioned period, the 
path to structural reforms undertaken in the country reﬂ ected, to some 
extent, a social standards devaluation strategy, combined with limited 
investment, especially in policy sectors deﬁ ned as growth-enhancing, 
such as education and R&D. Even more so, this was due to the use of 
EU funds.
Since January 2014 and the change of government’s stance, the na-
tional political factor has become more important in shaping the reform 
programme. The government is indeed more willing to increase deﬁ cit 
spending on both social and pro-growth policies, thus adopting a social 
standards improvement strategy. However, the allocation of EU funds 
remains an important instrument for inﬂ uencing national policies. This 
is proved by the responsive approach of the Sobotka government to the 
Youth Guarantee and to the recommendations on the need to improve 
the quality of the European Parliament, as well as the management of 
the funds for the period 2014–2020.
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Table 6 Summary table: drivers of reform and major reform trends in the 
Czech Republic, 2008–2014
2008–2009 2010–2013 2014–2015
Drivers of reform
Economic crisis Economic recession;
excessive general 
government defi cit 
Slight economic re-
covery (2010–2011)/
slight recession 
(2012–2013);
excessive general 
government defi cit
Slight economic 
recovery;
general government 
defi cit below the 
threshold
Coalition governments Centre-right Centre-right Centre-left 
EU infl uence EDP (from Dec 2009)
EU funds
EDP;
European Semester;
EU funds
EDP (until June 2014)
European Semester;
EU funds
Structural reforms
Reform path (for the 
fi ve policies under 
scrutiny)
Social standards 
devaluation
Social standards 
devaluation
Social standards 
improvement
Main reforms in each 
policy fi eld
Pensions - Revision of entitle-
ment to disability 
pensions
- Increased retirement 
age from 62 to 65
- Temporary change 
to indexation 
mechanism
- Introduction of pen-
sion savings pillar
- Increased retirement 
age 
- Restoration of 
standard formula for 
pension indexation;
- (planned) increase 
of pensions by 1.8%
Labour market - Tightening unem-
ployment benefi t
- Cuts in unemploy-
ment benefi ts from 
65% to 45% of 
previous earnings
- Reform of PES
- Youth guarantee
- Youth Employment 
Initiative
- Investment incentives 
for job creation
- ALMP
Education - Strategy of lifelong 
learning (2007)
- ECOP
- Cuts in resources for 
non-teaching staff 
- ECOP
- Youth guarantee
- Higher Education Act
- Investment in early 
childhood education 
and care 
Public sector - 10% reduction in 
public sector wages
- Public Procurement 
Act
- Civil Service Act
Research and 
development
- Income Tax Act - Education for com-
petitiveness opera-
tional programme
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
Overall, the Czech capitalist and social models have signiﬁ cantly inﬂ u-
enced reform of taxation and investment incentive policies aimed at at-
tracting inward FDI. This is also true of spending on R&D and the focus 
on improving educational outcomes, as well as on increasing possibili-
ties for the private sector, mainly corporate, to invest in research in the 
Czech Republic. 
3.2 Finland
3.2.1 Setting the scene: key traits of the country’s political 
economy
Finland has been hard hit by the economic and ﬁ nancial crisis. Being 
an open, export-oriented economy, the worldwide recession and the 
collapse in trade entailed a huge decline in manufacturing exports. This 
situation has been further aggravated by more structural problems 
confronting key sectors such as electronics (notably Nokia) and for-
estry (Dølvik et al. 2014; Hopia and Metelinen 2013). Looking at GDP 
growth, the country has experienced a ‘double dip’: the recession in 
2009 (–8.3 per cent of GDP) was followed ﬁ rst by a recovery in 2010, 
then by a second drop from 2012. According to a recent forecast (Euro-
pean Commission 2015c) the Finnish economy is expected to recover 
slowly from 2015. Both the general government gross debt and deﬁ -
cit were aﬀ ected by the economic downturn. The debt almost doubled 
– from 32.7 per cent of GDP in 2007 to 59.3 per cent in 2014 – thus 
approaching the 60 per cent Maastricht threshold, and the country’s 
budget moved from being in surplus in 2008 (4.2 per cent of GDP) to a 
persistent deﬁ cit in the following years (with a low-point of –3.2 per cent 
of GDP in 2014).
Social indicators, too – though less dramatically than in other EU coun-
tries – have deteriorated over the crisis years. The employment rate reg-
istered a decrease in 2009 (73.5 per cent, compared with 75.8 per cent 
in 2008) and then remained quite stable in the following years (Table 
7). Similarly, the unemployment rate increased by about 2 percentage 
points between 2008 (6.4 per cent) and 2009 (8.2 per cent), then re-
maining fairly ﬂ at until 2014 (8.4 per cent). However, while the Finn-
ish unemployment rate is still below the EU average, the 0.5 percentage 
points increase between 2013 and 2014 is particularly worrisome insofar 
as it represents the biggest increase in the EU over that period (Europe-
Finland
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an Commission 2015c: 46). The rate of people at risk of poverty or social 
xclusion remained fairly stable (around 17 per cent) over the crisis years 
and even declined slightly in some years. 
Finland displays the key traits of ‘national-coordinated market econo-
mies’ (NCME), characterised by a comprehensive industrial relations 
system with a high-level of social partner density and a key coordination 
role played by national-level wage bargaining (Agostini and Natali forth-
coming) (Table 8).
Table 7 Finland: selected socio-economic indicators, 2007–2014
Indicators/years 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Real GDP growth 5.2 0.7 –8.3 3.0 2.6 –1.4 –1.3 –0.1
General government 
gross debt (EDP con-
cept) (% of GDP)
34.0 32.7 41.7 47.1 48.5 52.9 55.8 59.3
General government 
defi cit/surplus (% of 
GDP)
5.1 4.2 –2.5 –2.6 –1.0 –2.1 –2.5 –3.2
Employment rate 
(% 20-64)
74.8 75.8 73.5 73.0 73.8 74.0 73.3 73.1
Unemployment rate 
(%)
6.9 6.4 8.2 8.4 7.8 7.7 8.2 8.7
People at risk of 
poverty or social 
exclusion (% of total 
population)
17.4 17.4 16.9 16.9 17.9 17.2 16.0 17.3
Source: Annex to Agostini and Natali (forthcoming).
Table 8 The Finnish social model
Labour market regime Welfare regime Varieties of capitalism
Nordic Social democratic National-coordinated market 
economy (NCME)
Peculiarities:
-  Member of the euro zone 
since 1999
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Agostini and Natali (forthcoming).
The presence of strong, centralised worker and employer organisations, 
the development of institutions facilitating tripartite cooperation and 
the emergence of stable party constellations or hegemonic parties are 
in fact strongly characteristic of Nordic countries (Dølvik et al. 2015: 
20). Because their economies are highly reliant on international trade, 
collective agreements have been fundamental to enhancing export com-
petitiveness by allowing for wage ﬂ exibility, technological change and 
investment (Vartiainen 2011b). In Finland, the role of the state in sup-
porting centralised pay setting has been even more accentuated than in 
other Nordic countries: indeed, through the so-called ‘incomes policy’ 
developed since the 1950s, Finnish governments have facilitated wage 
bargains by linking these to economic policies and social reforms (ibid.). 
Looking more speciﬁ cally at social policy, Finland can be included among 
the ‘social democratic’ welfare regimes, typically characterised by a com-
prehensive welfare state granting universal rights to income security and 
education, a high level of decommodiﬁ cation, high social spending and 
extensive provision of public services (Dølvik et al. 2014; Agostini and 
Natali forthcoming). The Finnish pension system is rather unusual by 
international standards, given the speciﬁ c features of the employment 
pension13 (which, together with the national pension, until 2011 repre-
sented one of the two schemes of the ﬁ rst pillar) and the fundamental 
decision-making role given to the social partners (Kautto forthcoming). 
In terms of labour market regime, Finland is part of the ‘Nordic’ cluster, 
characterised by a certain degree of internal ﬂ exibility and a relatively 
low degree of external ﬂ exibility, coupled with fairly generous unem-
ployment beneﬁ ts and high expenditure on ALMP (Sturn 2011). Legis-
lation on collective dismissal associated with economic downturns has 
traditionally been ﬂ exible, while provisions on individual terminations 
are stricter (with the exception of Denmark) (Dølvik et al. 2015: 68).
Many observers describe the economic crisis that hit the Nordic coun-
tries at the beginning of the 1990s as a critical juncture that signiﬁ cantly 
shaped their socio-economic models (Dølvik et al. 2014; Dølvik et al. 
2015; Jochem 2011): it was a sort of ‘existential crisis’ that called into 
question the viability of the Nordic social model (Dølvik et al. 2014: 
249). Confronted with such economic turmoil, the Nordic countries re-
Finland
13. The employment pension can be described as a ‘functional hybrid’ incorporating many 
features that, in other countries, are generally attached to second pillar schemes (Kautto, 
forthcoming). 
48 Balancing protection and investment: structural reforms in fi ve countries
 Balancing protection and investment: structural reforms in fi ve countries 49
acted with a series of reforms of macroeconomic and ﬁ scal policies, the 
ﬁ nancial sector, wage setting arrangements and labour market regula-
tion (Dølvik et al. 2014).14 In Finland (a member of the EU since 1995), 
the wage moderation and ﬁ scal consolidation eﬀ orts pursued over the 
1990s were also linked to the need to meet the Maastricht criteria, given 
the decision to join EMU among the ﬁ rst participants (Vartiainen 2011a). 
Although most social beneﬁ ts were either cut or not adequately raised 
compared with living costs or wage developments (Jutila 2011), reforms 
undertaken over the 1990s and 2000s did not result in the dismantling 
of the traditional social model but rather in its ‘consolidation’ (Dølvik 
et al. 2014).15 In particular, social and tax policies were reoriented to-
wards labour supply, the education and skills formation systems were 
expanded, and social beneﬁ ts were made more conditional and linked 
more closely to the ‘activation’ of the recipients. Moreover, public servic-
es were reinforced, more emphasis was put on programmes for the rec-
onciliation of work and family life and a series of pension reforms were 
implemented (Dølvik et al. 2014; Dølvik et al. 2015). Finland, along with 
the other Nordic countries, introduced or reinforced many elements of 
what is currently labelled the ‘social investment’ approach.
Summing up, on the eve of the Great Recession Finland was character-
ised by good socio-economic conditions, with relatively high rates of 
GDP growth, a sound budgetary situation, a robust ﬁ nancial sector, com-
paratively good labour market performance and a fairly comprehensive 
and eﬀ ective welfare state. That said, especially due to rapid population 
ageing and the shrinking working age population, doubts about the long-
term sustainability of the Finnish welfare system persisted and were an 
important theme already in the pre-crisis public debate (Vartiainen 
2011a). In particular, the sustainability of the pension and health-care 
systems were a matter of concern. Furthermore, the centralised wage 
setting system – which had played a pivotal role in the socio-economic 
development of the country – was seriously called into question in 2007, 
when employers refused to take part in nationally coordinated wage set-
tlements (Vartiainen 2011a, 2011b).
Country cases
14.  These measures were accompanied by huge currency depreciations in Finland and Sweden 
(ibid.: 264).
15.  For more critical accounts, see Blomgren et al. (2012) and Jutila (2011). While stressing 
that the Finnish welfare state is still enviably eﬀ ective, Blomgren et al. (2012) identify cuts/
slow increase in social beneﬁ ts and in tax rates (the latter since the 2000s) as key determi-
nants of the rise in income inequality over the past twenty years. Jutila (2011) concludes 
that these changes have entailed a gradual but continuous retrenchment of the Finnish 
The development of the crisis in the EU signiﬁ cantly inﬂ uenced Finn-
ish politics in terms of coalition composition, reform programmes and 
stability. Since 2007, ﬁ ve coalition governments have taken oɤ  ce in Fin-
land as a result of the parliamentary elections held in 2007, 2011 and 
2015 (Table 9).16 With regard to the reform pattern of the crisis years, 
Finland
16. The Kiviniemi and Stubb governments were both in oɤ  ce for one year and were formed 
because of the resignations of the Prime Ministers Vanhanen (for personal reasons) and 
Katainen (who joined the Juncker cabinet as Commissioner for Jobs, Growth, Investment 
and Competitiveness). These governments followed the path taken by previous cabinets, as 
the structure of the coalition remained more or less unchanged.
Table 9 Finnish governments, 2007–present
Years Prime Minister Position in 
the political 
spectrum
Coalition forces Reform 
programme
2007–2010 Matti Vanhanen 
(II)
Centre-right - Centre Party
- National Coalition Party
- Swedish People’s Party
- Green League
Social standards 
improvement 
(2009–2010)
2010–2011 Mari Kiviniemi Centre-right - Centre Party
- National Coalition Party
- Swedish People’s Party
- Green League
Social standards 
improvement 
(based on PM 
Vanhanen’s 
government 
programme)
2011–2014 Jyrki Katainen Grand 
coalition
- National Coalition Party
- Social Democratic Party
- Left  Alliance 
- Green League 
- Swedish People’s Party 
of Finland 
- Christian Democrats 
Social standards 
devaluation
2014–2015 Alexander Stubb Grand 
coalition
- National Coalition Party
- Social Democratic Party
- Green League (until 
September 2014)
- Swedish People’s Party
- Christian Democrats
Social standards 
devaluation
(based on PM 
Katainen’s 
government 
programme)
Some selective 
investment
29 May 
2015–
present
Juha Sipilä Centre-right - Centre Party
- Finns Party
- National Coalition Party
Social standards 
devaluation
(some selective 
investment)
Source: Hopia H. and Metelinen S. (2013); Jokivuori P. (2011); Prime Minister’s Offi  ce (2015).
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two broad trends can be identiﬁ ed. At the beginning of the crisis, Finn-
ish governments supplemented the work of the automatic stabilisers by 
expansionary policy packages (social standards improvement). Howev-
er, after a stimulus package of approximately 1 per cent of GDP imple-
mented in 2009 by the Vanhanen government (Jochem 2011: 141), more 
restrictive budget choices were gradually implemented (Dølvik et al. 
2015: 36). A clear trend reversal is visible after the 2011 parliamentary 
elections, marked by the historic success of the populist True Finns Party 
(nowadays the Finns Party) and the sharp decline in popularity of the 
Centre Party (Hopia and Metelinen 2013: 165). Indeed, ﬁ scal consolida-
tion was a priority for the coalition government formed by Prime Min-
ister Katainen (in which the True Finns Party decided not to take part 
despite the election results). The common trend towards social standard 
devaluation in the EU and the increasing pressure from the European 
Union in this direction might have played a role in shaping the reform 
pattern towards ﬁ scal consolidation. However, given the industry-spe-
ciﬁ c shocks experienced and the stagnating labour force, the Grand Coa-
lition government would probably have managed to implement such a 
programme even without pressure from European institutions in this 
regard (Dølvik et al. 2014: 271). A similar focus on the sustainability of 
public ﬁ nances characterises the Strategic Programme of Prime Minister 
Juha Sipilä, which combines this priority with a clear will to implement 
structural reforms promoting employment, entrepreneurship and eco-
nomic growth (Prime Minister’s Oɤ  ce 2015: 10). 
When it comes to ‘EU pressure’ coming from the European Semester, 
messages recommending Finland to continue its ﬁ scal consolidation ef-
forts and preserve a sound ﬁ scal position have been a constant of CSRs 
received between 2011 and 2015. In 2010, an Excessive Deﬁ cit Procedure 
was launched, based on the expectation that – in 2011 – the public deﬁ cit 
would have exceeded 3 per cent of the GDP. Since the forecast proved to 
be wrong, the EDP was closed in 2011. Growing concerns about the trend 
of the public budget emerge, in particular, from the CSRs for 2014 and 
2015. Other CSRs received by Finland between 2011 and 2015 concerned 
a number of sectors covered by the present research, including pensions, 
the labour market and the public administration.
Finland
3.2.2 Structural reforms sector by sector
Pensions
Confronted with a rapidly ageing population, the Finnish pension sys-
tem has been reformed several times over the past 20 years. Reforms un-
dertaken in the 1990s and the 2000s especially concerned the ‘ﬁ rst pil-
lar’ of the system, with a view to ensuring both its sustainability and its 
adequacy (Kautto forthcoming). Raising the eﬀ ective retirement age was 
a key goal of these reforms but, despite remarkable improvements, the 
progress achieved before the crisis was insuɤ  cient (Natali and Stamati 
2013). Furthermore, the crisis has uncovered some shortcomings related 
to poverty protection, insofar as Finland’s rate of people aged 65 or more 
at risk of poverty is higher than the EU average (ibid.).
Changes made over the crisis years have been characterised by continuity 
with the previous reform pattern. Most of them concerned the ﬁ rst pillar 
of the pension system and consisted of a mix of interventions aimed at 
reinforcing ﬁ nancial sustainability by promoting longer working careers 
and more expansive measures (Kautto forthcoming; Natali and Stamati 
2013). In spring 2009, the social partners and the government agreed to 
discuss measures aimed at achieving a three-year increase in the eﬀ ec-
tive pension age by 2025. However, due to trade union opposition, no 
agreement was reached on the government proposal to gradually raise 
the minimum retirement age by two years (Vartiainen 2011a). In the 
same year, taxes on pension income were lowered and the government 
intervened to prevent beneﬁ t indexation from turning negative in 2010 
(Natali and Stamati 2013).17 Furthermore, employer contributions to the 
Social Insurance Institution (responsible for the national pension) were 
gradually eliminated from 2010, while employee and employer contri-
butions to the TyEL fund (for private employees) were raised by 0.4 
percentage points a year between 2011 and 2014 (ibid.). In March 2011, 
the government introduced the ‘guarantee pension’, a scheme intended 
to top up the national pension for low-income pensioners and to cover 
people who do not qualify for the national pension due to insuɤ  cient 
years of residence (Kautto forthcoming). A further agreement concluded 
by the social partners in spring 2012 introduced additional measures 
such as the discontinuation of ‘early old age retirement’ (a scheme that 
17. As reported by Natali and Zaidi (2015: 5), over the crisis years pension payments have been 
aﬀ ected by the decision to decrease the indexation for both national and earnings-related 
beneﬁ ts.
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allowed retirement at the age of 62) from 2014, a one-year increase in 
the age limits to qualify for part-time pensions and the unemployment 
beneﬁ t system (from 60 to 61), and a 0.4 percentage point increase in 
contributions in 2014 and 2015 (ibid.). 
An agreement on the new reform was reached by the social partners 
in autumn 2014 and was due to be discussed by Parliament in autumn 
2015 with a view to entering into force in 2017. Among the main chang-
es agreed are (Ministry of Finance 2015: 18–19): a two-year rise in the 
retirement age, abolition of the part-time pension (to be replaced by a 
‘partial early old-age pension’) and the introduction of a new pension 
beneﬁ t (the ‘years-of-service pension’). The minimum age of eligibility 
for the old age pension will gradually increase until it reaches 65 years in 
2025 and, from 2027, it will be linked to life expectancy. The new ‘partial 
early old-age pension’ will initially concern individuals aged 61. Then, 
by 2025, the minimum age for this beneﬁ t will be raised to 62 and, from 
2027, it will be linked to life expectancy. Finally, the newly introduced 
‘years-of-service pension’ will apply to individuals aged at least 63 (from 
2027 the age limit will be linked to life expectancy) with a working career 
spanning at least 38 years in work that is either physically or mentally 
wearing, and with an impaired work capacity. 
Overall, looking at pension reforms implemented in Finland over the cri-
sis years, we can identify two sub-periods. At the beginning of the crisis, 
some expansive measures were enacted, especially aimed at ensuring the ad-
equacy of pensions. Since late 2011, however, initiatives aimed at ensuring 
the ﬁ nancial sustainability of the system (notably, by extending working 
life) have prevailed. Generally speaking, these measures go in the direc-
tion suggested by the CSRs on pension policy addressed to Finland since 
2011, which have repeatedly pointed to the need to increase the retire-
ment age and to reduce early exits from work. That said, considering the 
remarkable degree of continuity between changes undertaken over the 
crisis years and the pre-crisis reform pattern (Kautto forthcoming), the 
impact of pressure coming from the European Semester should not be 
overestimated. Indeed, the latter seems to have simply been an addition-
al stimulus to implement decisions already taken at the national level.
Labour market
After the employers’ decision to withdraw from nationally coordinated 
wage setting (in 2007), social partner negotiations took place at the sec-
toral level. However, already in 2011 there was a return to centralised 
Finland
wage bargaining and, in 2013, a traditional incomes policy settlement 
was concluded. The latter foresaw a very modest pay increase for the 
period 2014–201518 and was facilitated by the government, which linked 
inﬂ ation adjustments of income taxation to the success of the negotia-
tions (Dølvik et al. 2014: 278). Though centralised wage agreements con-
cluded over the crisis years did not include either wage freezes or wage 
cuts, such decisions were in many cases taken in the ﬁ rms hardest hit by 
the crisis (Dølvik et al. 2014; Svalund et al. 2013). Local-level ﬂ exibility 
was important for coping with the crisis and to avoid, whenever possi-
ble, dismissals: a number of ﬁ rms made extensive use of such solutions 
as ﬂ exible working time, internal redeployment and temporary lay-oﬀ s. 
The latter option was facilitated by the government which, in 2009, re-
laxed the access requirements for these schemes and extended to work-
ers temporarily laid oﬀ  the ‘change security’ activation programme, thus 
oﬀ ering further retraining opportunities (Svalund et al. 2013). 
The rate of unemployment beneﬁ ts remained unchanged over the cri-
sis years, although the duration of earnings-related unemployment in-
surance beneﬁ ts was marginally reduced for some groups (Dølvik et al. 
2014: 278). Conversely, at the beginning of the crisis replacement rates 
were raised moderately (OECD, 2012) and access criteria were eased in 
2009 and 2010 (Svalund et al. 2013: 188). However, the conditionality 
attached to the beneﬁ ts (notably, activation requirements) was tightened 
and sanctions for non-compliance were made more stringent.19 Further-
more, in order to push municipalities to take more responsibilities to-
wards the long-term unemployed, ﬁ nancing criteria for both the basic 
unemployment allowance and labour market subsidies were modiﬁ ed, 
introducing an earlier and more substantial participation of the munici-
palities in the co-ﬁ nancing of these schemes (Kangas and Kalliomaa-
Puham 2015: 16). 
Especially since 2013, the provision of ALMP has been extended (Dølvik 
et al. 2014; Jochem 2011), with a focus on speciﬁ c target groups, such as 
the long-term unemployed, people with reduced work capacity, elderly 
workers and unemployed young people. Measures implemented since 
2013 include (European Commission 2015c; Ministry of Finance 2015): 
18. ‘Promoting wage development in line with productivity’ was among the CSRs addressed to 
Finland under the European Semester.
19.  In particular, legal requirements for the geographical and occupational mobility of the 
unemployed were tightened.
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(i) the introduction of an income disregard (up to 300 euros) on earn-
ings-related incomes for the beneﬁ ciaries of the labour market subsidy; 
(ii) a reorganisation of the wage subsidies system introducing subsidies 
for long-term unemployed, elderly workers and workers with disabilities 
(eﬀ ective since 2015); and (iii) provisions targeted at young people, im-
plemented mainly within the framework of the ‘Youth Guarantee’. As for 
the latter, measures already existing since 1996 were amended in 2013 
with a view to strengthening and better integrating the two components 
of the model (employment and education), broadening the target group, 
enhancing measures for reaching the most vulnerable (through voca-
tional, medical and social rehabilitation services) and renewing ﬁ nancial 
investments (Ministry of Employment and the Economy n.d.). 
Other changes concerned the governance of labour market policies, with 
a view to enhancing the coordination between the various measures and 
the actors involved and improving the provision of individualised assis-
tance (especially for categories such as the long-term unemployed and 
young people). In 2013, in order to improve their eɤ  ciency and their 
capacity to oﬀ er customised services, the Public Employment Services 
were reformed: the 74 local Employment and Economic Development 
oɤ  ces were merged into 15 regional oɤ  ces (OECD 2014a).20 The ‘Act on 
multi-sectoral services cooperation’ (2014) aims at facilitating the devel-
opment of one-stop-shop arrangements by obliging the Social Insurance 
Institution (KELA), municipalities and public employment services to 
draft, in collaboration with the job seeker, multi-sectoral plans for em-
ployment (Kangas and Kalliomaa-Puha 2015: 16). 
Overall, looking at labour market policy, one can conclude that measures 
adopted over the crisis years have further reinforced the ‘social invest-
ment orientation’ of the Finnish model. Most of these changes were in 
line with recommendations coming at EU level, emphasising the need 
to target labour market measures at the long-term unemployed, young 
people and older workers.
20. As reported by the Finnish Ministry of Finance (2015: 17), since 2014 the Employment and 
Economic Development Centres have signiﬁ cantly increased job oﬀ ers made to the unem-
ployed, and employment plan monitoring and job-seeker reporting have been enhanced 
through the development of an electronic service. Probably, the reform of the PES also has 
budget saving objectives and, as reported by the European Commission (2015c: 48), the 
budget of the public employment services has indeed been cut.
Finland
Education
The Finnish education system has traditionally been highly eﬀ ective 
by international standards. Public spending on education is higher than 
the EU average and general government expenditure on education as a 
percentage of GDP remained fairly stable in the ﬁ rst years of the cri-
sis (European Commission 2014b: 3). Nevertheless, from 2011 several 
ﬁ scal consolidation measures were introduced. Data on year-on-year 
changes in constant prices (Agostini and Natali forthcoming: Appen-
dix) show that real government expenditure decreased both in 2011 
and 2012. Additionally, the ‘Structural Policy Programme’ adopted in 
2013 foresaw a further reduction of approximately 280 million euros (5 
per cent of the education budget) over the period 2014–2017 (Europe-
an Commission 2015c: 50–51). According to the European Commission 
(ibid.: 51), these cuts risk having an impact on the quality of educational 
outcomes.
Over the crisis years, the Finnish education system has been subject to 
a number of reforms, which have concerned early childhood education 
and care, tertiary education, and vocational and educational training. 
With regard to early childhood education and care, a ﬁ rst change con-
cerned the governance of the system, responsibility for which was trans-
ferred, in 2013, from the Ministry of Social Aﬀ airs and Health to the 
Ministry of Education and Culture. Therefore, early childhood educa-
tion and care is now an integral part of the education system. Second, 
in order to facilitate early interventions in learning diɤ  culties and en-
sure that every child has access to high quality pre-primary education, 
irrespective of their social background (Ministry of Finance, 2015), a 
mandatory school year for children aged 6 was introduced in 2013. As 
pointed out by Kangas and Kalliomaa-Puha (2015), both these interven-
tions have reinforced the social investment orientation of the Finnish 
early childhood education and care system, whose eﬀ ectiveness may, 
however, be reduced by recent ﬁ scal consolidation measures. The latter 
have indeed aﬀ ected municipalities’ budgets, leading to an increase in 
the child-to-staﬀ  ratio and in the average number of pupils in classrooms 
and to the cutting of some support measures for children with speciﬁ c 
needs (ibid.). 
Finland has traditionally been characterised by a high rate of participa-
tion of upper secondary students in vocational education and training 
and a relatively low level of participation in apprenticeship training (Eu-
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ropean Commission 2014b: 4). The provision of vocational education 
and training and apprenticeships for young people has recently been in-
creased, especially since 2013, within the framework of the Youth Guar-
antee (Ministry of Finance 2015: 23–24). As for vocational education, 
the reform of the selection criteria in upper secondary education is ex-
pected to give priority to people without a post-basic education qualiﬁ ca-
tion, while the reform of the vocational education qualiﬁ cation – aimed 
at improving the skill-base and the ﬂ exibility of the system – will come 
into force in August 2015. In 2014, the system of on-the-job learning 
and apprenticeship training (targeted at people under 25 without a post-
basic education qualiﬁ cation) was reformed in order to increase the 
availability of apprenticeship training placements and to promote the 
development of training models combining institutional training and 
apprenticeship. As for adults, in spring 2014 the government decided 
to allocate 20 million euros for 2014–2015 for programmes aimed at 
strengthening the skill-base of adults without basic or post-basic educa-
tion qualiﬁ cations.
As for tertiary education, a comprehensive ‘university reform’ aimed at 
improving both the eﬀ ectiveness and the eɤ  ciency of the system was en-
acted in 2009. The objectives of the reform were to improve universities’ 
capacity to react to changes in the operational environment, to diversify 
their funding base, to better compete for international research funding 
and to enhance international cooperation (Aarrevaara et al. 2009: 93). 
In order to do so, the reform enlarged the ﬁ nancial and administrative 
autonomy of the universities (transformed into independent legal enti-
ties taking the form of either public corporations or foundations under 
private law) and increased the incentives to search for private funding 
(ibid.: 94). In order to further rationalise the university system, the re-
form was accompanied by a proposal to merge some universities. A com-
mon goal of the reforms implemented since then has been the attempt 
to shorten the duration of studies in order to accelerate the transition 
to working life. Such an objective is apparent in the reform of both the 
funding model of universities (2013) and students’ ﬁ nancial aid (2014). 
The 2013 revision increased the importance attached to the number of 
qualiﬁ cations attained by students and their progress in their studies 
in determining the amount of funding for the universities (Ministry of 
Finance 2014). The new funding model was extended to universities of 
applied sciences in 2014. The reform of the students’ ﬁ nancial aid came 
into force in 2014 and aimed at supporting full-time studies and accel-
erating the completion of studies (among other things by introducing 
Finland
an ‘incentivising study loan compensation for the eɤ  cient completion of 
studies) (Ministry of Finance 2015: 35). 
Overall, reforms undertaken over the crisis years aimed at improving the 
eﬀ ectiveness and eɤ  ciency of the Finnish education and training system, 
from early childhood education and care to tertiary education. However, 
the education budget has been cut since 2011 within the framework of 
ﬁ scal consolidation policies.
Public sector
Over the crisis years, the Finnish public sector did not experience ma-
jor structural reforms. This is also true of the central public administra-
tion,21  in which little change has occurred since 2008. Speciﬁ cally, no 
pay cuts were introduced for employees in the sector, nor were changes 
in working time agreed or implemented (EurWORK 2014b). By contrast, 
tripartite negotiations in 2011 led to a pay increase of 4.3 per cent for 
94 per cent of the Finnish workforce (ibid.: 18). This trend is conﬁ rmed 
when looking at the general government public expenditure on compen-
sation of employees (as a percentage of GDP), which even increased in 
the aftermath of the crisis, from 12.9 per cent in 2008 to 14.3 per cent in 
2009, and then remained fairly stable in the following years (Annex to 
Agostini and Natali forthcoming). 
However, although the crisis did not worsen public workers’ conditions, 
it is worth mentioning that a reduction of about 6,400 has been reported 
in the number of employees in ‘public administration, defence and social 
security’22 from 2008 (116,300) to 2013 (109,900) (ibid.). The substan-
tial downsizing of the sector, however, followed a path already started 
in 2003 with the adoption of the Finnish State Productivity Programme 
(planned to end in 2015), which by 2011 had reduced the central public 
administration by 8,000 jobs with the aim of reducing costs and improv-
ing the eɤ  ciency of the system. The eﬀ ectiveness of the programme itself 
has been questioned as it has been shown to have brought about little (or 
no) productivity gains (EurWORK 2011).
21. In this case, following Eurofound (2015: 2), we understand by public administration ‘those 
central government departments or ministries that carry out planning, management and 
coordination functions rather than public-service delivery functions’. Therefore, the deﬁ ni-
tion excludes all the other sectors providing services of general interest, such as education 
and health care.
22.  The ‘public administration, defence and social security’ classiﬁ cation refers to the Statisti-
cal Classiﬁ cation of economic activity in the European Community (NACE), Rev. 2 (2008).
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Nonetheless, although major restructuring was implemented in the pre-
crisis years, new adjustments are under way, especially at local level, also 
because of EU pressure coming from the Country-Speciﬁ c Recommen-
dations addressed to Finland with regard to the public sector. The Local 
Government Structure Act, which entered into force in summer 2013, is 
aimed at achieving productivity gains and cost savings in the provision 
of public services (Ministry of Finance 2014: 17) by means of mergers of 
municipalities and reductions of their tasks. Consequently, the reform 
will have a strong impact on Finnish administrative structure, which ex-
presses the constitutional value of self-government with a high degree of 
decentralisation and a large share of local government spending as a per-
centage of GDP (OECD 2014a). According to an estimate of the Finnish 
government, the reform – when fully implemented between 2015 and 
2017 (indicatively) – will result in a reduction of 1 billion euros in operat-
ing expenditure for local authority duties and obligations. Additionally, 
the new local administrative structure aims to generate 1 billion euros 
in savings through measures implemented by local authorities, for in-
stance by improving productivity and through tax revenues (Ministry of 
Finance 2014: 17), although the eﬀ ects of these measures will be visible 
mainly in the medium and long term.
Summing up, no restrictive reforms in the public sector have been im-
plemented since 2008. The explanation is twofold. First, the role played 
by the social partners, especially the trade unions, which have managed 
to block unfavourable reform processes, such as (at least until 2014) the 
increase in the retirement age (EurWORK 2014b). Second, the reform of 
the sector already undertaken in the early 2000s, in common with other 
Northern European Member States, subsequent to the economic crisis 
experienced in the 1990s (Eurofound 2015). 
Research and development
Given the innovation-driven nature of the Finnish economy, gross do-
mestic expenditure on R&D in Finland has been the highest in the EU 
since 2007. Speciﬁ cally, it reached a peak of 3.8 per cent of GDP in 
2009 and – despite a reduction – in 2013 the level of domestic expendi-
ture on R&D was 3.3 per cent of GDP, an outstanding result in compari-
son with the 2 per cent EU average registered in the same year. Never-
theless, the country is not on track to reach the Europe 2020 national 
target on R&D (4 per cent of GDP). This is mainly due to the decline 
in business expenditure registered since 2011 (European Commission 
2015c: 61), despite the internationally high ﬁ gure when it comes to pri-
Finland
vate spending on R&D23 (Ministry of Finance 2014: 39). As for public 
spending on research and innovation, expenditure rose continuously 
from 2000 and declined for the ﬁ rst time in 2013, although it is still 
one of the highest values in the EU (1.01 per cent of GDP). However, 
consistent public spending on research and innovation did not directly 
translate into equivalent innovation outcomes (European Commission 
2015c: 56).
Comprehensive reform of research institutions and research funding was 
launched in 2013, aimed at tackling this lack of eɤ  ciency by strengthen-
ing multidisciplinary and high-level research of signiﬁ cance for society, 
including research promoting renewal of the country’s economic base 
and competitiveness, the development of working life and enhancement 
of the public sector (ibid.). Therefore, the reform addresses the speciﬁ c 
recommendations issued by the European Commission with regard to 
innovation policies and attempts to ﬁ nd new solutions and ﬁ elds of spe-
cialisation to increase the competitiveness of the Finnish economy (hard 
hit by the fall in productivity of the electronics and forestry industries). 
However, evaluation of the reform’s outcome in this respect will be pos-
sible only in the long term. In particular, the measures implemented 
include the organisation of research institutes into larger and stronger 
entities and a new funding system for universities. The research activi-
ties of universities of applied sciences saw an increase in the allocation 
of resources of 10 million euros in 2013 and a new funding model imple-
mented at the beginning of 2014 (Ministry of Finance 2014: 40). 
Moreover, in order to reverse the declining trend in business R&D in-
vestment registered in the past few years, the Finnish government has 
put in place, for 2013–2014, a system of incentives including a tax in-
centive for research and development activity and a double depreciation 
allowance for industrial investments (ibid.). Additionally, with the at-
tempt to promote research and development and enterprise growth, Fin-
land has also resorted to a signiﬁ cant allocation of European Regional 
Development Funds for the budgeting period 2014–2020 (European 
Commission 2015c: 60).
To sum up, despite remarkable performances in comparison with oth-
er EU Member States, Finland is experiencing a reduction of its gross 
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domestic expenditure on R&D, mainly as a consequence of shrinking 
private investment. Following this development, the measures imple-
mented in recent years have aimed at increasing private investments by 
means of tax incentives for conducting R&D activities. In 2013, addition-
al emphasis was placed on the need to make the research environment 
more responsive to the needs of the Finnish economic model through 
the implementation of a comprehensive reform of research institutions 
and research funding.
3.2.3 Preliminary remarks on structural reforms in Finland and 
their determinants
Finland has traditionally been considered to be a country following a 
‘high-road’ to economic growth and competitiveness, characterised by 
the desire to combine sound budgetary conditions, high quality produc-
tion and innovation-driven growth, fairly high wages and social stand-
ards. This development model was consolidated over the 1990s and 
2000s, when a series of reforms in various policy areas strengthened 
the ‘social investment orientation’ of the Finnish model, though at the 
cost of some cuts to social beneﬁ ts, which contributed to an increase in 
income inequality.
Attempts to preserve the model while coping with the global crisis (as 
well as with more country-speciﬁ c problems aﬀ ecting the Finnish econ-
omy and society) are apparent from policy choices made over the crisis 
years. In fact, changes undertaken over the period generally display a 
signiﬁ cant degree of continuity with past reforms, although in a context 
characterised by deteriorating budgetary conditions and growing impor-
tance attached to the objective of ﬁ scal consolidation. In more detail, 
while the initial reaction to the crisis consisted in the implementation of 
a series of measures aimed at preserving or improving social standards, 
since 2011 more restrictive measures (social standard devaluation) have 
been implemented, although they have sometimes been accompanied by 
investment-oriented initiatives. Particularly worrisome signals are com-
ing from two key sectors of the Finnish development model: education 
and R&D. The former has been heavily hit by budget cuts undertaken 
since 2011, although public spending on education is still above the EU 
average and various measures aimed at improving the eɤ  ciency and ef-
fectiveness of the system have been implemented. Similarly, although 
it is still the highest in the EU, gross domestic expenditure on R&D as a 
Finland
Table 10 Summary table: drivers of reform and major reform trends in 
Finland, 2008–2014
2008–2011 2011–2014
Drivers of reform
Economic crisis Economic recession (slight recov-
ery in 2010);
Drop in exports;
Increase of public defi cit and debt 
Economic recession;
Increase of public defi cit and debt
Coalition governments Centre-right Grand coalition
EU infl uence EDP (2010–2011);
European Semester (2011)
European Semester
Structural reforms
Reform path (for the 
fi ve policies under 
scrutiny)
Social standards improvement Social standards devaluation/some 
selective investment
Main reforms in each 
policy fi eld
Pensions - Reduction of taxes on pension 
income and measures to ensure 
benefi t indexation; 
- Introduction of the ‘Guarantee 
pension’
- Measures aimed at extending 
working life
Labour market - Measures facilitating temporary 
lay-off s;
- Changes to unemployment 
benefi ts (replacement rates/
access conditions/activation 
requirements/ sanctions)
- Extension of ALMP (for specifi c 
target groups);
- Reform of PES
Education - University reform - Decrease of government ex-
penditure;
- Reform of early childhood educa-
tion and care;
- Reform of the on-the-job learn-
ing and apprenticeship training 
systems
Public sector - 4.3 per cent pay increase (2011);
- Local Government Structure Act 
(2013)
Research and develop-
ment
- Reform of research institutions 
and research funding;
- Tax incentives on R&D
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
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percentage of GDP declined in 2012 and 2013, mainly as a consequence 
of a reduction in private expenditure.
Most of the reforms referred to in this report are consistent with the 
contents of CSRs received by Finland since 2011 within the framework of 
the European Semester. That said, the role of the EU in ‘pushing’ these 
changes should not be overestimated. Indeed, considering the remark-
able continuity of changes implemented over the crisis years with the 
reform path of the past, messages coming from the EU level cannot be 
understood as ‘strong pressure’ on domestic policymakers. Probably, it 
would be more correct to interpret most of these recommendations as 
additional stimuli to implement decisions already taken at the national 
level. This holds true also for the ﬁ scal consolidation measures imple-
mented by the Finnish government since 2011. Although recommenda-
tions to continue ﬁ scal consolidation eﬀ orts and preserve a sound ﬁ scal 
position have been a constant of CSRs addressed to Finland, Dølvik et al. 
(2014: 271) suggest that the Finnish grand-coalition government would 
have probably managed to implement this sort of ﬁ scal consolidation 
programme even in the absence of those recommendations. However, 
it is possible to expect that – in parallel with the deterioration of the 
budgetary situation – the degree of pressure from the EU level is likely 
to increase in the coming years, as such a trend is already apparent from 
the tenor of some of the CSRs received by Finland in 2014 and 2015. 
3.3 Germany
3.3.1 Setting the scene: key traits of the country’s political 
economy
Germany’s export-led economy was hit hard by the outbreak of the glob-
al crisis. Nonetheless, its economic and social performances in the years 
that followed diﬀ ered from those of most EU Member States in a number 
of respects. In terms of GDP development, Germany has experienced ﬂ uc-
tuations: a signiﬁ cant fall in the GDP growth rate (from 1.1 per cent in 
2008 to –5.6 per cent in 2009) was followed by a remarkable recovery of 
9.7 percentage points from 2009 to 2010 and a second collapse in 2012, 
which nevertheless did not lead the country into recession. Government 
gross debt rose steadily from 2007 to 2010 – when it registered a peak 
of 80.5 per cent – and then decreased consistently for the next few years. 
Also, the government deﬁ cit as a percentage of GDP followed a similar 
V-shaped trend. The budgetary eﬀ ect of the crisis-related measures im-
plemented and the activation of the automatic stabilisers in the ﬁ rst two 
years after the outbreak of the crisis is reﬂ ected in the low point regis-
tered in 2010 (–4.1 per cent). However, the improvements reported sub-
sequently, in terms of both gross debt and deﬁ cit/surplus, show the Ger-
man political authorities’ degree of commitment to ‘ﬁ scal responsibility’.
Indicators of social conditions – such as labour market or poverty statis-
tics – show substantially diverging trends from the economic and ﬁ nan-
cial indicators previously considered. The employment rate increased 
steadily in the aftermath of the crisis, rising from 72.9 per cent in 2007 
to 77.7 per cent in 2014. This is in marked contrast to the average EU28 
performance, which has seen a decrease in the employment rate, par-
ticularly in the Southern European economies. Similarly, the German 
unemployment rate has continuously diminished during the period in 
question. This peculiar trend of the German labour market must be at-
tributed at least partially to the changes that have occurred in Germa-
ny’s social model since reuniﬁ cation, combined with important ongoing 
characteristics limiting the negative inﬂ uence of the crisis on employ-
ment (Carlin et al. 2015: 49). Nonetheless, the launch of the so-called 
‘mini-jobs’ strategy through the adoption of the so-called ‘Hartz reforms’ 
between 2002 and 2005 (further investigated later in this section) also 
Table 11 Germany: selected socio-economic indicators, 2007–2014
Indicators/years 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Real GDP growth 3.3 1.1 –5.6 4.1 3.6 0.4 0.1 1.6
General government 
gross debt (EDP con-
cept) (% of GDP)
63.7 65.1 72.6 80.5 77.9 79.3 77.1 74.7
General government 
defi cit/surplus (% of 
GDP)
0.3 0.0 –3.0 –4.1 –0.9 0.1 0.1 0.7
Employment rate 
(% 20-64)
72.9 74 74.2 74.9 76.5 76.9 77.3 77.7
Unemployment rate 
(%)
8.5 7.4 7.6 7.0 5.8 5.4 5.2 5.0
People at risk of 
poverty or social 
exclusion (% of total 
population)
20.6 20.1 20.0 19.7 19.9 19.6 20.3 n.a.
Source: Annex to Agostini and Natali (forthcoming).
Germany
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produced employment growth, albeit by enlarging the low wage sector of 
the labour market and increasing market-income inequalities (Carlin et 
al. 2015). In other words, although the labour market reforms – which 
occurred until the mid-2000s – played a role in reducing the crisis-relat-
ed eﬀ ects on employment in Germany, they also increased the number of 
a-typical and ‘ﬂ exible’ work contracts. This may partly explain the lim-
ited change in the percentage of people at risk of poverty or social exclu-
sion from 2007 to 2014, despite the steady increase in the employment 
rate during the period. 
According to the ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach, as deﬁ ned by Hall 
and Soskice in 2001, the German model belongs to the group of ‘coordi-
nated market economies (CME)’, usually based on the principle of col-
laboration, credible commitments by ﬁ rms, as well as non-market re-
lations. More speciﬁ cally, the peculiarities of the continental European 
economies ﬁ t better with the deﬁ nition of the sectoral-CMEs sub-clus-
ter, characterised by sectoral coordination and weaker social partners 
than in the national-coordinated Nordic countries (Agostini and Natali 
forthcoming). Nonetheless, the German model ﬁ ts poorly into general 
categories due to its speciﬁ c features. According to Hall (2015: 45), ‘the 
German political economy displays some distinctive features constitu-
tive of a German model of economic development’, as it has been shaped 
by the combination of speciﬁ c institutional, political and economic ele-
ments both at the micro and macro levels of the economy. At the macro 
level, both institutions and policies have helped to shape a favourable 
environment for business, combined with a generous welfare state. At 
the micro level, ﬁ rm organisation and coordination, as well as the in-
stitutional environment in which they operate, are determining factors 
of the high quality of their production (ibid.: 46). The manufacturing 
sector, which plays a leading role in Germany’s export-led economy, is 
characterised by numerous medium-sized ﬁ rms, preference for business 
strategies focused on high-quality production and a thriving innovation 
system (Calvo 2015: 336). The whole microeconomic level is supported 
by a strong system of higher education and vocational training, local 
banks with specialised business knowledge, a dense and high-quality 
network of institutions devoted to industrial innovation and consensual 
collective agreements (ibid.). 
The industrial relations system constitutes an additional peculiarity of 
the German model compared with its peer sectoral-CMEs. Indeed, soon 
after reuniﬁ cation, employers began increasingly to oppose sectoral col-
Germany
lective agreements, preferring to adjust pay and working hours accord-
ing to local needs (Carlin et al. 2015: 53). By the late 1990s, plant-level 
agreements between management and works councils became frequent, 
and these even started to shape sectoral agreements rather than the 
other way round (ibid.). Nowadays, however, sectoral collective bargain-
ing remains the dominant level of collective bargaining in Germany, al-
though company-level bargaining is increasingly important (EurWORK 
2015). With regard to worker representation at national level, trade un-
ions used to be a cornerstone of German social dialogue, with a high level 
of worker participation, especially in western Germany (Schweiger 2014: 
107). However, their position has become increasingly weak, in terms of 
both union density and their inability to rally support for industrial ac-
tion (Carlin et al. 2015: 55–56).
As for the speciﬁ cities of the labour market, Germany belongs to the Con-
tinental European cluster, characterised by a traditionally high degree of 
labour market protection, combined with high levels of spending on pas-
sive measures and few active labour market policies (Agostini and Natali 
forthcoming). However, in Germany there is a large gap in the degree of 
labour protection between insiders and outsiders. This has been partly 
reduced by the implementation of the ‘Hartz reforms’ in the early 2000s, 
although more by reducing labour protection for insiders than improv-
ing protection for outsiders (Carlin et al. 2015: 65). These early ‘auster-
ity’-related labour market reforms were aimed at fostering ‘activation’ 
Table 12 The German social model
Labour market regime Welfare regime Varieties of capitalism
Continental European Conservative-corporatist Sectoral-coordinated market 
economy
Peculiarities: 
- Labour market protection 
relatively high for insiders 
(even though reduced 
following implementation 
of the Hartz reforms), but 
substantially lower for 
outsiders
- Reduced unemployment 
benefi ts and increased ALMP 
(following adoption of the 
Hartz IV reform)
Peculiarities:
- Strong reliance on plant-
level agreements between 
management and work 
councils.
- Historically strong trade 
unions at national level.
Source: Agostini and Natali (forthcoming).
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of the unemployed by introducing new ﬂ exible and part-time contracts. 
With regard to passive measures – although the unemployment insur-
ance system was one of the basic pillars of Germany’s Bismarckian wel-
fare state – these were reduced and reshaped by the ‘Hartz IV’ reform in 
order to lower the costs of the welfare system, ostensibly because of high 
unemployment (Carlin et al. 2015). Also, active labour market policies 
gained momentum during this period, although they were not usually a 
key element of the Continental European labour market strategies.
Drawing on the index of EU leverage on Member States’ policies outlined 
by Stamati and Baeten (2014), Germany can be included in the group of 
countries subject to moderate leverage from the EU system of economic 
governance. The country is indeed a member of the euro zone and sub-
ject to the Fiscal Compact. It underwent an Excessive Deﬁ cit Procedure 
(EDP) from 2009 to 2012, but has never been subject to a Macroeco-
nomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP). However, it is worth mentioning 
that the country managed to close its EDP well ahead of the deadline 
set for 2013, reducing its deﬁ cit to 1 per cent as early as 2011 (Council 
2012). The improved budgetary situation was driven by favourable cycli-
cal conditions, a robust labour market, ﬁ scal consolidation eﬀ orts and 
the phasing-out of economic stimulus and ﬁ nancial sector stabilisation 
measures (ibid.). Within the European Semester and on publication of 
the European Commission’s in-depth reviews on macroeconomic imbal-
ances, causes for concern were highlighted, mainly with regard to the 
large and recurrent German current account surplus, as this restricts 
the neighbouring Member States’ possibilities to compete internation-
ally with the German export-led economy. For the same reason, pressure 
to increase public investment in order to support domestic demand has 
been a recurrent theme in the Council’s CSRs addressed to Germany.
Angela Merkel has dominated German politics for the past 10 years. Due 
to the narrow victory of the Christian Democrats over the Social Demo-
crats in the 2005 general election a Grand Coalition government of the 
two largest German political parties was formed. This limited to a cer-
tain extent the government’s ability to carry out controversial ‘reforms’ 
(Funk 2013: 202), although it still managed to implement several crisis-
related measures during the 2008–2009 emergency period. These were 
mainly measures to support the ﬁ nancial sector, boost domestic demand 
and strengthen active labour market policies with a view to reducing the 
shock produced by the considerably worsened export prospects and the 
ﬁ nancial instability related to the crisis (ibid.) Nonetheless, the resulting 
Country cases
surge in general government debt has been taken by the following Mer-
kel government as a cue to pursue more restrictive economic policies. 
In 2009, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) formed a new coalition 
government with the Free Democratic Party (FDP), its former partner 
in government from 1982 to 1998. The reforms implemented between 
2009 and 2013 were heavily inﬂ uenced by these parties’ perception of 
the economic crisis and the increasing public debt levels aﬀ ecting EU 
Member States. Therefore, the so-called ‘debt brake’ and, more gener-
ally, the government’s commitment to ‘ﬁ scal sustainability and respon-
sibility’ became the dominant policy tools of German economic and ﬁ -
nancial policy. 
The federal election held in 2013 resulted in a clear victory for the Chris-
tian Democrats (The Economist, 2013), but the CDU did not gain enough 
seats to form a one-party government. Nevertheless, due to the poor re-
sults obtained by the CDU’s previous coalition partner, which even failed 
to get into Parliament at all (the FDP), Chancellor Merkel agreed to form 
a new coalition with the SPD (Spiegel Online International 2013; Fed-
eral Government 2013). The new government’s programme includes 
measures new to labour market developments in Germany (EurWORK 
2014a), including the establishment of a national minimum wage aimed 
Germany
Table 13 German governments, 2005–present
Years Prime 
Minister
Position in 
the political 
spectrum
Coalition forces Reform 
programme
2005–2009 
(October)
Angela 
Merkel
Grand 
coalition 
- Christian Democratic Union 
(CDU)/Christian Social 
Union (CSU) 
- Social Democratic Party 
(SPD)
Selective investment;
Crisis-related stimu-
lus measures
2009–2013 Angela 
Merkel
Centre-right - Christian Democratic Union 
(CDU)/Christian Social 
Union (CSU)
- Free Democratic Party (FDP)
Selective investment;
Fiscal consolidation 
package 
2013– Angela 
Merkel
Grand 
coalition 
- Christian Democratic Party 
(CDU)/Christian Social Un-
ion (CSU)
- Social Democratic Party 
(SPD)
Some social stand-
ards improvements;
‘Fiscal responsibility’;
Growth-enhancing 
and social investment
Source: Funk 2013, Federal Government of Germany.
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at tackling pay gaps and reducing the share of low-wage earners. It is just 
as committed to ﬁ scal consolidation as the previous Merkel government, 
but ﬁ scal restraints will seemingly not be applied to growth-enhancing 
policy sectors, such as education and research (a strategy of selective 
investment).
3.3.2 Structural reforms sector by sector
Pensions
Public expenditure on pensions in Germany was above average in com-
parison with other Continental economies until 2005, when an impor-
tant reform of the pension system was adopted. After starting to decrease 
in 2006, federal government expenditure on pensions remained fairly 
stable during the crisis-related years and even increased between 2008 
and 2009 (Annex to Agostini and Natali forthcoming). Indeed, pension 
reforms implemented in Germany in the wake of the crisis have not fol-
lowed the same retrenchment trend typical of several other countries in 
the EU. Germany is part of the group of Member States – also includ-
ing Austria and the Netherlands – that have adopted a rather mixed set 
of reforms, resulting in a longer term reduction, but also some beneﬁ t 
improvements (Natali and Zaidi 2015). In other words, pensioners in 
Germany did not suﬀ er a reduction of pension payments, but rather im-
provements in adequacy (ibid.). Speciﬁ cally, pensions increased by 2.41 
per cent in 2009 (rather than 1.76 per cent as set out in the 2005 rules), 
although there was no increase in 2010 (–2.1 per cent) (OECD 2013d: 
30).
As for the retirement age, the legislation adopted in 2007 increased the 
pension age from 65 to 67 (OECD 2013d: 30). However, the pension re-
form adopted in 2014 by the new CDU–SPD coalition government has 
again provided more generous pension entitlements. The reform, partic-
ularly sought by the Social Democrats, has come with no pressure from 
the European institutions and has been widely criticised in economic 
terms, including by the European Commission in its 2015 Country Re-
port. The new regulation accounts for most of the planned federal gov-
ernment’s higher spending. It provides for pension increases to women 
who gave birth before 1992, while workers with more than 45 years of 
contribution records can retire on a full pension at 63 years, rising to 65 
years, in line with the increase in the standard legal pension age from 
65 to 67 years (OECD 2014c: 107). According to the EC, the measure 
Germany
puts additional strain on the sustainability of the pension system and af-
fects intergenerational income distribution, especially given the project-
ed strong decline in Germany’s working-age population and a possible 
shortage of skilled workers in the medium term (European Commission 
2015:59). Moreover, despite the CSR issued in 2014 on the necessity to 
improve the sustainability of the pension system, no major actions have 
been taken in this direction during the year. 
To sum up, pension payments remained stable in the wake of the crisis, 
with some improvements in adequacy. Nonetheless, the reform path was 
less generous with regard to the changes of the retirement age (2007) 
professedly adopted to cope with an ageing population and lack of skilled 
workers in the country. However, the reform path initiated by the new 
‘grand coalition’ government is deviating from this fairly mixed set of 
reforms towards a strategy involving increased investment in pensions.
Labour market
As already mentioned, the German labour market was subjected to many 
structural reforms during the early 2000s. However, in the period that 
followed the outbreak of the economic and ﬁ nancial crisis, several meas-
ures were implemented and, combined with a ﬂ exible collective bargain-
ing system, this allowed the labour market to adjust to the new crisis 
situation. As for the results of collective agreements with regard to wage 
setting and working time provisions, the mainstream trend during the 
recession has been to ﬂ exibilise working time, as well as to reduce wage 
increases in exchange for job security. Speciﬁ cally, the average wage in-
crease fell from 2.9 per cent in 2008 to 2.6 per cent in 2009 and 1.8 per 
cent in 2010 (Reisenbichler and Morgan 2015: 70). It ﬁ nally began to 
rise again in 2012 and 2013 (+2.7 per cent) (ibid.: 73). 
The economic stimulus packages adopted in 2008 and 2009 – the so-
called ESP I and ESP II – introduced market measures, including the 
extension of the entitlement period for short-time working beneﬁ ts to 18 
(ESP I) and 24 (ESP II) months by the end of 2010 (Funk 2013: 211). In 
2011, entitlement to short-time allowances was reduced to six months by 
the second Merkel government, but it was later (temporarily) extended 
to 12 months one year later (Bandau and Dümig 2014: 340). The overall 
trend in labour market policies between 2009 and 2013 – in other words 
during the mandate of the centre-right CDU–FDP government – was 
limited mainly to readjustments of existing policy measures. Nonethe-
less, these readjustments were aimed primarily at ﬁ scal consolidation. 
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The austerity package approved in 2010 led to a series of cuts to the ba-
sic social security scheme for job-seekers – also known as Hartz IV – 
only partially mitigated by the intervention of the Federal Constitutional 
Court (FCC) (ibid.: 342–343). As for active labour market policies, the 
government had recourse mainly to cuts and mergers of single measures 
(ibid.: 344). Nonetheless, the relative scarcity of reforms during the pe-
riod compared with under previous governments was probably due to 
the good economic environment at the time. 
In 2015, the second Grand Coalition government of the CDU/CSU and 
the SPD introduced a national minimum wage set at 8.5 euros per hour 
for all workers in order to reduce the gap between insiders and employ-
ees in insecure employment (OECD 2014c). Some important exceptions 
included those sectors already covered by minimum wages stipulated in 
the Posted Workers Act. Moreover, sectoral collective agreements be-
tween social partners can be exempted from applying the ﬁ xed minimum 
wage until the end of 2016, after which time all sectors will have to com-
ply with the new regulation (EurWORK 2014a). The measure aims at 
counteracting the dualisation of the German labour market, extensively 
criticised by European institutions as well as benchmarking organisa-
tions. Therefore, after increasing employment rates, often to the detri-
ment of outsider workers’ conditions, the path of reform seems aimed at 
reducing the gap between core workers and those with a-typical, low-in-
come jobs. That said, there is the risk that the introduction of a statutory 
minimum wage could actually bring about job losses and reduced oppor-
tunities for low-skilled workers to enter the labour markets. In order to 
prevent negative eﬀ ects from the new measure, a commission composed 
of representatives of the employers’ associations and trade unions will 
review the level of the minimum wage, with a ﬁ rst review set for June 
2017 (EurWORK 2014a). 
To sum up, three major trends can be identiﬁ ed in the labour market pol-
icies promoted by the authorities in 2008–2015: (i) introduction of stim-
ulus measures and use of automatic stabilisers during the 2008–2009 
crisis period (Funk 2013); (ii) the implementation of restrictive, though 
minor, measures devoted to ﬁ scal consolidation between 2010 and 2013 
(Bandau and Dümig 2014); and (iii) de-dualisation of the labour market 
by improving the conditions of the low-wage sector earners in 2014 and 
2015 (Reisenbichler and Morgan 2015). Therefore, the reform path un-
dertaken has been fairly irregular. However, this has helped the labour 
market to adjust in timely fashion to the various economic shocks.
Germany
Education
Public expenditure on education in Germany increased slightly, but 
steadily in the ﬁ rst years following the outbreak of the crisis,24 both in 
terms of percentage of GDP and as a percentage of total public spending 
(Annex to Agostini and Natali forthcoming). According to the EC coun-
try report, these increases are not suɤ  cient, as the level of expenditure 
on education is below the EU average (European Commission 2015d). 
However, expenditure per student is well above the EU average, as the 
country has a ranking of eighth among the EU27 (European Commis-
sion 2014c: 3). Additionally, Germany spends below the EU average on 
primary education, but above average on upper secondary and tertiary 
education (ibid.), a policy in line with the need for a highly-skilled and 
specialised labour force for its innovation-driven economy. 
Nonetheless, early childhood education and care is the policy ﬁ eld in 
which the greatest improvements have been made in the past decade 
(Hanesch et al. 2015), through the provision of new facilities, regula-
tion and funding. Speciﬁ cally, since the Day Care Development Act 
(Tagesbetreuungsausbaugesetz) came into force in 2005 and the Child-
care Funding Act (Kinderförderungsgesetz, KiföG) in 2008, important 
changes have occurred in terms of the range of childhood services of-
fered, especially to children under three years of age (International Cen-
tre Early Childhood Education and Care 2015). These included funding 
from the federal government and the Länder for the expansion of facili-
ties, which occurred until 2013. Moreover, in August 2013 the Childcare 
Funding Act introduced a statutory right for children to attend centre-
based early childhood services or family day care from the age of one on-
wards (ibid.). The crisis seems to have brought about little or no change 
in the national priorities for early childhood education and care policy, 
or in the ﬁ eld of education in general.
In 2009, additional funding was made available for all levels of educa-
tion under the Investing in the Future Act, which provided 8.7 billion 
euros between 2009 and 2011 for early childhood education, school and 
university infrastructure, local facilities for further education and for re-
search. Also, in recent years policymakers have devoted some attention to 
improving the quality of teaching, an objective pursued in various stages 
through the adoption of the Quality Pact for Teaching in 2010 (OECD 
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Education Reform Finder) and afterwards with the introduction of a new 
federal government/Länder programme (Qualitätsoﬀ ensive Lehrerbil-
dung) concluded in 2013 in support of teacher training through the in-
troduction of innovative concepts (European Commission, 2015d: 65, 
Federal Ministry for Economic Aﬀ airs and Energy, 2014: 42). Although 
these measures had diﬀ ering objectives (the former concerns only public 
higher education institutions) both involve signiﬁ cant public investment 
in the education system. Speciﬁ cally, the ﬁ rst provides for investment of 
2 billion euros in the timeframe 2011–2020 and the second involves 500 
million euros (OECD 2015b; European Commission 2015d: 65).
Vocational Education and Training (VET) has always been an important 
element of both the German education system and the labour market, as it 
is one of the reasons for the country’s low youth unemployment rate (Eu-
ropean Commission 2014c). Therefore, the VET system has been regu-
larly updated to meet labour market needs in recent years (OECD 2014c: 
44). By contrast, according to the recurrent CSRs received by the country 
on the theme of education, still more should be done in terms of raising 
the educational level of disadvantaged people and providing greater op-
portunities for entry into the education system. Action has been taken 
by some Länder with a view to reducing the stratiﬁ cation of the school 
system by combining diﬀ erent school tracks in one school type (OECD 
2014c: 43). Moreover, several other measures were implemented in the 
Länder between 2013 and 2015 with the purpose of raising the level of 
education of disadvantaged people, as underlined in the National Re-
form Programme (NRP) for 2014. This shows some degree of concern to 
comply with recommendations issued by the Council on the topic. 
Overall, the policies implemented in the ﬁ eld of education, in terms of 
both expenditure and programmes aimed at improving the quality and 
fairness of the system, have been fairly consistent during the whole pe-
riod with expansionary reform activity. In this regard, neither the eco-
nomic and budgetary situation of the country, nor the diﬀ erent colours 
of governments in power have seemed to produce substantial changes in 
this pro-growth reform path.
Public sector
Since 2008, there have been no special adjustment programmes or 
structural reforms in the German public sector (Bosch et al. 2012). Pay 
reductions and wage freezes have been less common in Germany than 
in other Member States (Eurofound 2015: 8). From 2009 onwards, this 
singular trend could also be seen in the area of job losses, as the number 
of employees in the public sector slightly increased. However, this was 
the result of the increase in employment in the education and child-care 
subcategories (Keller 2014: 389), while the number of employees in pub-
lic administration, defence and compulsory social security25 remained 
fairly stable in 2008–2013, with an average change of 0.2 per cent (An-
nex to Agostini and Natali forthcoming). Nonetheless, it is worth men-
tioning that the lack of major reforms and restrictive measures since 
the outbreak of the crisis is at least partially the result of signiﬁ cant job 
losses and early austerity measures in the 1990s and 2000s, which also 
produced important cumulative eﬀ ects in the following years (Bosch et 
al. 2012: 7; Keller 2014: 388). Overall employment in the sector dropped 
from 6.7 million in 1991 to 4.5 million in 2009 – later increasing to 4.6 
million – thus contributing to the development of a ‘lean’ public sector 
(Keller 2014: 389).
The structure of German public services is characterised by three lev-
els of government: the Federal level, the Länder and the municipalities. 
Moreover, public employees are divided into salaried employees and 
civil servants (Beamte). The latter category has a unique status regulated 
by the Constitution, including life-long employment. Both these distinc-
tions are of particular importance for understanding the early austerity 
measures implemented from the 1990s. Indeed, the measures aﬀ ected 
employees mainly at municipal level – especially in eastern Germany 
after reuniﬁ cation – and non-civil servants, whose status was less well 
protected by law than that of the Beamte.
With regard to pressure from European institutions to reform the public 
sector in Germany – more speciﬁ cally the public administration – the 
only cause for concern (also expressed in the Country Report published 
by the EC in 2015) is the need to reduce the administrative burden on 
businesses and to improve e-government services. Indeed, Germany is 
among the Member States with the least online interaction between pub-
lic authorities and citizens (23rd out of 28 Member States – European 
Commission 2015d: 72). However, no speciﬁ c mention of the need to 
improve the public administration can be found in the CSRs addressed 
to the country in recent years. 
Germany
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It follows that, when it comes to reform of the public sector – besides the 
cutbacks of the years preceding the outbreak of the crisis – there is no 
important reform trend to underline. Nonetheless, a slight increase in the 
number of employees in the public sector, as a result of increased em-
ployment in education – especially the early childhood education and care 
sub-category – might suggest the presence of a lean expansionary trend. 
Research and development 
In the ﬁ eld of innovation, Germany is close to achieving its Europe 2020 
expenditure target of 3 per cent of GDP. The country performs above av-
erage also in terms of outcomes, as it is the best performer in the EU ac-
cording to the European Innovation Output Indicator (European Com-
mission 2015d: 71). Nonetheless, in recent years, pressure to increase 
public investment in R&D has come regularly from the CSR addressed 
to Germany. The level of investment in Germany is indeed lower than in 
other innovation-driven economies in Europe, such as Denmark, Fin-
land and Sweden (Annex to Agostini and Natali forthcoming). Moreover, 
R&D activities and expenditure remain mainly supported by the private 
sector in the country, as industry accounts for well over half of all spend-
ing on R&D (Federal Ministry for Economic Aﬀ airs and Energy, 2014: 
27). Nevertheless, the federal government has made consistent eﬀ orts to 
improve national competitiveness in terms of research and innovation, 
as shown by the additional funding included in the 2014 stability pro-
gramme, providing 3 billion euros for research, combined with increased 
expenditure of 6 billion euros for ﬁ nancing childcare facilities, schools 
and higher education institutions (European Commission 2015d: 31).
The expansionary trend in R&D expenditure has not changed in the af-
termath of the crisis. This can be partly shown by the extension – in terms 
of both timing and funding – of the programme ‘Research at Universities 
of Applied Sciences’, fostering application-related research in the ﬁ elds 
of engineering, natural sciences, social sciences and economics in col-
laboration with business enterprises (especially SMEs) and university-
based and non-university research institutions. The joint programme 
between the federal government and the Länder was launched in 2005 
and since then its funding has quadrupled from 10.5 million euros in the 
ﬁ rst year to roughly 41.5 million euros in 2013 (Federal Ministry for Eco-
nomic Aﬀ airs and Energy 2014: 61). Moreover, the new coalition govern-
ment has taken further steps to improve national business capacity by 
adopting the new Digital Agenda 2014–2017, approved in August 2014. 
This will expand high-speed data lines, boost internet security and foster 
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cyber-related entrepreneurship. It will also provide fast broadband (50 
Megabits per second) internet to rural and urban areas by 2018 (Euro-
pean Commission, 2015d: 71). Additionally, the update of the High tech 
strategy in 2014 is aimed at strengthening economic growth by means 
of a coherent innovation policy, supporting knowledge transfer and in-
novation in future markets (ibid.).
To conclude, the reform trend with regard to R&D policies has been fair-
ly consistent over the years with the investment strategy typical of highly 
innovation-driven economies, although the level of public expenditure is 
still below the average performance of similar economies within the EU. 
However, diﬀ erent digital strategies and the focus on increased coopera-
tion between academic and non-academic research institutes and busi-
nesses prove the level of commitment of public authorities to constantly 
improving economic competitiveness. 
3.3.3 Preliminary remarks on structural reforms in Germany and 
their determinants
In the wake of the crisis, the restrictive measures implemented in Ger-
many have spared the sectors of education and innovation, especially 
with regard to R&D activities, tertiary education and VET. Thus, the va-
riety of capitalism pursued in the German innovation-driven economy 
has played a role in deﬁ ning the reform path taken, also at a time of 
ﬁ nancial and economic constraints. 
However, the country’s welfare model and labour market underwent sig-
niﬁ cant restrictive changes in the years before the crisis and continued 
to undergo adjustments in its aftermath. The reforms ultimately led to 
the shrinking of the welfare state and dualisation of the labour market, 
despite an above-average level of employment, also among young people 
and women. Nonetheless, the policies implemented and planned by the 
new CDU–SPD coalition government will supposedly reduce the labour 
market gap between insiders and outsiders and increase social invest-
ment, while remaining committed to the principle of ‘ﬁ scal responsibil-
ity’. As regards pensions, the federal government has been relatively in-
dependent in pursuing its programmed reform path, also in the presence 
of opposing recommendations from the European institutions. Indeed, 
the EU’s inﬂ uence on the path of reform in Germany was fairly substan-
tial at the time of the launch of the EDP, but shrank after its closure. 
Germany
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Table 14 Summary table: drivers of reform and major reform trends in 
Germany, 2008–2014
2008–2009 2010–2012 2013–2014
Drivers of reform
Economic crisis Deep recession;
Surge of general 
government defi cit 
Economic recovery; 
High general public 
defi cit (2010)
Slight economic 
growth;
Slight general govern-
ment surplus
Coalition governments Grand coalition 
(CDU/CSU-SPD)
Centre-right (CDU/
CSU-FDP)
Grand coalition 
(CDU/CSU–SPD)
EU infl uence EDP (from December 
2009)
EDP (until June 2012)
European Semester
European Semester
Structural reforms
Reform path (for the 
fi ve policies under 
scrutiny)
Selective investment Selective investment Social standards 
improvements
Main reforms in each 
policy fi eld
Pensions - Improvement in 
adequacy ratio
- Increased retirement 
age (2007)
- Reform of pensions 
2014
Labour market - Automatic stabilisers
- ESP I and ESP II
- Downward readjust-
ment of existing 
policies 
- National minimum 
wage
Education - Childcare funding 
act
- Investing in 
the future act 
(2009–2011)
- Quality pact for 
teaching
- Investing in 
the future act 
(2009–2011)
- Steps to increase the 
fairness of the sys-
tem (some Länder)
Public sector Minor reforms (early austerity measures adopted before the outbreak of 
the crisis)
Research and 
development
- Research at universi-
ties of applied sci-
ences (from 2005, 
ongoing)
- Digital agenda
- High tech strategy
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
Ireland
Overall, the reform trend has reﬂ ected, to a great extent, a selective 
investment strategy. Substantial investments in those policy sectors 
deﬁ ned as growth-enhancing were combined with a shrinking level of 
workers’ protection and a fairly mixed set of pension reforms. However, 
more generous measures were implemented horizontally among policy 
sectors in 2008 and 2009, in reaction to the recession, while ﬁ scal con-
solidation measures were implemented soon afterwards with a view to 
improving the federal budgetary condition. In 2014 and 2015, a new 
tendency towards social standards improvements was launched through 
the adoption of the pension reform and the establishment of a national 
minimum wage.
3.4 Ireland
3.4.1 Setting the scene: key traits of the country’s political 
economy
Ireland has been one of the EU countries hardest hit by the ﬁ nancial 
and economic crisis that began in 2008. In 2010, the Irish government 
asked the European Union and the International Monetary Fund for ﬁ -
Table 15 Ireland: selected socio-economic indicators, 2007–2014
Indicators/years 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Real GDP growth 4.9 –2.6 –6.4 –0.3 2.8 –0.3 0.2 4.8
General government 
gross debt (EDP con-
cept) (% of GDP)
24.0 42.6 62.3 87.4 111.2 121.7 123.2 109.7
General government 
defi cit/surplus (% of 
GDP)
0.3 –7.0 –13.9 –32.5 –12.7 –8.1 –5.8 –4.1
Employment rate (% 
20-64)
73.8b 72.2 66.9 64.6 63.8 63.7 65.5 67.0
Unemployment rate 
(%)
4.7 6.4 12.0 13.9 14.7 14.7 13.1 11.3
People at risk of 
poverty or social 
exclusion (% of total 
population)
23.1 23.7 25.7 27.3 29.4 30.0 29.5 n.a.
Note: b = break in time series.
Source: Annex to Agostini and Natali (forthcoming: Appendix).
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nancial assistance. Before 2008, the country experienced a fairly high 
rate of GDP growth (4.9 per cent in 2007) and sound budgetary condi-
tions (public debt and deﬁ cit were, respectively, at 24 per cent and +0.3 
per cent of GDP in 2007). However, the years between 2008 and 2013 
saw a sharp deterioration of those indicators, with GDP growth falling by 
–6.4 per cent in 2009, the public deﬁ cit reaching 32.5 per cent of GDP 
in 2010 and public debt touching 123.2 per cent of GDP in 2013. The 
employment situation deteriorated signiﬁ cantly over the crisis years: the 
employment rate decreased from 73.8 per cent in 2007 to 63.7 per cent 
in 2012, while the unemployment rate, which stood at 4.7 per cent in 
2007, peaked at 14.7 per cent in 2011. In 2007, the rate of people at risk 
of poverty or social exclusion was 23.1 per cent, rising to 30.0 per cent 
in 2012 (Table 15). 
In 2014, the Irish economy showed some signs of recovery, at least in 
terms of GDP growth (+4.8 per cent) and some improvements of budg-
etary indicators: in 2014, public debt was 109.7 per cent of GDP (13.5 
percentage points lower than 2013) and the deﬁ cit was 4.1 per cent 
of GDP (1.7 percentage points lower than 2013). However, only modest 
progress was registered for employment and social indicators: in 2014, 
the employment rate reached 67.0 per cent (+1.5 percentage points 
compared with 2013, –6.8 percentage points compared with 2007) 
and the unemployment rate was 11.3 per cent (–1.9 percentage points 
compared with 2013 and +6.6 percentage points compared with 2007). 
In 2013, 29.5 per cent of the Irish population were at risk of poverty 
and social exclusion, which means a decrease of 0.5 percentage points 
compared with 2012 and an increase of 6.4 percentage points compared 
with 2007 data.
Scholars invoking the ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach generally situ-
ate Ireland among the liberal market economies. However, the country 
shows some important peculiarities, inherited mainly from economic 
policy choices made at the end of the 1980s (Kirby 2008; Schweiger 
2014). First, the Irish economy has traditionally been highly dependent 
on foreign direct investments and on exports, much more than other 
countries in the liberal market cluster. Second, the country’s industrial 
relations system displays some features comparable to the coordinative 
arrangements characterising coordinated market economies. Ireland is 
indeed among the most open economies in Europe: the establishment 
in the country of large multinational companies and the export of their 
products were the basis of the ‘Celtic Tiger’ boom during the 1990s, a 
Ireland
period characterised by high rates of GDP growth, increasing employ-
ment and decreasing unemployment rates. Policy choices made in that 
period pursued a precise strategy for increasing national competitive-
ness, creating an attractive environment for foreign direct investments, 
which have indeed given the Irish economy a comparative institutional 
advantage (Kirby 2008). Foreign investors were oﬀ ered among the low-
est corporation taxes in Europe and a stable, non-conﬂ ictual industrial 
relations system. Employment relations in Ireland have historically re-
lied on a ‘voluntarist’ approach, with the state providing a supportive 
framework for collective bargaining, which results in non–legally en-
forceable collective agreements binding only on the signatory parties 
(Doherty 2014). At the sectoral level, important exceptions are the Reg-
istered Employment Agreements (REAs) – sectoral agreements regis-
tered with the Labour Court applying to all the employers and employees 
in the sector – and the Employment Regulation Orders (EROs) agreed 
by Joint Labour Committees (JLCs) and setting legally binding mini-
mum wages and working conditions for the relevant sector (ibid.). At the 
national level, a peculiar feature of the Irish industrial relations system 
is the so-called ‘social partnership’ model, a ‘semi-corporatist’ model 
(Schweiger 2014) based on triennial social pacts signed by the govern-
ment, employers’ representatives and trade unions. Social partnership, 
developed since 1987, has entailed a strong centralisation of the social 
relations system, although it still relies on a regulatory framework based 
on voluntarism (Baccaro and Howell 2011; Doherty 2014). While social 
pacts agreed over the years have focused on a variety of issues, the key 
feature of these deals has remained constant: wage moderation in return 
for a reduction in personal taxation (Kirby 2008). That said, wage mod-
Table 16 The Irish social model
Labour market regime Welfare regime Varieties of capitalism
Anglo-Saxon Liberal Liberal market economy
Peculiarities:
- Strong dependence on FDI 
and important presence of 
multinational companies;
- Coordinative arrangements 
at both sectoral (REAs, 
EROs) and national level 
(social partnership)
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Agostini and Natali (forthcoming).
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eration has been more rigidly enforced in the private sector than in the 
public sector (Baccaro and Howell 2011: 546). 
In terms of welfare regime, Ireland displays most of the characteristics 
of liberal welfare regimes (Kirby 2008). The Irish welfare system has 
a residual nature and relies substantially on non-contributory, means-
tested beneﬁ ts. Cash beneﬁ ts – generally kept at a low level – signiﬁ -
cantly prevail over services. Social protection spending as a percentage 
of GDP has traditionally lagged behind the EU average – even during 
the years of sustained growth of the ‘Celtic Tiger’ – and the system has 
proved to be scarcely eﬀ ective when it comes to the reduction of pov-
erty and inequalities. Overall, though social spending has increased and 
new provisions have been gradually introduced over time, the Irish so-
cial protection system has always remained aligned with the imperative 
of cost competitiveness characterising the country’s economic policy 
objectives (Dukelow 2015). Looking more speciﬁ cally at labour market 
policies, the Irish model has taken some inspiration from the Danish and 
Dutch systems of ﬂ exicurity, with some emphasis on activation and hu-
man capital development: however, the presence of a signiﬁ cant degree 
of ﬂ exibility26 was never accompanied by equally generous unemploy-
ment beneﬁ ts (Baccaro and Howell 2011: 546). 
The beginning of the 2000s represented a turning point for the Irish econ-
omy. Although still extremely important, foreign direct investment started 
to slow down and the importance of domestic demand increased (Sch-
weiger 2014: 156). The latter was fuelled by an expansion of the con-
struction sector and the development of risky ﬁ nancial practices, which 
favoured private borrowing and the development of a property bubble. 
Thus, despite the country’s growth rate and its sound budgetary posi-
tion, the business model of many Irish banks left them signiﬁ cantly ex-
posed to the turmoil of the US ﬁ nancial sector in 2007–2008. In Sep-
tember 2008, the Irish government announced that it would guarantee 
all the banks’ liabilities. Because of this cash inundation into the banking 
system, the ﬁ nancial crisis rapidly turned into a sovereign debt and eco-
nomic crisis and, in November 2010, the Irish government oɤ  cially 
asked for ﬁ nancial assistance from the EU and the IMF. As is the case for 
the other countries under ﬁ nancial assistance, the Economic Adjustment 
Country cases
26. Considering the strictness of employment protection over the period 1999-2013, Ireland 
displays values among the lowest in the EU (Agostini and Natali forthcoming: Appendix).
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Programme (EAP) for Ireland, signed in December 2010, foresaw three 
types of measure (European Commission 2011): (i) ﬁ nancial measures 
(with the aim to achieve a fundamental downsizing and reorganisation 
of the banking sector); (ii) ﬁ scal measures (restoring ﬁ scal sustainabil-
ity through expenditure cuts and changes to the tax system); and (iii) 
structural reforms (including, for instance, reforms of the labour market). 
Ireland oɤ  cially left the ﬁ nancial assistance programme in November 
2013, entering into the post-programme surveillance phase. Further-
more, since 2009 the country has been under the corrective arm of the 
SGP (Excessive Deﬁ cit Procedure) and, for 2014 and 2015, it was among 
the countries for which the Commission had detected macroeconomic 
imbalances, which require ‘speciﬁ c monitoring and decisive policy ac-
tion’.
Three governments have been in power over the period 2008–2015. In 
2007, a coalition government headed by Bertie Ahern (Fianna Fáil) was 
formed. The lead party was Fianna Fáil, a centrist/conservative party, 
while the other members of the majority were the Progressive Demo-
crats (liberals) and the Green Party (Table 17). 
In 2008, a period characterised by signiﬁ cant political turmoil, Mr Ah-
ern was replaced by Brian Cowen (Fianna Fáil) and the new govern-
ment coalition was made up of Fianna Fáil and the Green Party. The 
rapid deterioration of the ﬁ nancial situation from 2008 made the Cowen 
government extremely unpopular and Mr Cowen resigned in 2011. The 
two opposition parties – Fine Gael (centre-right) and the Labour Party 
Table 17 Irish governments, 2007–present
Years Prime Min-
ister
Position in 
the political 
spectrum
Coalition forces Reform 
programme
2007–2008 Bertie Ahern 
(Fianna Fáil)
Centrist-
conservative
- Fianna Fáil
- Progressive Democrats
- Green Party
Social standards 
devaluation
2008–2011 Brian Cowen 
(Fianna Fáil)
Centrist-
conservative
- Fianna Fáil
- Green Party
Social standards 
devaluation
2011– Enda Kenny
(Fine Gael)
Right-left  
coalition
- Fine Gael
- Labour Party
Social standards 
devaluation
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
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– won the early general election held in February 2011 and formed a 
coalition government headed by Enda Kenny (Fine Gael). Looking at the 
governments’ stance during the crisis, some observers point out that – 
overall – the interpretation of the causes of the crisis and of the actions 
needed was not disputed by members of the Irish political and economic 
elites (Dukelow 2015). The crisis was attributed to an excessive growth 
in expenditure and a related loss in competitiveness and reputation, so 
priority was to be given to cost containment and to the rescue of the 
banking system in order to preserve investors’ conﬁ dence. An austerity 
plan amounting to 9 per cent of GDP was implemented in 2008–2009 
and the Kenny government basically continued the austerity policy of its 
predecessors (social standards devaluation).
 
3.4.2 Structural reforms sector by sector
Pensions
Pension reforms have been at the heart of ﬁ scal consolidation eﬀ orts of 
Irish governments over the crisis years. Measures implemented since 
2009 have included cuts in pensions, changes concerning the retirement 
age and access conditions and cuts in public support to pre-funded pen-
sion schemes (Natali and Zaidi 2015). 
The Irish MoU (European Commission 2011) contained measures re-
lated to pensions, including a reduction in pension tax relief and pen-
sion-related deductions to be undertaken in 2011 and the enactment of 
a reform increasing the state pension age in line with the government’s 
National Pension Framework.27 Speciﬁ c provisions concerned public 
service pensions: existing beneﬁ ts had to be reduced on a progressive 
basis averaging over 4 per cent, while a reform to be enacted in 2011 
was expected to set up a new regime for new entrants. Notably, the 2011 
reform was expected to provide for: a review of accelerated retirement 
for certain categories of public servants and an indexation of pensions to 
27. The National Pensions Framework – published by the Cowen government in March 2010 
as part of the negotiation for the rescue programme – set out the direction of future re-
forms. It included provisions on public sector pensions, higher retirement ages, the reform 
of tax subsidies as well as the expansion of coverage among low and middle income groups 
(Natali and Stamati 2013: 27). This document foresaw a gradual increase in the age for 
qualifying for the state pension to 66 years in 2014, 67 in 2021 and 68 in 2028. 
Ireland
consumer prices; linking pensions to average career earnings; and link-
ing new entrants’ retirement age to the state pension retirement age.
An initial set of measures was introduced between December 2010 and 
February 2011 (Natali and Stamati 2013: 27). First, current civil serv-
ants’ pensions above 12,000 euros were reduced by an average of 4 per 
cent.28 Second, provisions contained in the Finance Act enacted in Feb-
ruary 2011 entailed a reduction of the maximum earnings limit for tax 
relief on pensions and of the limit on the ‘tax-free’ lump sum, as well as 
a gradual reduction of tax incentives for voluntary retirement savings. 
In continuity with the approach followed by the Cowen government, 
the Social Welfare and Pensions Act enacted by the Kenny government 
in June 2011 contained the bulk of pension reforms. Besides increas-
ing the standard retirement age for the state pension, as foreseen by the 
National Pension Framework, the Act also introduced disincentives for 
early retirement in the public sector, abolished exemptions from contri-
butions for very low-income workers and put in place a new regime for 
newly hired civil servants (Natali and Stamati 2013: 27). The latter were 
assigned to a Public Service Pension (Single Scheme), paying a single 
price-indexed pension calculated on career average wages and with age 
prerequisites equalised to the new levels for private employees (ibid.).
As for private pensions, a 0.6 per cent annual levy for the years 2011–
2014 was introduced in 2011, followed by an additional levy of 0.15 per 
cent for 2014 and 2015 (Natali and Zaidi 2015: 36). Considering the 
scope and speed of the changes described above, Natali and Stamati 
(2013: 29) conclude that in Ireland ‘(…) pension austerity has probably 
reached its limits’. 
Labour market
Two main lines of change can be identiﬁ ed in labour market policies over 
the crisis years: (i) a review of minimum wage and sectoral wage agree-
ments; (ii) reforms of unemployment beneﬁ ts and active labour market 
policies (ALMP). The changes implemented largely went in the direction 
of the measures listed in the Irish MoU (European Commission 2011).
28.  A pension levy on civil servants, reducing beneﬁ ts by 7 per cent on average, had already 
been introduced in 2009. Furthermore, the 2013 public service wage agreement included 
pension cuts for annual pensions above 32,500 euros for new retirees from 31 August 2014 
(European Commission 2015b: 18).
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As for wages, the Irish government was asked to reduce by 1 euro per 
hour the nominal level of the national minimum wage and to extend the 
scope of the ‘inability to pay clause’.29 Furthermore, an independent re-
view of the REA and JLC arrangements was to be carried out in order to 
avoid distortions of wage conditions across the sectors associated with 
the presence of sectoral minimum wages in addition to the national min-
imum wage. The national minimum wage was actually reduced by 1 euro 
(12 per cent) through the Budget Law for 2011 (December 2010). Howev-
er, after negotiations with the Troika, the Kenny government succeeded 
in reversing this decision in 2011. As for the REA and JLC arrangements, 
the results of the review conducted in 2011 were in favour of keeping 
the system in place, while reforming it. This reform was enacted in 2012 
through the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act.30
According to the Irish Economic Adjustment Programme, social beneﬁ ts 
had to be included in the ﬁ scal consolidation plan to be implemented by 
Ireland. In particular (ibid.: 63), changes were to be introduced to avoid 
unemployment beneﬁ t – as well as social assistance beneﬁ ts – leading to 
so-called unemployment and poverty ‘traps’, including a possible reduc-
tion of replacement rates for individuals accumulating more than one 
beneﬁ t. Furthermore, conditions concerning work and training avail-
ability and activation measures were to be strengthened.31 Finally, the 
governance of the system was to be improved by exploiting synergies 
and reducing the overlapping of competencies across the departments 
responsible for the administration of the various beneﬁ ts. 
With regard to measures on unemployment beneﬁ ts implemented over 
the crisis years, there has been a mixture of negative incentives for acti-
vation (including a reduction of the replacement rate and the duration 
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29.  As reported by Schweiger (2014: 547), during the crisis, ‘[m]any private sector companies 
used the “inability to pay” clause in the national agreement either to freeze wage increases 
or even implement nominal pay cuts’.
30.  According to some observers, the new provisions have entailed a downgrading of the social 
partners’ role when it comes to negotiating terms and conditions of employment, while a 
subsequent decision of the Irish Superior Court has declared the erga omnes extension of 
the contents of the REA agreements unconstitutional (Doherty 2014: 87–88). 
31.  According to the MoU, improvements were needed in the identiﬁ cation of jobseekers’ 
needs and the monitoring of jobseekers’ activities, and to make sanction mechanisms for 
jobseekers not complying with labour-market activation more eﬀ ective. EU attention to 
ALMP – as well as to Vocational and Educational training – would remain high even after 
the Irish exit from the ﬁ nancial assistance programme, resulting in a country-speciﬁ c 
recommendation on those issues addressed in 2014 (cf. European Commission 2015c).
Ireland
of unemployment beneﬁ ts, as well as the introduction/reinforcement 
of sanctions) and positive incentives (the development of ALMP). In 
2009, the number of contributions required to be entitled to Job Seek-
er’s Beneﬁ t was doubled and, by 2013, the maximum claiming period 
was reduced from 15 to 6–9 months (Dukelow 2015: 105).32 As for the 
Jobseeker’s Allowance, in 2010 its level was cut for young recipients: 51 
per cent of the full payment for recipients aged 18–21, 30 per cent for 
those aged 22–24 and, since 2014, 51 per cent of the full payment for all 
recipients aged up to 24 (ibid.). Overall, subsequent cuts to the value of 
the beneﬁ t made since 2009 have entailed a decline in the net replace-
ment rate of unemployment beneﬁ ts from 57 per cent in 2008 to 53 per 
cent in 2011 (Daly 2015:13). As for sanctions, a 30 per cent reduction 
in payments was introduced in 2010 for recipients not complying with 
activation conditions, and a further sanction in the form of a nine-week 
suspension of full payment was introduced in 2013 for claimants repeat-
edly refusing or failing to comply with activation conditions (Dukelow 
2015: 106). 
Since 2010, the measures described above have been accompanied by in-
creased attention to ALMP and the development of related programmes 
and services. In this regard, particular emphasis has been put on the 
‘Pathways to Work’ strategy, launched in February 2012 and revamped 
every year, which is supposed to complement the Plans for Jobs pub-
lished annually since 2012 (Government of Ireland 2014). A key element 
of the strategy is the creation of Intreo oɤ  ces, ‘one-stop shops’ integrat-
ing welfare and employment services, thus providing a single reference 
point for unemployment and welfare recipients and oﬀ ering tailor-made 
support to beneﬁ t claimants. The Intreo working methodology has been 
gradually introduced in the Irish Employment oɤ  ces, a process that 
should be completed by 2015 (Government of Ireland 2015). Since 2013, 
within the framework of the ‘Pathways to Work’ strategy, measures ad-
dressed to the long-term unemployed have been extended, including in-
centives for employers who recruit long-term unemployed people (Job-
Plus), relief from income tax for individuals who start a new business 
(Start Your Own Business), training opportunities and temporary em-
ployment schemes. Besides measures concerning public services, a new 
32.  In detail, Jobseeker’s Beneﬁ t duration was reduced from twelve months to nine months for 
recipients with 260 or more contributions paid and from nine months to six months for 
recipients with less than 260 contributions paid, in 2013 (OECD 2013c: 35). 
86 Balancing protection and investment: structural reforms in fi ve countries
 Balancing protection and investment: structural reforms in fi ve countries 87
Country cases
labour market activation service speciﬁ cally targeted at the long-term 
unemployed – JobPath – is expected to begin in 2015. JobPath is to be 
delivered by private providers, on the supposition that it will entail gross 
beneﬁ t savings estimated at 525 million euros (European Commission 
2015c: 38). 
While political attention to ALMP has grown over the crisis years and a 
number of new initiatives have been implemented, data on expenditure 
suggest a more nuanced interpretation of these developments (cf. Ago-
stini and Natali forthcoming: Appendix). Indeed, total expenditure on 
labour market policy measures33 as a percentage of GDP was fairly stable 
between 2008 and 2011 and total expenditure on labour market policy 
supports (as a percentage of GDP) increased between 2008 and 2010, 
but has been on the decline since 2011. As a consequence, when looking 
at the percentage of ALMP expenditure out of total labour market policy 
expenditure, a negative trend emerges, with the level of this expenditure 
declining over the crisis years and slightly increasing only from 2011 (al-
though still at a lower level than in the pre-crisis period). Data on ex-
penditure in relation to GDP may be misleading, however, because they 
are extremely sensitive to the economic cycle: other indicators appear 
better suited to capturing trends in labour market policy over the crisis 
years and in particular the scope of ‘activation eﬀ orts’ (Eurostat 2011; 
on this point, see also Dukelow forthcoming).34 Expenditure on labour 
market policy support for people wanting to work (in purchasing power 
standards) grew between 2007 and 2010, but has declined since 2011. 
Conversely, expenditure on labour market policy measures per person 
wanting to work (in pps) collapsed between 2008 and 2009, although 
since then it has been increasing at a slow pace (always remaining well-
below the pre-crisis level). Overall, the ﬁ nancial eﬀ ort to support the in-
troduction of new ALMP initiatives seems uncertain and doubts can be 
raised about the adequacy of the resources made available. Furthermore, 
the number of people involved in labour market policy measures has also 
declined compared with the pre-crisis period. Notably, the rate of par-
ticipants (per 100 persons wanting to work) fell signiﬁ cantly between 
33.  ‘Labour market policy measures’ can be broadly equated with activation measures, while 
‘labour market policy supports’ generally involve income maintenance beneﬁ ts. 
34.  Eurostat (2011) deﬁ nes activation eﬀ orts as ‘eﬀ orts that countries make to help people 
in the transition from unemployment or inactivity to work’. In this case, the target group 
considered is the ‘population wanting to work’, that is ‘unemployed and inactive people 
who do not qualify as unemployed because they are either not actively seeking work or not 
immediately available for work but who would nevertheless like to work’” (ibid.).
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2008 and 2009 and then continued to decline until 2011. Besides calling 
into question the eﬀ ectiveness of the activation eﬀ ort, this circumstance 
may also indicate an attempt to target interventions better. 
Budget constraints have also aﬀ ected the implementation of the Youth 
Guarantee, which is proceeding gradually, starting with long-term un-
employed young people and mostly adapting some of the already exist-
ing schemes for the long-term unemployed to the requirements of the 
Youth Guarantee (Government of Ireland 2014; 2015). 
To sum up, it is possible to detect two main directions in labour market 
policies implemented in Ireland over the crisis years. On one hand, un-
employment beneﬁ ts have been a target of ﬁ scal consolidation measures, 
entailing some reduction of their replacement rates and duration and 
more emphasis on sanctions. On the other hand, since 2010 more atten-
tion has been paid to the development of ALMP: the scope of measures 
has been enlarged and their governance strengthened. That said, doubts 
arise when considering the trends of expenditure actually devoted to 
those initiatives. 
Education
In Ireland, public spending on education as a percentage of GDP in-
creased over the crisis years (4.9 per cent in 2007 vs 6.2 per cent in 
2011), while the percentage of public spending on education out of total 
spending basically remained unchanged (23.4 per cent in 2007 vs 23.1 
per cent in 2011) (Agostini and Natali forthcoming: Appendix). Howev-
er, data on year on year changes in constant prices reveal a signiﬁ cant re-
duction in real government expenditure between 2008 and 2011, with a 
peak in 2009, when expenditure declined by 7.6 per cent compared with 
the previous year (ibid.). That said, despite severe budget constraints 
and cutbacks, a number of measures concerning the education system – 
from early childhood education and care35 to primary, post-primary and 
higher education, and, in particular, vocational and educational train-
ing (VET) – have been implemented since 2010 (European Commission 
2014d; OECD 2013b; Government of Ireland 2014: 2015).
35. As for early childhood education and care, the most signiﬁ cant measure is the introduc-
tion in 2010 of a free pre-school year for all 3 to 4 year olds: this measure is on a part-time 
basis, consisting of a maximum entitlement of 3 hours per day, 5 days per week, 38 weeks 
per year (Daly 2015: 9).
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A strategy to improve the quality of early childhood, primary and sec-
ondary education – the National Strategy to Improve Literacy and Nu-
meracy among Children and Young People – was launched in July 2011, 
with a budget of 9 million euros (Government of Ireland 2014: 40). The 
strategy set a number of performance targets to be reached by 2020 
and it foresees the implementation of a series of concrete actions over 
the years. Also, in order to support the national strategy, primary and 
secondary initial teacher education courses were reconﬁ gured in 2011 
(OECD 2013b). Furthermore, a new system for school self-evaluation 
was put in place in 2012 (European Commission 2014d).
As for higher education, in the EAP the Irish government put forward 
their intention to increase charges on students in tertiary education, 
while providing means-tested support for lower-income groups (Euro-
pean Commission 2011:54). Indeed, in 2011/12 a new student charge 
of 2,000 euros replaced the previous Student Services Charge of 1,500 
euros. This charge was then increased to 2,250 euros in 2012/13 and is 
expected to rise by 250 euros each year up to a maximum of 3,000 euros 
by 2015 (OECD 2013b: 16). At the same time, a new scholarship scheme 
for higher education – the Student Universal Support Ireland (SUSI) – 
has been introduced to improve access for students from disadvantaged 
backgrounds (Government of Ireland 2014).
A number of initiatives have targeted the VET sector, closely monitored 
by the Commission under the 2014 and 2015 European Semester pro-
cess. First, in 2013 the Education and Training Board Act was passed 
with a view to rationalising and boosting the eɤ  ciency of the VET system 
by merging the existing 33 Vocational Education Committees into 16 
Education and Training Boards (ETB). The latter now include the func-
tions previously performed by the VECs (vocational education commit-
tees) and the FÁS training centres (vocational training) (Government of 
Ireland 2014: 28). Second, the 2013 Further Education and Training Act 
led to the establishment of SOLAS, an agency responsible for the devel-
opment, funding and supervision of the further education and training 
sector (including the development of multi-annual strategies) (ibid.: 29). 
Finally, a review of the apprenticeship system was launched in 2013 with 
a view to adapting the system to the new needs. The review resulted in 
the publication of an Apprenticeship Implementation Plan in June 2014 
which foresees – among other things – the establishment of an Appren-
ticeship Council bringing together representatives from business, trade 
unions and higher education bodies (Government of Ireland 2015: 20).
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Overall, the analysis shows that a number of measures aimed at improv-
ing the eﬀ ectiveness and eɤ  ciency of education and vocational training 
systems have been enacted in Ireland over the crisis years. The imple-
mentation of those measures, however, took place in a context charac-
terised by ﬁ scal consolidation priorities, with a signiﬁ cant overall reduc-
tion of government expenditure on education between 2008 and 2011.
Public sector
In the public sector, pay cuts and freezes have been a constant over the 
crisis years. Already in 2008 the government withdrew from the nation-
al pay agreement settled in November 2006 and unilaterally decided to 
freeze public servants’ wages at least until 2010 (Glassner 2010: 18). In 
March 2009, as part of an emergency budget plan (the Financial Emer-
gency Measures in the Public Interest Act), a cut in public sector pay was 
decided, followed by a further reduction introduced through the budget 
law enacted in December 2009 by the Cowen government.36 After a dif-
ﬁ cult negotiation, a four-year Public Service Agreement (known as the 
‘Croke Park Agreement’) was signed in March 2010. The agreement pro-
vided protection for public sector pay levels in exchange for a reduction 
in employee numbers and a commitment to reform working practices 
in the public sector (Doherty 2014: 86); a pay freeze in the public sector 
until 2014 was also decided on.
In the Irish Memorandum of Understanding (European Commission 
2011), the ‘reduction of public service in terms of numbers’, the im-
plementation of the provisions concerning public servant pensions (cf. 
Section 2.1) and a 10 per cent pay reduction for new entrants are listed 
among the ﬁ scal consolidation measures to be implemented, together 
with the pay freeze already decided by the government.37  
The recommendation to reduce the number of public employees appears 
particularly telling, taking into account the fact that, on the eve of the 
crisis, Ireland already had one of the lowest shares of public administra-
tion jobs in total employment, which indeed had remained stable over 
the period 1999–2008 (Glassner 2010: 7–8). In any case, the reduction 
Ireland
36. In 2009, the introduction of a pension levy inversely related to the level of income entailed 
a cut in net pay of 5 per cent to 7 per cent, while cuts from 5 per cent to 8 per cent (in-
versely related to the level of income) were introduced with the December 2009 budget law 
(Glassner 2010: 28). 
37.  The latter measure was not explicitly required by the MoU, but it was considered part of 
the ﬁ scal target (Sapir et al. 2014: 77). 
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in the number of public service workers, to be completed by 2015, was 
quantiﬁ ed in the National Recovery Plan 2011–2014 – presented by the 
Cowen government in November 2010 – at approximately 24,750 people 
compared with the 2008 level.38 Numbers reported in the Public Ser-
vice Reform Plan presented by the Kenny government in November 2011 
refer to a 37,500 staﬀ  reduction (compared with 2008 levels) by 2015 
(DPER 2011) and, according to data provided by the Irish government, 
overall staɤ  ng levels were reduced by 10 per cent, from 320,400 in 2008 
to 289,600 in 2014 (DEPR 2014). This reduction was obtained mainly 
through early retirements, non-replacement of departing staﬀ  and the 
imposition of strict limits on public sector recruitment, thus avoiding 
compulsory redundancies (Doherty 2014: 89).
A new triennial agreement – the Haddington Road Agreement – was 
signed in 2013, foreseeing further pay cuts, new pay freezes and changes 
to public sector working conditions. The latter include additional working 
hours, greater use of redeployment, the reform of work-sharing arrange-
ments and a reform of ﬂ exible work arrangements (Doherty 2014:90). 
The Haddington Road Agreement was followed by the publication, in 
January 2014, of the Second Public Service Reform Plan 2014–2016.
Initiatives undertaken in the public sector between 2009 and 2014 are 
clearly in line with what we deﬁ ne as a social standards devaluation 
strategy. Over the years, the various Irish governments have enacted 
measures freezing or cutting public servants’ wages and reducing the 
number of public sector employees. 
Research and development
Over the crisis years, in Ireland gross domestic expenditure on R&D in-
creased from 1.2 per cent of GDP in 2007 to 1.6 per cent in 2012 (in the 
latter year, the EU average was 2.0 per cent of GDP) (Agostini and Natali 
forthcoming: Appendix). This resulted from the growth of business ex-
penditure on research and development, in particular by foreign ﬁ rms, 
while government expenditure declined in real terms from 169 million 
euros in 2008 to 129 million in 2013 (Government of Ireland 2015: 40).
An important factor in stimulating private expenditure in R&D has tra-
ditionally been the existence of a fairly generous tax credit, recently re-
Country cases
38.  The same plan also foresaw the introduction of a reformed pension scheme for new en-
trants to the public service and a reduction of their pay by 10 per cent.
formed in 2014 in order to increase the generosity and ﬂ exibility of the 
system (OECD 2015c: 221). 
Besides the reform of this tax credit, other actions implemented over 
the crisis years were aimed at rationalising the R&D system, which, due 
to the plethora of programmes and agencies created over the years, was 
sometimes considered rather fragmented (OECD 2013c: 25). A ﬁ rst ini-
tiative in this direction has been the implementation, since March 2012, 
of the National Research Prioritisation Exercise, which has entailed the 
identiﬁ cation of 14 priority areas on which public funding should be con-
centrated in the coming years. Moreover, this measure also entailed the 
reinforcement of the mandate of the Science Foundation Ireland, the 
body charged with the funding of institutions operating in those areas 
(Government of Ireland 2014). In order to strengthen the commerciali-
sation of publicly funded research, a new national Intellectual Property 
Protocol has been developed and a central Technology Transfer Oɤ  ce, 
charged with providing an interface between industry and the research 
community, was set up (ibid.).
To sum up, mixed evidence emerges from the analysis of developments 
in the R&D sector in Ireland over the crisis years. Gross domestic ex-
penditure on R&D as a percentage of GDP increased between 2007 and 
2012 but this increase was largely due to private expenditure, while gov-
ernment expenditure declined. Public initiatives in this domain basically 
aimed at facilitating private investment (compare the reform of tax cred-
its) and rationalising the R&D system.
2.1.3 Preliminary remarks on structural reforms in Ireland and 
their determinants
The pattern of reform over the crisis years in the policy domains con-
sidered in this report puts Ireland close to the ‘low-road’ to economic 
growth and competitiveness, a model reliant mainly on cost contain-
ment and narrow welfare provisions. Fiscal austerity – in the context 
of a strategy of social standard devaluation – has indeed been the main 
goal of the reforms implemented since 2009 in the domains of pensions, 
unemployment, education, R&D and the public sector. That said, the 
present report also identiﬁ es some policy changes likely to positively af-
fect human capital development. In particular, some initiatives aimed 
at rationalizing and improving the quality of ALMP, education and VET 
Ireland
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systems have recently been undertaken. This may be the source of a 
new selective investment strategy in the future, although the adequacy 
of ﬁ nancial resources currently devoted to those measures can be ques-
tioned. 
The model of economic development embraced in the past, signiﬁ cant-
ly dependent on foreign direct investment and exports, has arguably 
played a major role in shaping the Irish reaction to the crisis. The latter 
was attributed to an excessive growth in expenditure and a related loss in 
competitiveness and reputation; given this assumption, priority was to 
be given to cost containment and to the rescue of the banking system in 
order to preserve ‘investors’ conﬁ dence’ (Dukelow 2015). Consequently, 
a severe austerity plan of 9 per cent of GDP was implemented already 
in 2008–2009, a period when most EU governments were still trying 
to implement expansionary policies. Austerity provisions contained in 
the MoU with the EC and the IMF signed in 2010 were largely in line 
with – and, in a way, further reinforced – such a stance. While cost con-
tainment messages undoubtedly represented the bulk of the ‘EU pres-
sure’ on Ireland, one can also observe other kinds of ‘stimuli’. Notably, 
the insistence of the EU on the need to strengthen ALMP and the VET 
system may have played a role in the recent developments in the sectors 
illustrated above.
Finally, looking at party politics, one can note that the historic success 
of the opposition parties in the 2011 general election and the consequent 
formation of a coalition government supported by Fine Gael and the 
Labour Party have not entailed any major changes in the government 
attitude towards ﬁ scal consolidation. Even if the Kenny government suc-
ceeded in negotiating a few aspects of the MoU (among them, the cut in 
the national minimum wage), its policy choices have been basically in 
continuity with the austerity actions of the previous government. This 
is particularly evident when looking at initiatives related to pensions, 
unemployment beneﬁ ts and the public sector. Furthermore, according 
to many observers, the Irish governments have assumed an increasingly 
unilateral stance in taking policy decisions, a circumstance that has led 
to a crisis of the Irish social partnership model.
Ireland
Table 18 Summary table: drivers of reform and major reform trends in 
Ireland, 2008–2014
2008–2010 2011–2014
Drivers of reform
Economic crisis Financial crisis and economic 
recession; 
Strong increase of public 
defi cit and debt 
GDP growth (except 2012);
Slight increase of public debt (until 
2013) and decrease of defi cit 
Coalition governments Centrist-conservative Right-left  coalition
EU infl uence EDP Economic Adjustment Programme 
(until 2013);
Post-programme surveillance (since 
2014);
European Semester (since 2014);
EDP; MIP (2014)
Structural reforms
Reform path (for the 
fi ve policies under 
scrutiny)
Social standards devaluation Social standards devaluation
Main reforms in each 
policy fi eld
Pensions - National Pensions Framework - Restrictive measures (including cuts 
to pension payments); 
- Social Welfare and Pensions Act
Labour market - Unemployment benefi ts: 
reduction of duration and 
replacement rates/ intro-
duction or reinforcement of 
sanctions
- Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act;
- Further changes to unemployment 
benefi ts;
- Reinforcement of ALMP (especially 
for LTU) and institutional reconfi gu-
ration (e.g. Intreo offi  ces)
Education - Reduction in real govern-
ment expenditure
- Free pre-school year for 
children aged 3 to 4
- National Strategy to Improve Literacy 
and Numeracy;
- Higher education: reforms of stu-
dents’ contributions and scholarships;
- Education and Training Board Act
Public sector - Wage freeze and cuts;
- Staff  reduction
- Staff  reduction;
- Haddington Road Agreement (further 
pay cuts and freezes; changes to 
working conditions)
Research and 
development
- Tax credit reform;
- National Research Prioritisation 
Exercise
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
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3.5 Italy
3.5.1 Setting the scene: key traits of the country’s political 
economy
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Italy was characterised by signiﬁ cant 
economic growth, but later on, growth stagnated and between 2001 and 
2008 average growth was 0.8 per cent of GDP (roughly half the euro-area 
average). Economic contraction was particularly evident in 2009 (–5.5 
per cent) and in 2012 (–2.8 per cent). Italy thus experienced a ‘double-
dip’: the Great Recession of 2009 was followed by some ﬁ rst signs of re-
covery (in 2010 and 2011) and then by further economic decline in 2012. 
Moreover, for many years in the 2000s Italy’s national debt was the 
highest in Europe, and currently it is second only to Greece’s. The gov-
ernment gross debt constantly increased between 2007 (99.7 per cent 
of GDP) and 2011 (132.1 per cent of GDP). As regards the deﬁ cit, during 
the ﬁ rst years of the crisis, it signiﬁ cantly increased (–2.7 in 2008 and 
–5.3 in 2009), but it started to fall between 2010 (–4.2) and 2013 (–2.9) 
(Table 19).
Table 19 Italy: selected socio-economic indicators, 2007–2014
Indicators/years 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Real GDP growth 1.5 –1.0 –5.5 1.7 0.6 –2.8 –1.7 –0.4
General government 
gross debt (EDP con-
cept) (% of GDP)
99.7 102.3 112.5 115.3 116.4 123.1 128.5 132.1
General government 
defi cit/surplus (% of 
GDP)
–1.5 –2.7 –5.3 –4.2 –3.5 –3.0 –2.9 –3.0
Employment rate 
(% 20-64)
62.8 63.0 61.7 61.1 61.2 61.0 59.8 n.a.
Unemployment rate 
(%)
6.1 6.7 7.8 8.4 8.4 10.7 12.2 n.a.
People at risk of 
poverty or social 
exclusion (% of total 
population)
26.0 25.3 24.7 24.5 28.2 29.9 28.4 n.a.
Source: Agostini and Natali (forthcoming: Appendix).
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The economic and ﬁ nancial crises have signiﬁ cantly aﬀ ected the social 
situation; in particular, the unemployment rate doubled between 2007 
(6.1 per cent of population) and 2013 (12.2 per cent of population). At 
the same time, the employment rate decreased between 2008 (63 per 
cent of population) and 2013 (59.8 per cent). As regards the percentage 
of the population at risk of poverty or social exclusion, we see a signiﬁ -
cant increase between 2010 (24.5 per cent) and 2012 (29.9 per cent). 
On the contrary, a slight improvement emerged in 2013 (28.4 per cent) 
(OECD 2015e).
A mixed market economy, the variety of capitalism typical of South-
ern European countries, characterises Italy. Mixed-market economies 
(MME) are political economies governed by non- market forms of coor-
dination. The state is an important actor through the creation of a large 
state-controlled business sector, and the control of the ﬁ nancial system 
(Pagoulatos 2003). At the same time, interest associations of both busi-
ness and labour have stronger organisational structures than in liberal 
market economies, but are more fragmented and weaker than in coordi-
nated market economies. As a result, they are unable to deliver collective 
goods or develop strong autonomous forms of coordination throughout 
the economy, but they are powerful and demand some form of compen-
sation from the state for their acquiescence (Molina and Rhodes 2007). 
Compensation usually consists of passive labour market policies and a 
transfer-oriented welfare state.
Table 20 The Italian social model
Labour market regime Welfare regime Varieties of capitalism
Southern European Southern European Mixed market economy (MME)
Peculiarities:
- high level of debt;
- falling productivity;
- falling share of national 
goods and services in world 
trade;
- declining role of the state in 
the national economy;
- coordinated decentralisation 
of collective bargaining
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Agostini and Natali (forthcoming).
Italy
96 Balancing protection and investment: structural reforms in fi ve countries
 Balancing protection and investment: structural reforms in fi ve countries 97
Country cases
With regard to the economic model, Italy’s major problem – partly ex-
plaining low growth – is its competitiveness gap, in particular high av-
erage unit labour costs and low productivity (Goretti and Landi 2013). 
Italy’s position has deteriorated steadily since the launch of the euro 
area, after a decade of economic slowdown and declining exports. Italy’s 
share in world trade has fallen since the mid-1990s, and the country has 
not proﬁ ted from increased demand in fast-growing emerging markets. 
This seems to be closely related to the typical proﬁ le of Italian ﬁ rms: they 
are very focused on low-technology and labour intensive products (such 
as textiles). Recent decades have seen no signiﬁ cant shift in the indus-
trial specialisation pattern, while economic regulation and openness to 
competition lag far behind other Western countries. Another structural 
characteristic is the traditional predominance of small and medium-
sized enterprises that are unable to fully exploit economies of scale. Fur-
thermore, access to the equity market to ﬁ nance ﬁ rms is underdeveloped 
(especially for SMEs) (ibid.: 9).
As regards the social model, Italy is a typical example of a South Euro-
pean welfare state (Ferrera 1996). It is a typical ‘transfer-centred’ wel-
fare state, where social and employment policies are very fragmented 
(with various schemes along occupational and social lines). The spread 
of a universalist health care system has hybridised the system rooted 
in occupational welfare provision in other policy ﬁ elds. Italian welfare 
is therefore characterised by the individual appropriation of welfare re-
sources, related to a low degree of state penetration of welfare institu-
tions and a low degree of state power, with the consequent spread of 
political clientelism (social beneﬁ ts exchanged for political support and 
votes) (Katrougalos and Lazaridis 2008).
In this context, at the beginning of the 1990s welfare programmes pre-
sented two main problematic aspects. The ﬁ rst was the ﬁ nancial strains 
upon them, part of the broader tensions in the public budget. The second 
was the inequity implicit in the system: across occupational groups, as 
well as in terms of standard risks (for instance, pensions versus unem-
ployment beneﬁ ts) and regions and gender (Ferrera, Fargion and Jes-
soula 2012). 
Owing to its large public debt and low growth, Italy was vulnerable to 
the economic and ﬁ nancial crises of 2008. The European institutions 
applied pressure on national policymakers to address the country’s 
structural weakness, considered to be the cause of the low growth rates 
Italy
(Caritas Europa 2013). When the sovereign debt crisis began in the euro 
zone (in 2010) Italy was in a fragile position, and the eﬀ ects of the crisis 
were particularly severe. Any request for an external loan was viewed 
as a danger to the entire euro zone (Oxfam 2013). For that reason, the 
reform programmes were based mainly on severe austerity measures. In 
particular, in December 2011, the technocratic government headed by 
Mario Monti adopted a package of ﬁ scal reforms called ‘Save Italy’ in or-
der to push the view that without such changes Italy would go bankrupt. 
Italy has been subject to manifold EU pressure: ‘informal conditional-
ity’ has inﬂ uenced many reforms (in particular in the ﬁ eld of pensions 
and the labour market). This conditionality (diﬀ erently from countries 
such as Greece, Portugal or Spain) was not linked to a ‘memorandum of 
understanding’. Rather, it was put into action by supervision and coordi-
nation of economic and budgetary policies (particularly within EMU and 
often through unprecedented procedures) and through the leverage pro-
vided by the ECB’s autonomous decision to purchase bonds on the sec-
ondary market within the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) (Sacchi 
2013; Agostini et al. 2015). The ECB’s support was made conditional on 
Italy following the EU prescriptions for budgetary austerity and struc-
tural reforms of the social models; in line with the idea that the social 
Table 21 Italian governments, 2007–present
Years Prime 
Minister
Position in 
the political 
spectrum
Coalition forces Reform 
programme
May 2008–
November 
2011
Silvio 
Berlusconi
Centre-right PdL, Lega Nord e MpA Social standards 
devaluation
November 
2011–April 
2013 
Mario 
Monti
Technocratic 
government
PdL, PD, UDC Social standards 
devaluation
April 2013–
February 
2014
Enrico 
Letta
Left -right Pdl, PD, UDC, Lista Civica (1)
February 
2014–
Matteo 
Renzi
Left -right PD, NCD, UDC, Lista Civica Social standards 
devaluation and 
improvements
Note: (1) Due to the peculiar nature and short duration of the mandate, the approach to reform of 
the caretaker government is not clear.
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
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model played a key role in determining the fate of the country during the 
euro-crisis. As regards the policies adopted by Italian governments, it 
is clear that the euro zone crisis impacted signiﬁ cantly on social spend-
ing and public employment. In sum, the austerity policy implemented in 
recent years has led to a serious lowering of social standards (Perez and 
Rhodes 2015).
During the ﬁ nancial and economic crisis period, structural funds also 
played a signiﬁ cant role, particularly in the ﬁ eld of employment poli-
cies. These funds were used mainly to ﬁ nance pre-existing programmes 
(short-time working schemes by way of a derogation) and the provision 
of active measures linked to them (Agostini et al. 2015).
3.5.2 Structural reforms sector by sector
Pensions
In Italy, public pensions have been extremely generous and costly (Italy 
has been one of the highest-spending EU countries). Since the 1990s, a 
long list of reforms has radically transformed the system, with a move 
to a (still incomplete) multi-pillar pension model (in line with a gradual 
reduction of public pensions and more room for supplementary pension 
funds).
While the so-called welfare protocol of 2007 adopted by the left-of-cen-
tre Prodi government reduced cutbacks introduced earlier by the right-
of-centre parliamentary majority, three diﬀ erent pension reforms were 
introduced in the period 2009–2011 (Natali 2011). Both were shaped by 
external constraints. The EU put pressure on Italian policymakers by 
means of a range of diﬀ erent instruments. First, direct pressure came 
from the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Its ruling C 46/07 found Ital-
ian legislation on the retirement age – in particular, the diﬀ erent legal 
retirement ages for men and women in the public sector – to be discrim-
inatory. This led to the opening of an infringement procedure against 
Italy. The Berlusconi government decided to introduce a revision of 
pension legislation in 2009, to equalise the retirement age for men and 
women in the public sector at 65 (for women it was 60), with a phase-in 
period of 9 years. This direct pressure from the ECJ was supplemented 
by the ﬁ rst impact of the economic recession. The Italian government 
had to pass measures to stabilise the public budget deﬁ cit in a context of 
huge recession. The increase of the legal retirement age was thus supple-
Italy
mented by automatic mechanisms to further increase the retirement age 
(for both social assistance, old-age and seniority pensions) in line with 
the gradual increase in life expectancy. These measures were introduced 
through a short phase-in period, with full implementation since 2015.
A second reform package was passed in 2010. Due to the persistent eco-
nomic recession and the gradual deterioration of the public budget, the 
Berlusconi government reduced the transition period for full implemen-
tation of the measures introduced in 2009. As a consequence of the new 
law of 2010, the equalisation of the retirement age for men and women 
(in the public sector) became operative in 2012, and the activation of the 
automatic adjustment of the legal retirement age to life expectancy has 
applied since 2010.
The dramatic context of the so-called ‘spread-crisis’ in 2011 led to a more 
radical revision of the Italian pension system. The Monti government 
passed a new set of measures in 2011 (the so-called ‘Save Italy’ decree of 
December 2011). Law Decree 201/11 (December 2011) – then translated 
into Law 214/11 – introduced major changes, in particular: 
– a move towards a single retirement age for men and women (66 
years and 7 months by 2018), for employees in both the public and 
private sectors, and the self-employed; 
– a ﬂ exible retirement age, with a minimum retirement age of 63 (in 
the case of pension beneﬁ ts above the minimum level of 2.8 times 
the assegno sociale), and a postponed retirement at 70;
– regular adjustment of the retirement age in line with increases in 
average life expectancy since 2013 (while before the reform it was 
supposed to be introduced in 2015) with a rise of three months, and 
further increases every three years up to 2019;
– from 2012, the full enforcement of a deﬁ ned-contribution pension 
scheme introduced in earlier reforms to replace the earnings-related 
deﬁ ned-beneﬁ t scheme;
– the seniority pension – allowing workers with at least 35 years of 
pension contributions to retire early – was eliminated;
– gross monthly pensions above 1,400 euros were not indexed to bring 
pension spending under control for 2012 and 2013.
These new measures were expected to produce savings from 2012 
(around 2.7 billion euros) reaching 22 billion euros in 2020. Accord-
ingly, the reduction in public pension expenditure in terms of GDP was 
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deemed to be 0.2 percentage points in 2012, 0.9 in 2015 and 1.4 in 2020, 
then gradually declining to 1.1 percentage points in 2025, 0.9 in 2030 
and 0.5 in 2035 (Jessoula and Pavolini 2013). In distributive terms, this 
reform largely reduced the transition towards the full implementation 
of cutbacks (related to the introduction of the deﬁ ned-contribution type 
of beneﬁ t). This has addressed the inter-generational divide between 
younger generations (already aﬀ ected by previous reforms) and older 
cohorts.39 But there is a risk that retrenchment will lower the adequacy 
of pension beneﬁ ts and put some elderly people at risk of insuɤ  cient 
protection: this is the case with regard to workers on low wages and with 
interrupted careers (ibid.).
 
Labour market 
In the shadow of the economic and ﬁ nancial crisis, the main measure 
adopted by the Italian government to reduce its impact involved short-
time working schemes and the new regulation of labour contracts. These 
measures (adopted by the Berlusconi government) did not structurally 
aﬀ ect the employment beneﬁ t system (Sacchi 2013). As far as short-
time working schemes are concerned, the Cassa Integrazione Guadagni 
(CIG) is used in a new version that derogates to current legislation by ex-
tending protection to further categories of worker, enterprises (includ-
ing small and medium-sized enterprises), economic sectors and extend-
ing the duration of the measure. The so-called Ammortizzatori Sociali in 
Deroga (AD) – the CIG plus other short-term work schemes – are aimed 
at: (i) extending income support measures to some categories of work-
ers (especially those in small and medium-sized enterprises) previously 
excluded from the scheme; and (ii) ﬁ nding, with the help of the regions, 
the necessary funds to cope with the increasing demand for wage sup-
port due to the economic crisis. The Italian government signed an agree-
ment with the regions, which calls on them to cover 40 per cent of the 
cost of AD, partly through the European Social Fund. As has been noted, 
the social safety net has not been revised in response to the economic 
crisis, but it is subject to a temporary derogation, thus leading to the fur-
ther fragmentation of the sector (Sacchi and Vesan 2011; Vesan 2012). 
As regards employment legislation, the package of emergency measures 
adopted by the Berlusconi government recognised the possibility of der-
ogating from the principle of the individual employment relationship in 
39. The Dini reform of 1995 that introduced the deﬁ ned-contribution logic in the PAYG pen-
sion system had a 40-year transition before its full implementation in 2035. The Fornero 
reform of 2011 cut this transition and made the new rules operative from 2012.
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national contracts and law, through collective bargaining agreements at 
the industrial or territorial level (the so-called ‘proximity agreements’). 
This provision was introduced under pressure from the EU and inter-
national institutions to reform the labour market and promote decen-
tralisation of the collective bargaining system (Vesan and Pavolini 2015).
On April 2012, the executive led by Mario Monti passed the so-called 
‘Fornero reform’ (named after Ministry of Labour Elsa Fornero) (Law 
No. 92/2012). The reform regulates individual dismissal and ﬁ xed-term 
employment contracts, with the aim, on one hand, of favouring the use 
of permanent contracts (reducing atypical contracts) and, on the other 
hand, of simplifying the procedures for laying oﬀ  employees. In this 
framework, Law No. 92/2012 reformed Article 18 of the Workers’ Stat-
ute by limiting the reinstatement of workers in case of unlawful dismiss-
al only to speciﬁ c circumstances. At the same time, this law introduced 
monetary compensation as a general rule for unlawful dismissal (Vesan 
and Pavolini 2015). 
Moreover, the reform deﬁ ned new measures for income support. It rede-
ﬁ nes the system of social safety nets, distinguishing between measures 
to support wages in the case of unemployment and measures to comple-
ment wages in the case of suspension or reduction of working hours. A 
new scheme called Assicurazione Sociale per l’Impiego (ASPI) has been 
introduced and, for the government, it should represent the ﬁ rst step to-
wards a unique scheme of income guarantees in case of unemployment. 
Finally, as regards ‘proactive employment policies’, contracts ‘with train-
ing contents’ were introduced. Apprenticeships are considered the main 
way to promote the access of younger workers to the labour market. The 
reform also introduces some measures to promote women’s labour mar-
ket participation. These measures are, however, limited compared with 
what has been implemented in other European countries (Vesan 2012). 
At the end of 2014, the centre-left government led by Matteo Renzi in-
troduced the so-called ‘Jobs Act’. As regards the regulation of employ-
ment relationships, the Act introduced a new kind of contract (contratto 
a tutele crescenti) that, by replacing permanent contracts, has made it 
even easier to dismiss workers employed in ﬁ rms with more than ﬁ fteen 
employees. In the framework of the new ‘contratto a tutele crescenti’, 
reintegration has been limited to discriminatory and unlawful dismiss-
als, whereas for all other situations, and if the dismissal is declared un-
lawful by the judge, the employer has to pay monetary compensation. 
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Moreover, the Renzi government introduced a further liberalisation of 
temporary contracts in 2014 and limited the use of other forms of atypi-
cal contract. The Jobs Act reformed also the unemployment beneﬁ ts sys-
tem. In particular, the reform reviewed the strict eligibility criteria for 
unemployment insurance. To obtain the ASPI (now called NASPI), the 
jobseeker must have paid three months of contributions in the past four 
years and worked for at least 30 days in the past year. The amount of 
NASPI is 75 per cent of the previous salary up to 1,195 euros (for 2015), 
and 25 per cent for the share exceeding that amount up to a maximum 
amount. Its duration is related to the length of the period of contribu-
tions and with the new rules, the eﬀ ective average duration of NASPI is 
estimated to be equal to 8.6 months. Finally, another important change 
concerns the introduction of a social assistance allowance for the unem-
ployed (assegno sociale per la disoccupazione – ASDI). This measure is 
reserved for workers who have ﬁ nished NASPI. This scheme is means-
tested and gives access to a sum equal to two-thirds of the last NASPI 
beneﬁ t for six months. Due to budgetary constraints, this new scheme 
has been introduced on an experimental basis and it will be provided 
only up to the exhaustion of the available budget set by the government 
(400 million euros for 2015 and 2016). If ASDI becomes permanent, it 
will be the ﬁ rst universal unemployment assistance scheme to be intro-
duced in Italy (Vesan and Pavolini 2015). 
Education
Various laws were adopted to reform the education system in the pe-
riod between 2008 and 2010. The so-called ‘Gelmini Reform’ (after a 
Minister of Education and Research in the Berlusconi government) pri-
oritised the reduction of education expenditure, for both the school and 
university systems. The school reform, for example, reduced the hours of 
teaching in primary schools, in particular the afternoon schedule (tempo 
pieno), which was transformed into a sort of complementary activity 
also with the payment of fees (Pattarin 2011; Saraceno 2010). 
Concerning the main measures aﬀ ecting mandatory schooling since 
2008, we refer to Decree-Law 112/2008 (Decreto Brunetta) that: 
– increased the student/teacher ratio by 1 per cent;
– reduced schools’ staɤ  ng levels (administrative, technical and auxil-
iary) by 17 per cent;
– reorganised schools, curricula and classes; and
– cut public expenditure by at least 7.8 billion euros by 2012. 
Italy
In an eﬀ ort to justify the cuts in public expenditure, the Decree-Law 
makes express (and generic) reference to international and EU commit-
ments to stabilise public ﬁ nances. 
Provision was made also to increase the size of school classes: 
– about 18 to 29 pupils in pre-primary school classes;
– about 15 to 27 pupils in primary school classes;
– about 18 to 28 pupils in lower secondary school classes.
Moreover, to implement the budget goals, measures were taken to assign 
only one teacher (no longer three) to primary school classes. Reductions 
were also made regarding hours of teaching, subjects and staﬀ . Finally, 
a number of schools were merged. As a result, between the school years 
2007/2008 and 2013/2014 the number of pupils increased by nearly 2 
per cent, whereas the number of classes and teachers fell by more than 2 
per cent and 12 per cent, respectively. 
Law 122/2010 and DPR 122/2013 have frozen teachers’ salaries since 
2009. This helped to increase the gap between Italy and other OECD 
countries, because the starting salary for teachers in upper secondary 
school is 6 per cent lower than the OECD average. This gap is wider for 
experienced teachers: they are paid 11 per cent less than the OECD aver-
age (European Parliament 2015). 
The university reform made signiﬁ cant cutbacks to the ‘ordinary funds’ 
at national level (Fondo di Finanziamento Ordinario) (Ichino and Ter-
lizzese 2012). Moreover, the ‘Gelmini Reform’ has heavily restructured 
the internal organisation and governance of the university system. Two 
main changes were inspired by ‘New Public Management’ and cost 
containment. The ﬁ rst concerns the governance structure of universi-
ties, which became more centralised. At the same time, the reform has 
changed recruitment and careers, abolishing permanent positions for 
new entrants and increasing the importance of merit-based selection in 
the careers of professors (Ballarino 2015). 
Cutbacks did not stop with the Monti government. As has been pointed 
out (European Parliament 2015), after the public budget spending re-
view of August 2012, cost-sharing for higher education was increased, 
while fees rose by between 25 per cent and 100 per cent for students 
graduating with some delay (after the statutory deadline). In the wake 
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of the ﬁ nancial and economic crisis, Italy registered a signiﬁ cant drop 
in real public education expenditure. Italy is the only Member State that 
has reduced this kind of expenditure for four consecutive years: –0.2 per 
cent in 2009, –3.0 per cent in 2010, –4.0 per cent in 2011 and –1.8 per 
cent in 2012. 
In 2015, the Renzi government passed the so-called ‘Good school’ re-
form. The bill redesigned the powers of head teachers and allowed for 
pay increases based on merit (rather than on seniority). It also provid-
ed tax incentives for private schools and launched a plan to hire about 
100,000 full-time teachers. The government budgeted about 3 billion 
euros for the reform (Binnie 2015).
Public sector
Italy has introduced two main measures to reform the public sector (Bach 
and Stroleny 2013; Setnikar Cankar and Petkovšek 2013), involving the 
freezing of recruitment and wages. Also in this case, the measures were 
approved after the ECB pressed the government to take measures to re-
duce the cost of public employees by strengthening staﬀ  turnover rules 
and, possibly, by reducing wages (Bordogna and Neri 2014). On the ﬁ rst 
point, since 2008 recruitment of public employees has been signiﬁ cantly 
limited (10 per cent in 2009, 20 per cent in 2010 and 2011, 50 per cent 
in 2012). The rationalisation measures have applied to schools and staﬀ  
with ﬂ exible employment contracts. The eﬀ ect of the freeze on recruit-
ment was evident in 2010, when the total number of public employees 
was 4 per cent lower than in 2008. This decrease applied to the number 
of permanent employees (3.6 per cent) and, even more (almost 13 per 
cent), the number of employees with ﬂ exible contracts. Other measures 
for strengthening and prolonging the recruitment freeze were adopted in 
2010; as a result a contraction of 10 per cent in the public sector was ex-
pected by 2014. In 2012, these measures were conﬁ rmed and reinforced 
by the Monti government. 
As regards the second point, the measures adopted in 2008 implemented 
the national wage freeze, which was extended from 2010–2011 to 2013 
and 2014. In particular, for 2011–2013, the wages of individual employ-
ees may not exceed the level of 2010. With the partial exception of the 
component linked to performance or merit pay, the economic eﬀ ect of 
career promotions has also been frozen. Moreover, other measures con-
cerned higher wages and, in particular, cuts of 5 per cent for those with 
a gross wage of between 90 and 150 thousand euros a year, and of 10 per 
Italy
cent for the proportion exceeding 150 thousand euros. In sum, in com-
parison with the 2000–2007 period, wage growth slowed signiﬁ cantly in 
2008–2009 and has substantially been frozen since 2010. 
Research and development
In the shadow of the economic and ﬁ nancial crisis, R&D investment has 
not been signiﬁ cantly reduced. In Italy, the level of R&D expenditure is 
lower if compared with the average level of the EU28 (–0.7 percentage 
points in 2013). Average EU28 expenditure in R&D is 2 per cent of GDP, 
in Italy it is 1.3 per cent. This level of expenditure remained substantially 
stable during the crisis: it was 1.2 per cent between 2008 and 2011 and 
1.3 per cent in 2012 and 2013. This increase should be understood in 
terms of trends in GDP. 
The government has adopted various measures for promoting invest-
ments. They include a temporary tax credit for companies that increase 
investment and speciﬁ c loans (for small and medium-sized enterprises 
for the purchase of machinery, equipment, capital goods and for invest-
ments within the country). A speciﬁ c tax credit devoted to an increase 
in investments in R&D has been introduced for the period 2015–2019. 
Moreover, a favourable ‘patent box’ taxation on income derived from the 
use of intellectual property, patents and trademarks has also been in-
troduced. Project bonds for infrastructure investment have been made 
cheaper and simpler to issue. Similarly, regulations governing the in-
volvement of institutional investors in real estate have been relaxed 
(OECD 2013e). 
3.5.3 Preliminary remarks on structural reforms in Italy and their 
determinants 
The Italian reform pattern seems consistent with the ‘low-road’ to eco-
nomic growth and competitiveness, a model reliant mainly on cost con-
tainment in the diﬀ erent policies under scrutiny. Budgetary cutbacks 
– in the context of broader social standards devaluation – have been 
the main goal of the reforms implemented since 2009 in the domains 
of pensions, unemployment, education, R&D and the public sector. All 
these ﬁ elds have experienced retrenchment both in the long- and short-
terms. The latter has become a key part of the reforms since the eruption 
of the ‘spread-crisis’. 
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This reform path has reﬂ ected the guidelines laid down by the EU. Ita-
ly has experienced huge constraints, related to the SGP (application of 
EDP), hard regulation (for example, the role of the ECJ in the ﬁ eld of 
pensions) and tough forms of conditionality implemented by the ECB. 
The EU has also shaped – but with a more limited impact – social policy 
and labour market policies in order to favour the move towards acti-
vation in the two policy areas through the structural funds. The role of 
domestic political forces has proved limited, but the Renzi government 
has implemented a more pro-growth agenda with more ﬂ exibility in ap-
plication of the EU budgetary rules (despite ongoing austerity measures, 
more social standards improvements have appeared).
Italy
Table 22 Summary table: drivers of reform and major reform trends in 
Italy, 2008–2014
2008–2011 2011–2012 2013–2014
Drivers of reform
Economic crisis Deep recession;
Surge of general 
government defi cit 
Deep recession; 
High general public 
defi cit (2010)
Slight economic 
growth
Coalition governments Centre-right (PdL/
Northern League)
Grand Coalition (Pdl; 
PD; UDC) supporting 
a technocratic govern-
ment
Left -Right (PD; NCD; 
LC)
EU infl uence EDP EDP;
European Semester;
Financial Assistance 
(Securities Markets 
Programme)
European Semester;
Financial Assistance 
(quantitative easing)
Structural reforms
Reform path (for the 
fi ve policies under 
scrutiny)
Social standards 
devaluation
Social standards 
devaluation
Social standards 
improvements and 
devaluation
Main reforms in each 
policy fi eld
Pensions - Increased retirement 
age (e.g. for women)
- Increased retirement 
age (automatic 
mechanisms)
- Cut in seniority 
pensions
- Introduction of the 
NDC system since 
2012
Labour market - Increased fl exibility
- Recalibration of pas-
sive labour market 
policies 
- Increased fl exibility
- Recalibration of pas-
sive labour market 
policies 
Education - Retrenchment - Retrenchment - Increased spending 
through the ‘Good 
School’ reform
Public sector - Retrenchment - Retrenchment
Research and 
development 
- Stability - Stability - Tax incentives to 
favour private 
investments
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
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4. Conclusion
The evidence collected for the ﬁ ve countries under scrutiny allow us to 
draw some broad conclusions. In the following section we ﬁ rst provide 
some concluding remarks on the key characteristics of the structural re-
forms adopted in these countries. Then we look at the key factors that 
have shaped these reform trends.
As far as the nature of the reforms is concerned, we should ﬁ rst stress 
that the structural reform path of the diﬀ erent countries has changed 
over time. While some form of social standards devaluation – for exam-
ple, ﬁ scal austerity, wage freezing, weakening of collective bargaining in-
stitutions, more limited employment protection – has characterised the 
whole period under scrutiny (2008–2014), the ﬁ ve countries have gone 
through diﬀ erent phases. Just after the recession started to hit Europe, 
some of these countries adopted anti-cyclical packages. This ﬁ rst step, 
largely involving improvements in social standards, was a short-term 
strategy, followed since 2010 by austerity packages. All the ﬁ ve countries 
have seen, in the period between 2010 and 2013, the implementation of 
a social standards devaluation strategy. The only major exception is Ger-
many, where more favourable economic conditions and a huge reform 
programme between the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the 
twenty-ﬁ rst century allowed more room for investment. A third phase 
has been characterised by a more relaxed budgetary policy – inspired 
by the EU – and a shift towards some selective investment, if not a more 
ambitious social standards improvement path. This is the case of the 
Czech Republic, Italy and Germany, while in Finland and Ireland persis-
tent ﬁ nancial stress has limited the opportunity for pro-growth reforms.
Second, while the paradigm of ﬁ scal austerity and pressure on social 
standards has dominated the reform process in all the countries under 
Conclusion
scrutiny, its actual implementation has varied from one country to the 
other. The two countries hardest hit by the sovereign debt crisis – Ire-
land and, to some extent, Italy – have seen the most radical social stand-
ards devaluation. In Ireland, cutbacks to social spending have been ac-
companied by the deconstruction of the system of industrial relations 
inherited from the past. The coordination of socio-economic and em-
ployment variables, mainly through social pacts, has been replaced by 
unilateral reforms adopted by the government with the help of the so-
called Troika. Italy has also experienced weakened social standards with 
cutbacks in pensions, a further reduction in EPL for typical workers and 
the decline of social dialogue. These countries, at least between 2010 and 
2013, have experienced an overall devaluation strategy with a reduction 
of both social protection and investment. The case of Italy is intriguing, 
in that both the social standards devaluation phase and the subsequent 
more growth-oriented strategy have been characterised by a non-selec-
tive approach. Both the reduction and then partial improvement in so-
cial standards have been implemented by means of both investment and 
protection policies. In other words we do not see any proof of a move 
towards social investment or pro-competitive policies. Finland has ex-
perienced a less severe adaptation to the new recessive economic cycle. 
National coordination of wages, welfare and labour market reforms has 
been maintained, but the apparent consolidation of the system may 
hide an institutional drift. Social investments, at the core of the Finn-
ish model, have been cut and this risks undermining the country’s ‘high 
road’ to competitiveness. As stressed above, Germany has experienced a 
peculiar trend in structural reforms. Some social standards devaluation 
began well before the Great Recession and reﬂ ect a selective investment 
strategy in a context of ﬁ scal stability. Finally, the Czech Republic has 
seen the parallel development of austerity measures, on one hand, and 
selective investment and pro-growth reforms, on the other. All in all, the 
four ideal-typical reform paths proposed in Section 2 (social standards 
devaluation, social standards improvement, selective investment and 
protectionism) have been useful for assessing complex structural reform 
paths involving both devaluation and some measures to boost invest-
ment and/or consumption.
With regard to the key factors shaping structural reforms in Europe, the 
report provides evidence of the complex interplay between domestic and 
supranational stimuli. The role of path-dependency is evident in the case 
of Finland, where the old institutions of a national coordinated market 
economy have survived. Italy is another case where old institutions (and 
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paradigms) largely survived in the context of austerity: both devalua-
tion and improvements have been implemented across the board, with 
limited proof of any paradigm shift. In such a context, some institution-
al features of the varieties of capitalism under scrutiny seem crucial to 
shaping structural reform decisions. We have spoken, with reference to 
the Czech Republic and Ireland, of the role of FDI in shaping policymak-
ers’ agenda on R&D and education reforms. The need to attract foreign 
investors has led to ongoing investment in knowledge and to the safe-
guarding of tax beneﬁ ts to provide incentives for private sector invest-
ment. The role of exports in the country’s economic model seems to be 
another key dimension. Countries more open to international trade and 
with an export-led economic model have invested more in knowledge 
and R&D, with the exception of Finland. These traits of national political 
economies need further investigation.
While supranational constraints are particularly important in this phase, 
national policymakers have been seen to have some room for manoeu-
vre: the Czech Republic, Italy and Germany provide evidence of a more 
pro-growth orientation of left-wing parties or coalitions including left-
wing parties.
As far as the EU is concerned, the study of ﬁ ve EU members has provided 
evidence of increased EU constraints on national decision-makers. This 
is particularly the case of those countries subject to some form of condi-
tionality: Ireland under the MoU and Italy under the Securities Markets 
Programme. The European Semester has also shaped some reforms, as 
we have seen with regard to the Czech Republic and Finland. But the 
EU has also activated other tools to inﬂ uence structural reforms: the 
structural funds and the Youth Guarantee programme have had a role in 
promoting (and ﬁ nancing) active labour market policies (for example, in 
Ireland, Italy and the Czech Republic), and public sector reforms (Czech 
Republic).
What is more, the EU strategy with regard to social, economic and la-
bour market reforms has not been stable, but has changed over time. 
While the neoliberal paradigm remains dominant, its actual implemen-
tation has changed slightly, with more ﬂ exible implementation of ﬁ scal 
consolidation and more explicit priority given to structural reforms since 
2014.
Conclusion
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